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A list of definitions is provided here for terms that are used in this thesis. 
Acquired limb absence: The result of the removal of a whole or part of a limb, 
through injury or a surgical procedure. 
Amelia/Meromelia: See congenital limb absence. 
Amputation: See acquired limb absence. 
Amputee: Individuals with limb absence often refer to themselves as amputees, 
and sometimes ‘amps’. Whilst an amputation is associated with acquired limb 
absence, individuals with congenital limb absence may also sometimes refer 
to themselves as amputees too. It may be difficult to determine whether this 
is because an individual’s congenital absence is due to congenital 
amputations (such as being caused by amniotic band syndrome) or whether 
this is more due to an individual’s identification with a dominant ‘amputee’ 
population. 
Artificial limb: See prosthesis. 
Attachment site: Part of the individual’s body that the prosthesis attaches to. This is 
commonly the terminating end of a residual limb that is then covered by an 
enveloping socket. 
Bilateral: Involving two sides. In the context of this study, bilateral limb absence is 
an absence of both upper limbs or an absence of both lower limbs. A person 
may also be a bilateral prosthesis user in the sense that prostheses are worn 
on both sides. 
Congenital limb absence: Individuals that were born with partial or complete limb 
absence. This may be due to congenital amputations during pregnancy or a 
limb never developing. Undeveloped limbs may later be fully or partially 
amputated to better accommodate a prosthesis. 
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Disability: The definition used in this thesis is that of the World Health 
Organization’s (WHO) International Classification of Functioning, Disability 
and Health (ICF), which states that disability is: ‘an umbrella term for 
impairments, activity limitations, and participation restrictions, denoting the 
negative aspects of the interaction between an individual (with a health 
condition) and that individual’s contextual factors (environmental and 
personal factors).’ (World Health Organization, 2011, p. 303). 
Function: Function is often used within the amputation and prosthetics research 
literature to refer to physical abilities, such as being able to walk or grasp 
objects with a prosthesis, and often this is distinguished from cosmesis or 
other things that a prosthesis can afford. However, function is a broad term 
and the definition in this thesis is that of the WHO’s ICF (2011) which 
considers ‘all human functioning’ to fit with their categories of ‘body 
functions and structures’, ‘activities’ and ‘participation’ (p. 5). 
Limb absence: The absence of a whole or part of an upper or lower limb. This term 
is used to collectively refer to both individuals with acquired limb absence 
and those with congenital limb absence. 
Limb difference: An inclusive term describing any difference in a limb that differs 
from the norm of a regular biological limb. In this thesis, limb difference may 
refer not just to difference due to the partial or complete absence of a limb, 
but also the inclusion of a prosthesis that similarly means that a person’s limb 
is different from the ‘norm’. 
Limb-fitting centre: A place where individuals go to be fitted with a prosthesis. 
These locations are often the practices of prosthetists that include rooms for 
consultations as well as workshops for the fabrication and adjustment of 
limbs. These centres may be attached to public or private hospitals, they may 
be independent rehabilitation services centres, or they may be attached to a 
particular prosthesis manufacturer. 
Limb loss: See acquired limb absence.  
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Prosthesis/prosthetic: An artificial part of the body. In the context of this thesis, a 
prosthesis is delimited to a whole or part of an upper or lower limb (part or 
an entire arm or leg), and so excludes other prostheses (breast implants, 
artificial eyes, heart valves, etc). The term artificial limb (sometimes 
shortened to limb where it is apparent what is being referred to) is used 
interchangeably with this. 
Prosthesis user: An individual that makes use of an artificial limb. 
Prosthetic solution: A term employed to refer to the particular prosthesis an 
individual uses. Some individuals refer to the part that acts as an artificial 
substitute for a biological limb as the prosthesis, referring separately to the 
socket, liners, or other parts or materials. This term is used in this thesis to 
refer to all aspects of the artificial limb. 
Prosthetist: An individual who practises the design and fitting of prostheses for 
individuals with limb absence. Sometimes referred to as a rehabilitation 
professional. 
Residual limb: The distal part of the body to which a prosthesis is commonly 
attached. Residual limbs vary in location, length, and mass. Residual limbs 
may change in mass over time, particularly soon after an amputation. 
Residual limbs are often referred to as stumps by individuals with limb 
absence. 
Socket: The part of the prosthesis that connects to the individual, often partially or 
completely enveloping a residual limb to give a firm attachment. 
Stump: An informal term for a residual limb, particularly following amputation. 
Unilateral: Involving one side. In the context of this study, unilateral limb absence is 
the absence of either one upper or lower limb, or part of one of these. Since 
unilateral limb absence is the most common form of limb absence, it is not usually 
explicitly mentioned when describing the characteristics of a sample of individuals 
with limb absence, whereas bilateral is used to foreground and differentiate 




‘Just Normal’: A Grounded Theory of Prosthesis Use – Philip Jefferies 
A significant number of individuals around the world live with limb absence and use 
prosthetic technologies to assist and enable them in various ways about their lives. 
The aim of this study was to enhance our understanding of prosthesis use through 
exploring a core concern of prosthesis users and to develop a theory of how this 
concern is managed. By employing classical Grounded Theory methodology (Glaser, 
1978, 1992, 1998, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2009, 2011a, 2013, 2014; Glaser & Strauss, 
1967), data from 24 participants that used upper- and/or lower-limb prostheses 
were collected and analysed. These individuals were interviewed using a flexible, 
unstructured interviewing style. In addition to interviews, data from internet 
forums, blogs and autobiographical texts were also included, all of which were 
analysed in accordance with the established procedures of Grounded Theory 
methodology, which included open and selective coding, theoretical memoing, and 
theoretical sampling. 
A main concern of being ‘just normal’ emerged through analyses, and the data 
were further explored in order to develop a theory of the resolving of this concern. 
Just normal is the condition of being and living in ways that persons variously 
perceive are ‘about right’; that are sufficient, that are fair, and generally how things 
‘ought to be’ for them, as they see it. Three modes of just normal were identified, 
which were: preserving being just normal, where persons manage threats to their 
ability to be this way, redressing to just normal when this is judged to be lacking 
and so persons bring themselves into alignment with this, and persevering with just 
normal, accounting for how persons keep going with living just normally and 
despite difficulties that may accompany this. 
The theory provides a novel perspective on users of prostheses and elucidates the 
benefits and challenges of living with artificial limbs, as persons make efforts to live 
in ways they see as fitting with what they consider is just normal. Such an 
understanding has the potential to facilitate multidisciplinary teams involved in the 
appropriate fitting of prostheses, inform goal-setting in rehabilitation, and how to 
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manage further consultations. The theory links to existing research and goes 
beyond this in providing an understanding of what compels prosthesis users to act 
in particular ways. It also has the transferrable potential to related areas of living 




Chapter 1: Introduction 
Nobody realizes that some people expend tremendous energy 
merely to be normal. (Camus, 2010, p. 80) 
Just Normal 
The core contribution that this thesis presents is the theory of ‘just normal’. This is 
an ‘emergent’ theory, developed through a Grounded Theory analysis of accounts 
of prosthesis users. The theory addresses a concern that is central in the area of 
prosthesis use, indicating how persons are continually engaged in resolving this 
concern, and how they do so in varied ways. This resolving theory is argued to 
provide a means of usefully interpreting a range of scenarios in the substantive 
area of prosthesis use and beyond. 
The main concern and central concept in the theory is ‘just normal’. ‘Just normal’ is, 
in essence, the quality of something being ‘about right’ – that something can be 
judged by a person as fair and sufficient. This also means it is ‘good enough’, and 
can be judged by knowing about the variability of the thing such that persons know 
whether a particular occurrence of something is acceptable. So when persons seek 
to be ‘just normal’, or to live ‘just normally’, this may involve living in ways that 
they perceive are right, reasonable, fair or sufficient, and this is informed by 
knowing how this could be otherwise. Being ‘just normal’ is not necessarily about 
optimising one’s circumstances, but instead that a regular day-to-day being is in 
accordance with how a person views things at least ought to be; that it shouldn’t be 
‘too much to ask’ to be able to be a particular way. 
The thesis discusses the theory of ‘just normal’ in detail, exploring the variation in 
this core pattern, and in doing so elaborates how ‘just normal’ can be considered a 
pervasive concern for prosthesis users. Once fully understood, a theory of ‘just 
normal’ can be used to helpfully interpret a number of important contexts within 
prosthesis use. 
Ten chapters document the development of this study and help to substantiate the 
claim that ‘just normal’ is a pervasive pattern in the accounts of prosthesis users 
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involved in this study, and that this is an important and useful discovery for the 
area of prosthesis use. Over the course of these chapters, the work underpinning 
this is elaborated through exploring what is known about limb absence and 
prosthesis use, leading to the rationale for the research study and the proposal for 
the development of the theory, the explication of the methods and processes 
involved in this, followed by a discussion of the main emergent theoretical product 
of the thesis, which is then explored and critically evaluated. A specific breakdown 
of each chapter is now presented, enabling an overview of the content and purpose 
of each. 
Thesis Conspectus 
In chapter two, the substantive area of prosthesis use is introduced. This involves a 
discussion of the nature of prosthetic limbs and the contexts within which 
individuals might use them. The extant literature on the psychosocial aspects of 
limb absence and prosthesis use is identified and discussed, leading to the rationale 
for the present study. 
In chapter three, the Grounded Theory methodology that guided the research is 
introduced. An overview of different epistemological and methodological versions 
of Grounded Theory is given before a justification and elucidation of the use of 
‘classical’ Grounded Theory methodology. This chapter also involves discussion of 
issues of preconception, emergence, and openness to theoretical discoveries. 
In chapter four, the application of the methodology is described and design 
decisions are elucidated. In particular, data collection and analysis procedures are 
elaborated. The sources of data involved in the study are identified and explanation 
is given to how these were interrogated. This chapter also involves contending with 
ethical considerations and managing the development of the emerging theory. 
In chapter five, the main concern and resolving core category of the theory of just 
normal are outlined and are examined in the context of prosthesis use. 
Chapters six, seven and eight involve discussion of the categories that substantiate 
the theory, where the key conceptual processes of Preserving, Redressing, and 
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Persevering are explored with reference to illustrative accounts. These chapters are 
dedicated to discussing each of these in turn. 
In chapter nine, the significance of the emergent theory is explored, foregrounding 
the key discoveries of the study. Prominent aspects of the theory are discussed in 
relation to areas highlighted in the research literature and scenarios indicated to be 
important by prosthesis users themselves. The theory is also explored in terms of 
how it compliments and extends other conceptual and theoretical accounts in the 
area of prosthesis use and beyond, and how fresh insights are brought to these 
discussions. 
Concluding this thesis, chapter ten provides a critical discussion of the theory of just 
normal. This involves evaluation against the criteria of Grounded Theory 
methodology, which include the need to ensure good workability, relevance, fit, 
and modifiability. In conjunction with chapter nine, this enables a judgement of the 
worth of the theory. Within this chapter, proposals are also given for further 
development of the theory and subsequent investigation in the substantive area 
and beyond.  
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Chapter 2: Prosthetics 
Introduction 
In this chapter, the area of prosthesis use is introduced and explored. This involves 
a review of the research literature that has investigated limb absence and 
prosthesis use and illuminates the varied qualities of artificial limbs and their users. 
This review leads to the rationale for the empirical work that was undertaken in 
this study. 
Limb Absence and Prostheses 
Prostheses are adaptive and enabling entities used by a significant number of 
individuals worldwide. The word itself has roots in Greek, meaning ‘an addition’, 
from ‘pros’ meaning towards and ‘tithenai’ to place (Oxford University Press, 2014). 
A prosthesis can therefore take any shape or form in providing something that 
would not normally be there. In particular, this thesis is concerned with limb 
prostheses. These are used by individuals who have an absence of one or more 
limb regions, and so the ‘addition’ that the prosthesis provides is for an absent arm 
or leg, or part of these. 
The aetiology of limb absence itself is varied, but can be categorised as acquired or 
congenital absence. In acquired limb absence, persons have lost a limb, and this 
may be due to trauma (e.g., motor vehicle or work-related incidents, warfare 
injuries, self-harm), dysvascularity (e.g., diabetes mellitus or cardiovascular 
disease), infections (gangrene), tumour or cancer, or neurological disorders (polio, 
diabetic neuropathy). In many of these cases, limb loss due to amputation is a life-
saving surgical procedure. In cases of congenital limb absence, a limb may be lost 
prior to birth due to complications in pregnancy (e.g., amniotic band constriction) 
or to teratogenic agents (e.g., thalidomide). However, congenital limb absence may 
also be due to a lack of limb development, possibly also due to teratogenic agents 
or to genetic variation, and so congenital cases can be more inclusively defined as 
the absence of a limb at birth. Persons with either form of limb absence are often 
informally referred to, and often refer to themselves, as ‘amputees’, despite 
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including congenital cases in their number where a limb was not lost (a case in 
point being the Amputee Coalition of America, a national organisation supporting 
individuals who “have experienced amputations or were born with limb 
difference”, Amputee Coalition of America, 2014). Additionally, individuals may be 
born with limb difference and later undergo related amputations, such as in cases 
where medical professionals suggest a prosthesis could provide greater physical 
function than is currently possible for an individual due to their limb difference. For 
clarity, in this thesis I refer to ‘persons with limb absence’ as the collective term, 
and refer to acquired or congenital limb absence where relevant. 
The incidence of limb absence varies globally, though is hard to precisely quantify 
due to the varying causes of limb absence as well as many countries not keeping 
adequate records of hospital amputations (Esquenazi, 2004). A report in 2005 
indicated that 1 in 190 people live with limb loss in the US, and estimates suggest 
this currently summates to two million individuals, a figure projected to reach 3.6 
million by 2050 (Ziegler-Graham, MacKenzie, Ephraim, Travison, & Brookmeyer, 
2008). In the UK, statistics concerning limb absence are not currently collected, but 
the United National Institute for Prosthetics & Orthotics Development (2013) 
reported that nearly 6,000 individuals with limb absence were referred to 
prosthetic centres in 2010-11. Limb absence statistics are also not officially 
collected in the Republic of Ireland, but a national representative organisation 
recently claimed that there are over 5,000 individuals living with limb absence in 
this country (Amputee Disability Federation Ireland, 2014). 
Acquired limb absence is the most prevalent form of limb absence. The Limbless 
Statistics report for 2010-11 indicates that only 4.8% accounted for congenital 
cases in the UK, but this report is limited to those referred to centres for prostheses 
and so does not capture individuals with limb absence who may not opt for a 
prosthesis (United National Institute for Prosthetics & Orthotics Development, 
2013). However, reports from the US appear to reflect this rate, where it is claimed 
that 158,000 individuals per year undergo amputations (Dillingham, Pezzin, & 
MacKenzie, 2002), compared to only 1,500-4,500 children per year who are 
reported to possess congenital limb difference (Smith, 2006). There is also a 
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difference in the prevalence of the region of limb absence. Smith (2006) reports 
that less than half of cases of children born with congenital limb absence in the US 
involve the absence of a lower limb, while Ziegler-Graham et al. (2008) estimate 
that lower-limb absence accounts for approximately 65% of individuals in the US 
who have lost a limb. In the UK, the Limbless Statistics report indicates that 91% of 
individuals referred to prosthetic centres in 2010-11 had lower-limb absence 
compared to only 7.9% with upper-limb absence. Of those with lower-limb 
absence, 1% were individuals with congenital limb absence and 79% had acquired 
limb absence. Of the upper-limb absence referrals, 49% had acquired limb absence, 
while 26% possessed congenital limb absence (the remaining percentages were 
classified as “no data” United National Institute for Prosthetics & Orthotics 
Development, 2013). While limb absence tends to be broadly distinguished within 
the literature as ‘upper’ or ‘lower’, there are varying levels of limb absence within 
these, and figure 1 below indicates the common categories of these. 
The leading cause of upper-limb loss is trauma (92%) while for lower-limb loss 
vascular complications account for the majority of cases (78%) (Ziegler-Graham et 
al., 2008). Individuals with lower-limb loss are typically in their 60s or older at the 
time of amputation (Roberts et al., 2006), whilst individuals with upper-limb loss 
tend to be younger (60% are between 21-60 years old) (Dudkiewicz, Gabrielov, 
Seiv-Ner, Zelig, & Heim, 2004). Older age means individuals with lower-limb loss 
often present with other co-morbidities, such as diabetes and cardiovascular 
disease, leading to poor survival rates following an initial amputation (Dillingham, 
Pezzin, & Shore, 2005; Icks et al., 2011). Furthermore, it has been claimed that 
whilst trauma-related amputations may be decreasing, the increasing prevalence of 
obesity, which is linked to diabetes, and the growing global population living to 
older ages, linked to dysvascular conditions, mean that the incidence of amputation 
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Figure 1. Common categories of limb absence 
 
For individuals with limb loss, the prescription of a prosthesis is the most common 
form of intervention in their rehabilitation. Individuals with congenital limb 
absence may use prostheses, with some being fitted in early childhood and others 
taking them up later in life. Depending on the aetiology of a person’s limb absence, 
artificial limbs may be obtained in order to restore function or to provide function if 
this part of the body was never present. The discussion now moves to 
consideration of the varied nature of artificial limbs. 
Prosthetics 
Prosthetic limbs are artificial extensions of the body that take the place of absent 
biological limbs. They can be dynamic entities, operated by the user through bodily 
movements, manual adjustment, or myoelectric signals, or they can be static, non-
mechanical appendages. Prostheses tend to be wholly removable, through 
decoupling oneself from a suspension socket or releasing a strap, though some 
 
Common levels of amputation 
1. Forequarter amputation 
2. Shoulder disarticulation 
3. Transhumeral (above elbow) 
4. Elbow disarticulation 
5. Transradial (below elbow) 
6. Wrist disarticulation 
7. Metacarpal/digit amputation 
8. Hindquarter amputation/hemi-pelvectomy 
9. Hip disarticulation 
10. Transfemoral (above knee) 
11. Knee disarticulation 
12. Transtibial (below knee) 
13. Ankle disarticulation 
14. Foot/partial foot amputation 
 
Categories of congenital limb absence 
Transverse – Defined according to the last 
remaining bone segment present 
Longitudinal – A reduction or absence within 
the long axis of the limb, but with the 
possibility of normal distal skeletal elements 
For further detail see Day (1992). 
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individuals undergo osseointegration, where a limb is surgically connected to bone. 
However, osseointegration may only involve the bonding of an anchor which an 
artificial limb can then attach to, meaning a prosthesis is also largely removable. 
Fundamentally, a prosthetic limb has the scope to include all manner of ancillaries 
that may be mechanical or non-mechanical in their nature and that may resemble 
or may not resemble a biological limb. An illustration of the variety of 
contemporary prostheses is given in Figure 2 below. 
 
Figure 2. Collage of various contemporary prostheses1 
 
In recent years, prosthetic technology has developed significantly. The 
incorporation of new materials such as carbon fibre and metal alloys has enabled 
artificial limbs to become lighter and more durable, requiring less energy and 
exertion on the part of the user. Many limbs now afford more degrees of freedom 
in movement, consequently affording new levels of dexterity. The shape and form 
of limbs has also developed, and it is now possible to have cosmetic covers made 
for limbs that make them virtually indistinguishable from their biological 
                                                     
1
 Images were sourced via Google images and had been labelled for re-use. 
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counterparts, matching skin tone, texture, veins, hairs, fingerprints, tattoos, or 
other custom requirements. Such improvements in prosthetic technology have the 
potential to enable individuals far more than in decades prior. 
The industry itself has also seen a significant shift in value and operation. In 1990, 
the orthotics and prosthetics industry reportedly generated $700m in the US 
(Pederson, 2001), of which artificial limbs constitute a significant proportion. A 
decade later, the industry was estimated to be valued at $2.6bn (Hanger 
Orthopedic Group, 2012). In a market analysis white paper, McGimpsey and 
Bradford (2010) reported that the US prosthetics market alone drew $1.45bn in 
2006, and they estimated this would reach $1.85bn by 2013. Together with 
accompanying services, this market in the US alone is valued at $5bn annually. 
Industrial competition and user expectations have been said to be the drivers of 
technological developments both in Europe and the US, leading to the formation of 
several multinational organisations that manufacture and supply prostheses 
(McGimpsey & Bradford, 2010). Today there are also a vast number of small 
companies in Europe and the US that provide prosthetic services and innovating 
new technologies that continue to improve prosthetic provision (McGimpsey & 
Bradford, 2010). 
Despite the prevalence of suppliers and the multitude of varieties of prostheses 
currently being produced, there are restrictions on what is obtainable. Developing 
countries often have limited resources with which to provide public prosthetic 
provision, meaning many people may not be able to access prosthetic limbs at all, 
or if they can, these will be fairly basic (Bigelow et al., 2004; Strait, 2006; Swartz & 
MacLachlan, 2009). In other parts of the world, restrictions are also found, often 
relating to financing limbs. Quoting a study estimating costs for service members 
suffering limb loss in the American military, the Limb Loss Task Force/Amputee 
Coalition (2012) report that five-year prosthesis-related costs for a person with a 
lower-limb amputation would be around $230,000, while for upper-limb this would 
be approximately $117,000, and for multiple limb loss costs could be as high as 
$450,000. While the US military may provide financial assistance to obtain 
prostheses, civilians in need of artificial limbs may be dependent on third-party 
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insurers or healthcare plans, which can often limit availability or options when a 
limit is set on what may be funded (Biddiss, McKeever, Lindsay, & Chau, 2011; Limb 
Loss Task Force/Amputee Coalition, 2012). McGimpsey and Bradford (2010) report 
that financiers also tend to question the need for more expensive limbs if cheaper 
alternatives appear to suffice. Explaining the meaning of differently priced limbs, 
the authors state that between $5,000-7,000 will afford a lower-limb prosthesis 
enabling an individual to become a ‘community walker’, while upwards of $20,000 
will enable walking ‘without having to think about every step’ (p. 11). In a Canadian 
study, Biddiss et al. (2011) surveyed upper-limb prosthesis users about the costs 
incurred by their prostheses (n=109), finding that of the 40 individuals that incurred 
costs themselves, a prosthesis cost an overall average of $9,986 per limb, where 
electric prostheses cost an average of $12,156, body-powered prostheses cost 
$4,532 and passive/static limbs cost $6,694. 
In addition, a prosthesis is rarely associated with a singular cost, but rather is 
ongoing as limbs require replacements, repairs and modifications. Nair, Hanspal, 
Zahedi, Saif and Fisher (2008) found that individuals with transfemoral amputations 
required an average of 0.96 new prostheses, 3.27 new sockets, 2.31 major repairs, 
3.36 component changes and 21.85 minor repairs over a 10-year period, while 
individuals with transtibial amputations required an average of 1.4 new prostheses, 
2.9 new sockets, 3.2 major repairs and 14.1 minor repairs. Biddiss et al. (2011) 
reported that individuals using upper-limb prostheses incurred an average yearly 
maintenance expense of $3,179 (range = $100-$10,000). While Nair et al. suggest 
that the relatively recent introduction of ‘modular’ prostheses that improve repair 
and adjustment processes may go some way towards reducing costs through 
avoiding total replacement, these figures indicate that prosthetic provision is a 
costly affair, and the projection of a rise in limb absence prevalence indicates that 
supporting this is a growing concern for healthcare providers and third-party 
reimbursers alike. 
Like difficulties in quantifying limb absence, it is similarly hard to know the number 
of individuals using prosthetic limbs due to the variety of ways that artificial limbs 
can be acquired. Prostheses can be prescribed and obtained under healthcare 
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systems in countries that have such systems, but in Ireland this is typically only for 
the first prosthesis, and thereafter any prostheses must be paid for by other 
means, unless the individual qualifies for a HSE medical card, though limb absence 
itself is not an automatically qualifying criterion (HSE, 2013). Individuals may also 
be referred or refer themselves to private prosthetic centres that obtain or 
manufacture limbs themselves, and they may also contact manufacturing 
companies as direct customers. In addition to this, there are growing reports of 
individuals fabricating their own limbs, given the right materials, expertise and 
motivation (e.g., ABC News, 2014; BBC, 2013), though these tend to be less 
sophisticated. In the next section, the discussion moves to an exploration of the use 
and non-use of prostheses. 
Prosthesis Use and Non-Use 
Not all persons with limb absence will use a prosthesis. Statistics quantifying 
proportions of persons that use and do not use prostheses are largely non-existent, 
though in a market analysis white paper, McGimpsey and Bradford (2010) claim 
that of the nearly two million individuals in the US that are estimated to be living 
with limb absence, 1.5 million are users of prostheses, leaving a quarter of a million 
that are not. However, the authors do not account for how this number was arrived 
at and so these figures must be considered with caution. Reviewing the research 
literature, Raichle et al. (2008) note that reported prosthesis usage ranges between 
27-56% across studies for individuals with upper-limb amputations and 49-95% for 
lower-limb amputations, though the equivocality of studies limits further 
interpretation. 
One way of assessing prosthesis use can be through considering rates of successful 
fittings, or in other words, the proportion of individuals referred to prosthetic 
services that could actually be fitted with a prosthesis. Fletcher et al. (2001) report 
rates across studies of 50-90% for successful fittings in older patients with lower-
limb amputations. The incidence of failure to fit has been attributed to health-
related issues (such as cardiovascular disease), cognitive debility and unsuitable 
residual limb sites. Fletcher et al. (2001) also found that successful lower-limb 
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fittings could be predicted by marriage, a younger age, living with other family 
members, and a more distal limb absence. However, two main limitations of 
quantifying rates of usage in this way are that the data do not include those who do 
not seek a prosthesis in the first place or who are not referred for fitting. In 
addition, a successful fitting does not necessarily denote ongoing usage. 
In exploration of ongoing usage, rates of retention and abandonment have been 
investigated in the literature. Biddiss and Chau (2007a) reviewed studies 
undertaken in the previous 25 years in upper-limb use, determining in the 
paediatric population that an average of 45% of body-powered limbs would be 
rejected compared to 35% of electric limbs. In an adult population, rejection rates 
of 26% for body-powered limbs and 23% for electric limbs were reported. In their 
subsequent study (n=242), Biddiss and Chau (2007b) determined that a fifth of 
those surveyed in Canada had abandoned their limb, and that origin of limb 
absence, being female, and having bilateral limb absence were factors implicated in 
predicting rejection. Those rejecting their limbs expressed dissatisfaction with the 
state of available technology, specifically in comfort and physical function. The 
researchers also determined that shorter time to fitting (see also, Biddiss & Chau, 
2008) and being involved in the selection of the limb could facilitate ongoing use. 
Rates of abandoning lower-limb prostheses are similarly significant, with one study 
(n=396) reporting 33% of Canadian individuals with lower-limb absence abandoned 
their prosthesis in the first year, with 16% having never worn it (Gauthier-Gagnon, 
Grisé, & Potvin, 1999). The researchers indicated that many reject a limb on the 
basis that it has a poor fit, but will not have sought adjustments even when centres 
were close and appointments to do so are ‘readily available’. Commenting on this, 
Schaffalitzky (2010) suggests that this indicates a tendency to abandon a limb 
regardless of fit, and so other factors may be at play. In the US, Dolezal, Vernick, 
Khan, Lutz and Tyndall (1998) surveyed lower-limb prosthesis users (n=142), linking 
non-use to being black (African-American), lower levels of education, 
unemployment, comorbidity of diabetes mellitus and peripheral vascular disease, 
use of a walking frame, and the experience of phantom limb pain. 
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Furthermore, the use of a prosthesis varies in terms of how often a person uses a 
prosthesis they have been fitted with. Khoury (1983) surveyed individuals with 
acquired upper- and lower-limb absence in Jordan (n=100) and determined that out 
of the 56 fitted with a prosthesis, 32 ‘always’ wore their limb, 11 wore it 
‘occasionally’ and 13 never wore their limb. Khoury found that being male, 
educated, and having a lower-limb prosthesis were factors most associated with 
use reported as ‘always’ or ‘occasionally’. Those who elected not to use their limb 
or used it infrequently claimed that it was ‘heavy’, ‘painful’, ‘poor fitting’ or 
‘unoperational’. In the US, Pezzin, Dillingham, MacKenzie, Ephraim and Rossbach 
(2004) reported that 94.5% of individuals with acquired upper- and lower-limb 
absence (n=935) that they surveyed used a prosthesis and used it ‘extensively’, 
entailing at least 71 hours per week (+/- 41 hours). Over three-quarters of their 
sample reported that they were generally satisfied with their prostheses, but just 
under a third expressed dissatisfaction with comfort. The authors also identified 
that a shorter period between amputation and prosthesis fitting was associated 
with frequency of usage and satisfaction with the limb. 
Frequency of usage has also been explored separately for upper- and lower-limb 
prosthesis use. In terms of the frequency of upper-limb use, Davidson (2002), noted 
a large discrepancy in the literature, reporting ‘regular’ use that ranged between 
35-81%. While Davidson did not elaborate on a definition of regular, an earlier 
study involving the author reported that 37% of upper-limb users surveyed in 
Australia (n=27) were ‘regular’ users, explained as using a prosthesis for eight or 
more hours per day (Jones & Davidson, 1995). In addition, this study indicated 
18.5% were ‘occasional’ users, which involved wearing the limb only for ‘specific 
purposes, such as to check the fit, for social occasions or for shopping’ (p. 439). The 
researchers state that the significant variation in usage rates could not be 
adequately explained by other extant research, but in her survey of Australian 
upper-limb prosthesis users (n=70), Davidson (2002) determined that 56% wore 
their prosthesis ‘once in a while’ or ‘never’, and found that there was a moderate 
association between the amount of time spent wearing a limb and satisfaction with 
the limb. In a further study in the US, 107 upper-limb prosthesis users were 
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surveyed about their limb usage, the results of which indicated that having a 
proximal amputation and lesser level of phantom limb pain were associated with 
increased usage of an artificial limb (Raichle et al., 2008). 
The frequency of lower-limb prosthetic usage has also been measured under 
varying criteria in the literature. Bilodeau, Hébert and Desrosiers (2000) reported 
that 81% of surveyed individuals in Canada (n=65) wore their prosthesis on a daily 
basis, of which 89% wore their limb for six or more hours per day. Lesser use was 
associated with older age, being female, possessing a wheelchair, level of physical 
disability, cognitive impairment, poorer perceptions of health and dissatisfaction. 
However, Kauzlarid, Kauzlarid and Kolundžid (2007) have reported an average of 5.5 
hours use for individuals they surveyed in Croatia (n=46), which ranged between 3-
10 hours. Greater frequency of usage, however, has been correlated in the US with 
younger age, employment, being married, distal amputation, amputation due to 
trauma, and a lack of phantom limb pain (Raichle et al., 2008). 
These studies indicate that the incidence of prosthesis use, including the frequency 
of use to complete abandonment for both upper- and lower-limb prosthesis users, 
varies significantly, and while some predictors of these have been put forward, they 
have not been adequately accounted for in the literature (Biddiss & Chau, 2007a; 
Raichle et al., 2008). Given that a prosthesis can be viewed as a fundamentally 
enabling technology, or ‘adjuvant in daily-life activities’ (Vasluian et al., 2013, p. 1), 
as it provides a level of function for persons with limb absence that they would not 
otherwise have without a limb, being without a prosthesis indicates being deficient 
of this function. A lack of use or ‘underutilisation’ in this way has been interpreted 
by some as potentially problematic (e.g., Gunawardena, Seneviratne, & Athauda, 
2004; Schaffalitzky, Gallagher, MacLachlan, & Wegener, 2012), and could lead to 
tension when considerable funds from another party have been committed to 
financing a limb. 
There is therefore a pressing need to develop a richer picture of prosthesis use in 
order to understand what may account for variable usage. Doing so involves a 
deeper understanding of the person that uses a prosthesis, and this involves 
exploring factors related to adaptation and adjustment to the loss of a limb as well 
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as to the acquisition and adjustment to an artificial limb (Gallagher, Desmond, & 
MacLachlan, 2008). 
The Psychosocial Aspects of Limb Absence 
Acquired Limb Absence 
The loss of a limb can be a life-changing event, and the research literature details a 
diverse and widespread range of extensive effects that are associated with 
acquired limb absence, affecting the person at the physical, psychological and 
social functioning level (Desmond et al., 2012; Fishman, 1949; Horgan & 
MacLachlan, 2004; Williamson, Schulz, Bridges, & Behan, 1994). In particular, the 
permanent loss of a limb means that persons experience functional impairment, 
finding themselves physically restricted (Schoppen et al., 2003), they may 
experience pain as a consequence of the amputation (Ephraim, Wegener, 
MacKenzie, Dillingham, & Pezzin, 2005), alterations to their body image (Gallagher, 
Horgan, Franchignoni, Giordano, & MacLachlan, 2007), their self-concept (Grobler, 
van Schalkwyk, & Wagner, 2006), their sexuality and relationships with others 
(Geertzen, Van Es, & Dijkstra, 2009; Ide, 2004; Williams et al., 2004), and 
restrictions from community and wider social participation (Gallagher, O’Donovan, 
Doyle, & Desmond, 2011; Medhat, Huber, & Medhat, 2010). 
Studies have also indicated the presence of depressive symptomatology post-
amputation in 13-35% of cases (Atherton & Robertson, 2006; Desmond & 
MacLachlan, 2006; Gallagher & MacLachlan, 2000a). In particular, the two years 
following an amputation are reported to present an elevated risk (Horgan & 
MacLachlan, 2004; Singh et al., 2009), but some have noted that depression may 
remain elevated for up to 10 years after the loss of a limb (Bodenheimer, Kerrigan, 
Garber, & Monga, 2000). The experience of depression in limb absence has also 
been found to be linked with other negative psychosocial outcomes that include 
elevated general anxiety (Atherton & Robertson, 2006; Donovan-Hall, Yardley, & 
Watts, 2002; Livneh, Antonak, & Gerhardt, 1999; Singh et al., 2009), body image 
anxiety (Fisher & Hanspal, 1998; Rybarczyk, Nyenhuis, Nicholas, Cash, & Kaiser, 
1995), feelings of vulnerability (Behel, Rybarczyk, Elliott, Nicholas, & Nyenhuis, 
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2002), diminished self-esteem (Donovan-Hall et al., 2002; Dunn, 1996), phantom 
limb pain and neuroticism (Badura-Brzoza et al., 2006), general pain (Ide, 2011), 
lower levels of perceived health and social support (Ikram, Iqbal, Bin Ayez, Zaheer, 
& Matee, 2014; Rybarczyk, Dnyenhuis, Nicholas, Alioto, & Blair, 1992; Senra, 2013), 
greater self-awareness of impairment, lower identification with the impairment 
(Senra, 2013), and lower perceived quality of life (Asano, Rushton, Miller, & 
Deathe, 2008; Rybarczyk et al., 1995). 
Anxiety is also commonly associated with the loss of a limb, and similarly this is 
prominent soon after the loss of a limb, but is not generally found in long-term 
follow-ups (Horgan & MacLachlan, 2004). Atherton and Robertson (2006) 
determined that 30% of individuals undergoing amputations (n=67) exhibited 
symptoms of anxiety in their post-operative period, which they note is significantly 
elevated compared to a 12.6% morbidity rate observed in the general adult UK 
population (Crawford, Henry, Crombie, & Taylor, 2001). Anxiety in individuals with 
limb loss has also been linked to body image disturbance (Atherton & Robertson, 
2006; Breakey, 1997b; Fisher & Hanspal, 1998), activity limitation (Callaghan, 
Condie, & Johnston, 2008) and self-consciousness (Atherton & Robertson, 2006; 
Donovan-Hall et al., 2002). 
There are also indications that levels of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) in 
individuals experiencing the loss of a limb are higher than that which may be found 
in the general population. Desmond and MacLachlan (2006) surveyed ex-service 
members in the UK with lower-limb loss and found that 24.6% of their sample 
(n=582) reported symptoms of PTSD. In a similar survey, Doukas et al. (2013) found 
14.8% of their sample of US service members (n=324) deployed in the recent 
conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq and who underwent unilateral lower-limb 
amputations screened positive for PTSD, with 10% for bilateral limb amputations. 
Similarly, Graham, Parke, Paterson and Stevenson (2006) surveyed persons who 
had suffered upper- and lower-limb loss as a result of terrorism in Northern Ireland 
(n=75) and found that 67% reported symptoms of PTSD. PTSD is normally 
associated with limb loss due to trauma more than any other aetiology (Cavanagh, 
Shin, Karamouz, & Rauch, 2006), and remains a concern if individuals experiencing 
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traumatic limb loss do not receive appropriate intervention. Cheung, Alvaro and 
Colotla (2003) contrasted individuals with lower-limb amputations (n=25) to those 
with upper-limb amputations (n=30), determining those with upper limb 
amputations displayed significantly higher rates of depression and PTSD 
symptomatology. The researchers suggest the extensive significance of the hand in 
the relationship with the world (self-care, self-expression, communication, 
occupation performing) means that the loss of an upper-limb impacts on the 
individual across numerous different domains, arguably having an overall greater 
impact on the person. 
Individuals with acquired limb absence are also often reported to express 
dissatisfaction with their body image (Breakey, 1997a; Foort, 1974; Holzer et al., 
2014; Parkes, 1975). In addition to being linked with depression (Breakey, 1997b; 
Rybarczyk et al., 1992, 1995) and general anxiety (Breakey, 1997b; Fisher & 
Hanspal, 1998), dissatisfaction with one’s body image after the loss of a lower limb 
has been associated with lower levels of self-esteem (Breakey, 1997b), lower levels 
of life satisfaction (Breakey, 1997b), as well as reduced levels of physical activity 
(Tatar, 2010; Wetterhahn, Hanson, & Levy, 2002) and elevated phantom limb 
sensations (Alessandria, Vetrugno, Cortelli, & Montagna, 2011). 
Quality of life has also been a focus for research involving persons who have lost a 
limb, but a recent systematic review on this was unable to come to a definitive 
conclusion reportedly due to poor study quality (Sinha & van den Heuvel, 2011). 
However, a follow-up study conducted by the review authors found that quality of 
life was lower in their sample of lower-limb amputees (n=605) than for the general 
population, and that higher quality of life was associated with employment status, 
use of a prosthesis, non-use of assistive devices other than a prosthesis (canes, 
crutches), lower residual limb and phantom pain, and other comorbidities (Sinha, 
van den Heuvel, & Arokiasamy, 2011). A further study involving individuals with 
lower-limb absence (n=368) similarly found that a higher quality of life was 
associated with an absence of comorbidities, lower residual limb and phantom limb 
pain, employment status and non-use of assistive devices other than a prosthesis, 
but also found associations with younger age, lower functional restriction, greater 
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adjustment to limitation, increased social adjustment and lower restrictions in 
athletic ability (Sinha, van den Heuvel, & Arokiasamy, 2014). 
It is clear from these studies that there is a range of significant deleterious 
consequences associated with the loss of a limb. However, the loss of a limb is not 
necessarily a wholly negative experience. There are numerous cases of individuals 
using the experience to ‘take stock’ or to ‘turn their life around’ (e.g., Rigsby, 2009; 
Sabolich & Sabolich, 2001), and some achieving more than they consider they 
would have had they not lost a limb (Gow, MacLachlan, & Aird, 2004, p. 156). 
Collectively, these positive aspects can be termed ‘post-traumatic growth’ (see 
Calhoun & Tedeschi, 2006) and the research literature includes a number of studies 
that have determined positive experiences associated with the loss of a limb 
(Couture, Desrosiers, & Caron, 2011; Gallagher & MacLachlan, 2000b; Livingstone, 
van de Mortel, & Taylor, 2011). For example, in Oaksford, Frude and Cuddihy’s 
(2005) study, ten out of twelve of their participants with lower-limb absence 
described positive aspects about the loss of their limb, including an increased 
appreciation of the kindness of others, being more likely to help others out, an 
increase in patience, and a better appreciation of disability. In a study by Saradijian, 
Thompson and Datta (2008), men with upper-limb loss (n=11) indicated high self-
worth through taking pride in self-perceived positive adjustment, considering their 
capabilities and their abilities to perform tasks and fulfil roles that were important 
to them. In Gallagher and MacLachlan’s (2000b) study (n=104), nearly half of their 
participants considered that something good had happened as a result of their 
amputation, and that an ability to find positive meaning was associated with higher 
ratings of physical capability and health, lower levels of athletic activity restriction, 
and higher levels of adjustment to limitation. It is therefore important to consider 
that while the loss of a limb may be an unwelcome life experience often leading to 
undesirable physical and psychosocial consequences, there is also the potential for 
positive change. 
Current perspectives in rehabilitation have also acknowledged the potential impact 
of sociodemographic, clinical and psychosocial variables that may vary from person 
to person and that may interact with factors associated with the loss of a limb (T. R. 
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Elliott, Kurylo, & Rivera, 2002; Livneh, 2001). In exploration of sociodemographic 
and clinical factors, researchers have assessed the impact of age, gender, cause and 
level of amputation, and the experience of related pain. In terms of age, 
researchers have suggested that older individuals fare better after the loss of a 
limb, inferred through lower reported levels of depression (Phelps, Williams, 
Raichle, Turner, & Ehde, 2008; Williamson et al., 1994), anxiety (Livneh et al., 1999; 
Singh et al., 2009) and PTSD (Phelps et al., 2008). Horgan and MacLachlan (2004) 
note that some studies have failed to find an association between age and 
depression following the loss of a limb (Behel et al., 2002; Rybarczyk et al., 1992), 
but interpret a broader age effect as a reflection of older persons being more 
accepting of undesirable bodily changes at their age than younger individuals, who 
may not respond as well to activity restriction and changes in appearance. 
Potential gender differences have also been investigated, though no differences 
have been observed in terms of depression (Behel et al., 2002; Phelps et al., 2008; 
Rybarczyk et al., 1995), quality of life (Asano et al., 2008; Gallagher & Maclachlan, 
2004; Rybarczyk et al., 1995), or post-traumatic growth (Phelps et al., 2008). 
However, Phelps et al. (2008) reported that women displayed greater PTSD 
symptomatology in their study of individuals (n=83) with predominantly lower-limb 
absence (97.4%), though the researchers noted this was not a robust finding and 
further research is warranted to clarify this. 
Associations between limb loss aetiology and psychosocial outcomes have also not 
been found across measures of depression and PTSD (Kratz et al., 2010; Phelps et 
al., 2008; Rybarczyk et al., 1995), quality of life (Gallagher & Maclachlan, 2004; 
Rybarczyk et al., 1995), or post-traumatic growth (Phelps et al., 2008). However, 
some have indicated that chronic diseases such as diabetes or PVD may lead to 
more negative outcomes (Demet, Martinet, Guillemin, Paysant, & André, 2003; 
Desmond & MacLachlan, 2006; Williams et al., 2004). For instance, in a study of 
individuals with upper and lower limb amputations (n=539), Demet et al. (2003) 
found that amputations due to vascular conditions were significantly associated 
with social isolation. Similarly, in a study of individuals with lower-limb loss (n=89) 
Williams et al. (2004) discovered that limb loss due to non-traumatic injury was 
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associated with lower levels of social integration. However, in these cases it is 
difficult to determine the extent to which poorer outcomes following an 
amputation are due to the loss of a limb or related to an underlying medical 
condition related to the amputation. For instance, in a sample of individuals 
undergoing lower-limb amputations (n=68), Singh et al. (2009) found that the 
incidence of co-morbidities upon rehabilitation admission significantly predicted 
depressive symptomatology 2-3 years later, and this underscores the importance of 
taking existing conditions into account when considering limb loss outcomes. 
The level of limb loss could also be expected to have some bearing on psychosocial 
adjustment to acquired limb absence, given that a greater loss of limb extremity 
could be equated with greater functional impairment, as well as increased energy 
expenditure when using a prosthesis (Waters, Perry, Antonelli, & Hislop, 1976). 
However, studies have failed to find an association between level of limb absence and 
psychosocial adjustment (Asano et al., 2008; Behel et al., 2002; Breakey, 1997b; Unwin, 
Kacperek, & Clarke, 2009; Williamson et al., 1994). Coffey (2012) notes that this is in 
keeping with the literature on chronic illness and disability which has repeatedly 
indicated that measures of physical impairment tend to be poor predictors of well-
being (e.g., Albrecht & Devlieger, 1999; Maybury & Brewin, 1984). 
The potential impact of pain associated with an amputation has also received 
attention in the literature. One kind of pain that is experienced following limb loss 
is phantom pain (the experience of pain in anatomical areas no longer present), 
and is said to occur in 50-80% of amputations (Flor, 2002). In addition, the 
incidence of pain in a residual limb is also reported frequently in the literature 
(Ephraim et al., 2005; Gallagher, Allen, & MacLachlan, 2001; Williams et al., 2014), 
and studies have indicated the risk to adjustment posed by both forms of 
amputation-related pain (Jensen et al., 2002; Murray & Fox, 2002; Pell, Donnan, 
Fowkes, & Ruckley, 1993; Whyte & Carroll, 2004). In further exploration of this, 
Whyte and Carroll (2004) surveyed individuals who had lost an upper or lower limb 
(n=315), determining that psychosocial dysfunction was significantly predicted by a 
greater intensity and duration of associated pain. Similarly, Gallagher et al.’s (2001) 
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study of individuals with lower-limb amputations (n=104) indicated that the 
incidence of associated pain was linked to lower levels of adjustment to limitations. 
In addition to sociodemographic and clinical factors, researchers have also explored 
the impact of psychosocial variables following the loss of a limb. This literature has 
determined significant associations between greater adjustment following the loss 
of a limb and greater perceived social support (Asano et al., 2008; Unwin et al., 
2009; Williamson et al., 1994), social activity (Asano et al., 2008), perceived control 
(Dunn, 1996), sense of coherence (Badura-Brzoza, Matysiakiewicz, Piegza, Rycerski, 
& Hese, 2008), public self-consciousness (Atherton & Robertson, 2006; Williamson, 
1995), self-esteem (Breakey, 1997b; Donovan-Hall et al., 2002; Varni & Setoguchi, 
1996), lower perceived vulnerability (Behel et al., 2002), perceived social stigma 
(Rybarczyk et al., 1995), and greater levels of hope (Unwin et al., 2009) and 
optimism (Dunn, 1996). 
In addition to this, the influence of differing coping strategies following the loss of a 
limb has also received attention. Livneh et al. (1999) explored the use of differing 
coping strategies in a sample of individuals with acquired limb absence (n=61), 
determining that an ‘active problem-solving’ approach to coping with stress (e.g., 
planning, positive reinterpretation, seeking social support) was associated with 
positive psychosocial adjustment, whereas emotion-focused coping (e.g., venting 
emotions, social withdrawal, self-criticism) and disengagement were linked with 
psychological distress and a poorer acceptance of disability. This was somewhat 
reflected in the study by Desmond and MacLachlan (2006), who sampled war 
veterans who had lost a lower limb (n=796) and determined that stressor avoidant 
strategies were associated with psychological distress and poor adjustment, while 
greater problem-solving was associated with lower-levels of depression and 
anxiety, and seeking social support with lower levels of depression and greater 
social adaptation. Similar results were observed by Desmond (2007) in her 
subsequent study of older males with upper-limb loss (n=138). 
In a related investigation, Dunn (1996) explored salutary responses to upper- and 
lower-limb amputation (n=138) and found that individuals finding positive meaning 
about their limb loss tended to fare better than those unwilling or unable to see a 
22 
 
‘silver lining’. Specifically, finding meaning in the loss of a limb was associated with 
lower levels of depression, while perceiving greater control over disability and 
dispositional optimism were linked to lower levels of depression and greater self-
esteem. Dunn suggested that realising positive aspects could then help individuals 
to better come to terms with their situation – that it would foster ‘acceptance’ and 
help persons adjust. 
A more recent series of studies have explored differential responding to limb loss 
through employing Self-Regulation theory (Coffey, Gallagher, & Desmond, 2014a, 
2014b; Coffey, Gallagher, Desmond, & Ryall, 2014a; Coffey, Gallagher, Desmond, 
Ryall, & Wegener, 2014b; Dunne, Coffey, Gallagher, & Desmond, 2014). Self-
regulation is the process of monitoring and managing discrepancies persons 
perceive between desired and actual states of being, and according to the Dual 
Process model (Carver & Scheier, 2000) employed in these investigations, these 
discrepancies are said to be managed through tenaciously pursuing goals (goal 
assimilation) or through engaging in flexible goal adjustment (goal 
accommodation). In this literature, the loss of a limb is considered to constitute a 
discrepancy that persons are prompted to manage. Using this approach, Coffey, 
Gallagher and Desmond (2014b) determined that individuals with lower-limb loss 
(n=64) who had stronger tendencies toward goal pursuit on rehabilitation 
admission would display higher physical and psychological quality of life six months 
after discharge, whereas those with stronger tendencies toward goal adjustment 
would later report lower ratings of perceived disability and higher environmental 
quality of life. In a related inquiry with individuals with lower-limb loss (n=98), 
Coffey, Gallagher, Desmond and Ryall (2014a) found that goal pursuit was 
significantly associated with positive affect, while goal adjustment was inversely 
associated with negative affect, indicating the utility of goal adjustment strategies 
in buffering against difficulties during rehabilitation. Moreover, these studies 
indicate that different goal management strategies influence subjective well-being 
in different ways. In exploration of the value of particular goals, Coffey, Gallagher 
and Desmond (2014a) determined that individuals with lower-limb loss (n=64) 
rated goals associated with interpersonal relationships, independence, and well-
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being, as most important to them, and that the importance of goals was predictive 
of decreased depressive symptomatology and social adjustment at six months post-
discharge. In addition, higher goal disturbance was predictive of poorer general and 
social adjustment, while greater goal disengagement was predictive of decreased 
depressive symptomatology. Coffey et al. note that while goal attainment could 
continue to be a focus for rehabilitation, it is also important to consider the utility 
of promoting goal disengagement for inaccessible or unrealistic goals following the 
loss of a limb. 
Overall, this body of research indicates that the loss of a limb can be a highly 
impactful life experience and may lead to a range of negative outcomes, though 
there is also the potential for positive post-traumatic growth. Studies have also 
indicated that a number of sociodemographic and clinical factors impact an 
individual’s adjustment to the loss of a limb, and specifically there are indications 
that poorer outcomes are associated with a younger age, an existence of co-
morbidities, and the experience of associated pain. There are also a range of 
psychosocial factors indicated to interact with adjustment outcomes, and the 
appraisal and encouragement of engaging differing goals and coping strategies may 
be advantageous to different individuals, depending on their particular 
circumstances post-limb loss. This research enables an overview of the psychosocial 
aspects of acquired limb absence, but a more complete picture of limb absence 
also involves considering the potentially unique features of congenital limb 
absence. 
Congenital Limb Absence 
In contrast to limb absence due to limb loss, congenital limb absence has received 
markedly less attention in the research literature. In addition to this group being 
much smaller, congenital limb absence means that a person is born without the 
limb present, and so this imbalance of research may be because there is not an 
instance of loss and a resulting adjustment period to investigate. However, a 
number of studies have indicated difficulties that persons with congenital limb 
absence may yet experience as a result of an absent limb. 
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One study described children aged 8-16 with congenital limb absence (n=140) who 
reported higher perceptions of stigma and social exclusion than for children with 
other chronic health conditions (Ylimäinen, Nachemson, Sommerstein, Stockselius, 
& Norling Hermansson, 2010). Linked to this, studies have also suggested that 
adolescents with congenital limb difference possess a greater risk of depression, 
anxiety and diminished self-esteem (Varni, Rubenfeld, Talbot, & Setoguchi, 1989; 
Varni & Setoguchi, 1996). However, as development of a self-concept in youth 
occurs with the absence of a limb, it is integrated into a perceived body image and 
thus persons are said to develop a hardiness toward their limb difference which 
may not be so prominent in those experiencing limb loss (Rybarczyk & Behel, 2008). 
Additionally, as persons grow up experiencing stigma they are said to adapt to this 
and become better at managing further occurrences, thus becoming more resilient 
in adulthood (Frank, 1988). In some exploration of this, Krantz, Bolin and Persson 
(2008) investigated stigma-handling in women with congenital upper-limb absence 
(n=unspecified; multiple data sources), determining that individuals would employ 
a variety of strategies in managing daily life which were focused on controlling the 
information about one’s status that deviated from the normality of a particular 
situation. These helped to avoid the ‘micro-stresses’ resulting from the reactions of 
others when limb difference was realised and so protected personal well-being. 
One recent study explored the ‘life situation’ of Swedish individuals with congenital 
upper- and lower-limb absence (Sjöberg, Nilsagård, & Fredriksson, 2014). The 
researchers found few differences between this group (n=117) and the greater 
population in terms of health and activity levels and pursuits, though more were in 
employment than the national average. Additionally, a greater proportion of 
participants were in professions requiring theoretical expertise and fewer in 
construction or manufacturing professions than the national average. These 
findings link to that of Michielsen, van Wijk and Ketelaar (2011) who found that 
Dutch adolescents with limb difference (n=56) did not differ from a control group in 
terms of reported quality of life, but did report less activity diversity, in particular 
lower social and skill-based activity. This suggests that individuals with congenital 
limb absence may avoid pastimes and vocations they feel their limb difference does 
25 
 
not dispose them to, and indicates potential activity and employment-related 
barriers associated with an individual’s limb difference. 
This modest literature gives an overview of some of the unique features of 
congenital limb absence and indicates potential differences between this and that 
of acquired limb absence. In particular, growing up without a limb may mean that 
individuals are better able to manage difficulties posed by limb absence that may 
be experienced by both groups, such as the stigma of disability, and for individuals 
with congenital limb absence, the potential difficulties involved in the loss of a limb 
will not be experienced. However, in terms of individuals coming to use prostheses, 
there is no reason to suspect differences between these groups, and indeed, the 
literature does not tend to separate these groups in analyses. 
In summary of this section, the research reports a range of significant psychosocial 
features that accompany the absence of a limb. A number of factors are linked to 
the loss of a limb and to a consequent adjustment process, and these may be 
important to attend to in rehabilitation contexts. While persons with congenital 
limb absence may not experience adjustment to limb absence in the same way that 
those with acquired limb absence do, difficulties may instead be experienced at 
more formative stages in their lives. However, a number of factors conspire to 
complicate an integrated understanding of the psychosocial aspects of limb 
absence. In particular, definitions of psychosocial adjustment vary between studies 
or remain undefined (see Horgan & MacLachlan, 2004; Murray, 2010, p. 82) and 
heterogeneity in design and poor study quality limits the consolidation of some 
areas of this knowledge (Mckechnie & John, 2014; Sinha & van den Heuvel, 2011). 
Despite this, a broad overview is enabled of the varied psychosocial features of 
limb absence and thus some of the features relevant to an understanding of users 
of prostheses. In addition to this, the adoption of an artificial limb has also been 
associated with a range of psychosocial phenomena in itself, and this constitutes 
the following discussion. 
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The Psychosocial Aspects of Prosthesis Use 
The literature exploring the psychosocial adjustment to the use of a prosthesis and 
prosthesis use outcomes is relatively small compared to that which has investigated 
the psychosocial aspects of limb absence. However, many studies that explore limb 
absence either include prosthesis users or combine users and non-users in samples 
without recognising the importance of investigating the potential impact of an 
artificial limb in itself. 
For instance, a prosthesis enables or enhances function towards that which a 
biological limb would otherwise provide, and thus the use of a limb will have an 
impact on a person who would otherwise be without this, across a range of 
domains (e.g., see Cook & Miller, 2012; MacLachlan & Gallagher, 2003). To consider 
the framework of the WHO’s International Classification of Functioning, Disability 
and Health (ICF; 2011), the enabling properties of a prosthesis can be considered to 
support individuals across all three domains of body functions and structures, 
activities, and participation. For example, a prosthesis can provide a sense of bodily 
completeness and support gendered identities (Murray, 2008), it can facilitate 
activities of daily living, as well as support socialising and participation, and 
gesturing and partaking in rituals (Hall & Orzada, 2013; Samuelsson, Toytari, 
Salminen, & Brandt, 2012). Furthermore, studies exploring lower-limb prosthesis 
use have determined that an improved quality of life is associated with use of a 
prosthesis but not with other assistive technologies, indicating that there is 
something distinctive about the use of an artificial limb compared to use of other 
aids such as walking sticks or crutches (Sinha et al., 2014, 2011). 
However, there may also be associated issues with the use of a prosthesis, given 
that it is an imperfect substitute for a biological limb. For example, issues of 
comfort and limitations in physical functioning often leave individuals disappointed 
with the state of the technology, and this has been linked to device abandonment 
(Biddiss & Chau, 2007b). The weight of carrying an artificial limb can also fatigue 
individuals quicker than without one (Whyte & Niven, 2001), and in addition, 
persons using prostheses tend to remain in a cycle of follow-up consultations in 
order to maintain the technology they use, which may be undesirable 
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consequences of the adoption of an artificial limb. There may also be differences in 
how the technology is received, for instance, where a prosthesis could be viewed as 
embodying independence and ability, while others may consider that a limb 
embodies disability because it reminds or represents what they are unable to do 
without it (Gow et al., 2004). There are also indications from the research that a 
view of oneself may be antagonised by the use of a mobility aid, as generally these 
are associated with stigma of aging and disability (Aminzadeh & Edwards, 1998). It 
might therefore be inferred that the use of a lower-limb prosthesis in particular 
may in fact contribute to a negative self-perception if considered this way. 
However, use of upper- or lower-limb prostheses can help to minimise the 
difference between a visual perception of oneself prior to limb loss compared to 
post-limb loss, and also reduce a perception of feeling different from others, in turn 
reducing concern of social situations and the perceptions of others (Gallagher & 
MacLachlan, 2001; Lundberg, Hagberg, & Bullington, 2011; Saradjian et al., 2008), 
as well as fostering bodily confidence and engagement in situations more likely to 
reveal the body (Donovan-Hall et al., 2002). 
A prosthesis may therefore have a significant impact on a body image construct 
(Rybarczyk & Behel, 2008), and for some who consider themselves incomplete 
without the presence of all limbs, a prosthesis can support a more complete body 
image. However, users of prostheses who have experienced limb loss are said to 
possess three body images: one intact body prior to limb loss, one minus the limb, 
and one with a prosthesis fitted (Breakey, 1997b; Shontz, 1974), and these may not 
be easily reconcilable. Furthermore, for individuals with congenital limb absence, 
the introduction of a prosthesis may be antagonistic to a body image they consider 
is already satisfactory (Batty, McGrath, & Reavey, 2014; Gallagher et al., 2008, p. 3).  
One study determined moderate to high negative correlations between body image 
disturbance and overall lower-limb prosthesis satisfaction (n=44), indicating the 
importance of a limb that the individual feels is worth using (Murray & Fox, 2002). 
The researchers in this study also found that along a satisfaction sub-scale, lower 
physical functional satisfaction was correlated with higher levels of body image 
disturbance in men, whereas for women, physical function, aesthetics and weight 
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were correlated with body image disturbance. The researchers suggest that 
prosthesis use for women was important for sustaining a sense of femininity, 
where appearance and weight could be important factors in a limb, in addition to 
the physical function that both genders were found to value. 
Investigations of body image tend to have focused more on individuals with lower-
limb difference, but Rybarczyk and Behel (2008) suggest that because upper-limb 
prostheses arguably afford poorer physical function and bodily aesthetics 
compared to the capacities of lower-limb prostheses, these may be linked to lower 
satisfaction and so have implications for body image. Also, a lower-limb prosthesis 
can be worn underneath clothing, intentionally or unintentionally disguising usage, 
and so enabling social presentation much like others, but this option is not easily 
afforded to users of upper-limb prostheses (Desmond, 2007). Dudkiewicz et al. 
(2004) provide some corroboration of this in their study of upper-limb users (n=45), 
where over 70% reported dissatisfaction with their prosthesis that related to 
functional and cosmetic complaints, and this can be contrasted to the study by 
Webster et al. (2012) who found lower-limb users were generally satisfied with 
their prostheses (n=87; p. 1499). Furthermore, in a comparison of users of PVC 
upper-limb prostheses and more realistic silicone limbs (n=17), Carroll and Fyfe 
(2004) found little difference in body image scores but noted that those using the 
PVC limbs had significantly higher depression scores, highlighting the impact of 
aesthetics in upper-limb prostheses and that the impact of a prosthesis may be 
influenced by the type of limb used. 
Finally, a number of psychosocial factors have been associated with improved 
adjustment to an artificial limb, including greater social support, lower social 
discomfort, lower perceived social stigma, the meaning attributed to and the 
acceptance of an amputation, and lower public self-consciousness (Gallagher & 
MacLachlan, 1999, 2001; A. Hill, Niven, & Knussen, 1995; Livneh et al., 1999; 
Rybarczyk et al., 1995; Williamson, 1995; Williamson et al., 1994). Individual 
differences across these factors may impact how well a prosthesis is integrated into 
an individual’s life. 
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Considering these features and this literature, it appears that the use of a 
prosthesis can be both enabling and problematizing, and there may be aspects of 
both in usage depending on the type of limb used and predisposing factors of the 
individual themselves. An important critique of the literature is that researchers 
investigating prosthesis-related outcomes often do not attempt to control for 
important factors associated with the absence of a limb, such as those noted in the 
previous section (e.g., associated pain) and which may impact an adjustment to a 
limb or ongoing usage. Similarly, those focusing on limb loss outcomes do not tend 
to control for prosthesis use either, and from the studies above a prosthesis may be 
expected to have a bearing on particular psychosocial outcomes. For example, 
studies indicate the impact of a prosthesis on a body image construct, and 
Donovan-Hall et al. (2002) note the relationship of a perceived body image to 
psychosocial outcomes including depression, anxiety and self-esteem. Thus when 
studies refer to ‘amputees’ or persons with limb absence then later describe these 
individuals as users of prostheses (e.g., Miller, Speechley, & Deathe, 2001; Unwin et 
al., 2009; Williamson et al., 1994), or involve prosthesis users and persons with limb 
absence that do not use prostheses and do not separate these groups in analyses 
(e.g., Demet et al., 2003; Hagberg & Brånemark, 2001; Pell et al., 1993), or do not 
specify whether sampled individuals used prostheses or not (e.g., Richardson, 
Glenn, Horgan, & Nurmikko, 2007; Thompson, Sayers, Reid, Underwood, & Bell, 
1995; Wegener, Mackenzie, Ephraim, Ehde, & Williams, 2009), the literature 
becomes difficult to bring together and discrepancies in findings difficult to account 
for. 
However, from the literature reviewed in this section and the previous one, it is 
clear that limb absence is the basis for a range of physical and psychosocial 
consequences for the individual, just as a prosthesis may be associated with such 
outcomes. However, it is difficult to disentangle the particular effects of each, or 
how one may interact with the other, and this is complicated by studies that do not 
control for such variables, or do not make clear what they consider adjustment to 
involve, and which hamper efforts to consolidate research findings. Linked to this 
literature however, and providing some clarity about the experience of limb 
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absence and prosthesis use, a further body of research has sought to examine the 
perspectives of prosthesis users and to explore the meaning of these experiences 
as prompted by the individuals themselves. 
Perspectives of the User and Meaning in Prosthesis Use 
Recently, researchers have argued for the need for a more person-centric approach 
to understand limb absence and prosthesis use. Tending to employ qualitative 
methodologies, existing studies taking this approach explore the experiences of 
limb absence and prosthesis use from the perspective of the individuals 
themselves, as well as providing the meanings individuals ascribe to the use of their 
prostheses, and their perceptions of disability and health. In a systematic review of 
this literature, Murray and Forshaw (2013) synthesised the outcomes of fifteen 
qualitative studies (de Oliveira Chini & Boemer, 2007; Gallagher & MacLachlan, 
2001; Hamill, Carson, & Dorahy, 2010; Liu, Williams, Liu, & Chien, 2010; Livingstone 
et al., 2011; Lundberg et al., 2011; Murray, 2004, 2005, 2009; Oaksford et al., 2005; 
Reed, 2004; Saradjian et al., 2008; Senra, Oliveira, Leal, & Vieira, 2012; Sjödahl, 
Gard, & Jarnlo, 2004; Sousa, Corredeira, & Pereira, 2009). The framework derived 
from this review is used to explore this literature and is extended with other 
related and more recent studies that use this approach. 
The first area identified by Murray and Forshaw (2013) concerns the emotional 
response to limb loss and the prospect of prosthesis use (de Oliveira Chini & 
Boemer, 2007; Gallagher & MacLachlan, 2001; Hamill et al., 2010; Liu et al., 2010; 
Livingstone et al., 2011; Murray, 2004; Reed, 2004; Saradjian et al., 2008; Senra et 
al., 2012; Sjödahl et al., 2004). Individuals are said to feel overwhelmed, as well as 
vulnerable and afraid. Thoughts about their bodies ranged from experiencing it as 
‘strange’ to ‘mutilated’ (p. 1137). Persons experiencing limb loss also express 
worries about the future and in particular a concern about becoming a burden to 
others. A further study by Norlyk, Martinsen and Kjaer-Petersen (2013) adds to 
these findings, where the researchers identified that the loss of a leg meant that 
individuals (n=12) experienced a drastically altered ‘lifeworld’, described as the 
tacit aspects of existence that many of us take for granted. Perceived reductions to 
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freedom and independence were considered as indications of a ‘shrinking’ 
lifeworld, and these led to despair and a ‘painful sense of loss’ (p. 8). Feelings of 
inferiority were also experienced when individuals found they were not able to do 
some of the same things as before, though the researchers note that individuals 
also expressed a hope of eventually regaining ‘lost territory and personal 
independence’ (p. 4). Norlyk et al. also gave consideration to the disruption of 
identity, identifying that the loss of a limb could leave individuals feeling ‘alienated’ 
from their bodies, and without the same connection to the world as they had prior 
to their loss. The researchers also indicate that individuals lost their ability to live 
through their bodies ‘unreflectively’, but that a prosthesis enabled the prospect of 
feeling ‘whole again’. Ligthelm and Wright (2014) also identified a range of 
responses to the loss of an upper-limb (n=8), from outright ‘denial’ to an apparently 
emotionless ‘pragmatic assessment… with a view of ‘going on’’ (p. 103). The 
researchers indicate that these may be variously experienced at some stage as 
coping mechanisms and that acceptance was a process that was seldom found to 
come quickly in this context. 
Studies included in Murray and Forshaw’s review also involved discussion of the 
shock and disappointment experienced by individuals when they first saw the 
prosthesis they were coming to use, and this reminded them of the reality of their 
new physical circumstances. Early prosthesis use was then met with mixed 
reactions, as persons considered what a prosthesis could enable as well as how 
they could be limited by their new limbs, and often dependent on them. In a 
related study involving internet discussions with prosthesis users (n=155), Murray 
(2013) described that individuals tend to come to prosthesis use with little 
knowledge and experience of the area, and so are dependent on professionals to 
support and guide them in this regard. Interviews with lower-limb amputees (n=8) 
conducted by Ostler, Ellis-Hill and Donovan-Hall (2014) similarly foregrounded the 
uncertainty indicated by individuals about their circumstances and their future 
following an amputation, and when this related to their rehabilitation they sought 
information from similar others and direction from rehabilitation professionals (see 
also Sjödahl, Gard, & Jarnlo, 2008). The findings from these studies foreground the 
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unanticipated and disorienting experiences encountered following the loss of a 
limb and when facing prosthesis use, and which underscore the importance of 
appropriate information and support. 
The second area identified in Murray and Forshaw’s framework includes studies 
that have explored an adjustment process (Gallagher & MacLachlan, 2001; Hamill 
et al., 2010; Liu et al., 2010; Oaksford et al., 2005; Saradjian et al., 2008; Sjödahl et 
al., 2004). Linking to the previous area, persons are said to initially not know what it 
means to be ‘disabled’ and this prompts difficulties in coping after the loss of a 
limb. Without more comparable experiences, the loss of a limb would sometimes 
be equated to bereavement and this would help individuals accept their 
circumstances. Social comparisons were often engaged to enable a more positive 
appraisal of an individual’s own circumstances, particularly when considering those 
perceived to be worse-off. Individuals also recognised the impact of their own 
outlook and sought to adjust this through trying to adopt and maintain a more 
positive attitude and a sense of optimism in order to improve their well-being. 
In subsequent research, Norlyk et al. (2013) found that as time went on, rather 
than ‘getting things under control’, a sense of loss would initially escalate as 
persons encountered more domains of life affected by the loss of their limb. For 
instance, a person who has lost an arm may perceive difficulties with two-handed 
tasks, but as more and more of these are encountered as persons go about their 
lives there may be a cumulative effect. This might also be extrapolated to 
prosthesis use, where persons may later discover some of the limitations that 
accompany a limb (e.g., fatigue through carrying a limb, finite charge in powered 
limbs, etc.) and these may also have a detrimental impact on the individual. 
However, persons may similarly discover unexpected benefits through the use of a 
prosthesis, such as acquiring a lower-limb prosthesis primarily for mobility, but 
then realising the benefit of others not recognising limb difference when wearing 
the limb under clothing. Additionally, in a study by Mathias and Harcourt (2014) 
involving female lower-limb prosthesis users (n=4), the researchers found that their 
participants initially harboured worries about dating and meeting potential 
partners following the loss of a limb, assuming others would consider them inferior 
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to ‘normal’ women when they discovered their limb difference. However, they later 
discover their assumptions to be too severe or that issues did not exist at all, much 
to their relief. These studies foreground an unsettled period following the loss of a 
limb and when beginning prosthesis use where persons may encounter unexpected 
difficulties but similarly discover benefits to their new circumstances or that 
perceived difficulties are non-existent or less intense. 
The third area in Murray and Forshaw’s framework involves studies that have 
identified the importance of family and friends in adjustment and coping (de 
Oliveira Chini & Boemer, 2007; Gallagher & MacLachlan, 2001; Hamill et al., 2010; 
Liu et al., 2010; Livingstone et al., 2011; Oaksford et al., 2005; Saradjian et al., 2008; 
Senra et al., 2012; Sousa et al., 2009). These relationships were described as 
cherished by individuals and largely supportive, but had the potential to be sources 
of negativity if there was conflict in decision-making relating to rehabilitation. A 
sense of ‘normalcy’ and ‘humanness’ was found to be strongly influenced by the 
perceptions and actions of others close to the individual, such that if individuals 
found they were treated normally by friends and family, they would feel more 
normal themselves. Related to this, persons tended to indicate the desire to 
continue relationships in the manner prior to the loss of a limb, and more 
importantly that despite an acquired limb difference, others perceived and treated 
them as they were before. In their subsequent study, Ligthelm and Wright (2014) 
also identified the importance of close family members in supporting a person 
following the loss of a limb. In particular, they noted that individuals would 
describe relying heavily on others early on for support and assistance while they 
discovered how to adapt to their circumstances and become more independent. 
Other studies have also focused on the importance of an individual’s relationships 
with rehabilitation professionals. For instance, research has indicated that 
rehabilitation processes are perceived as most beneficial when the individual feels 
that they are conducted in a way they perceive is personal and that they are 
appropriately involved (Elnitsky, Latlief, Andrews, Adams-Koss, & Phillips, 2013; 
Sjödahl et al., 2008). An earlier study by Nielsen, Psonak and Kalter (1989) also 
found that individuals would change prosthetists if they perceived their input into 
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the session had been ignored, and who linked the perceived resolution of problems 
to longer consultations and greater patient involvement (n=21). Nielsen et al. 
reported these findings more than 25 years ago, but research has since indicated 
that individuals continue to perceive problems in their interactions with 
rehabilitation professionals and with the quality of communication in particular 
(Sjödahl et al., 2008). Murray (2013) also found that patients often described 
engaging passively early on, realising only later that there were invitations or 
opportunities to engage as a partner in decision-making processes, though the gap 
in skill and knowledge was perceived to have hindered this anyway. Individuals in 
this study also described being unsure about what was appropriate to discuss with 
the prosthetist, and were further deterred when the prosthetist themselves did not 
use a prosthesis. These difficulties in communication with the prosthetist led to 
greater online interaction with perceived similar others as individuals put forward 
their issues for comments and discussed those of others. Over time, Murray 
describes that some would determine what and how to convey their needs, but for 
others, this remained an ongoing issue, relating to persons feeling they were not 
valued or listened to. When disparities emerged between expectations and results, 
an adversarial interaction could then develop where individuals did ‘battle’ with 
prosthetists in order try to get what they needed or wanted done, going ‘armed’ 
with information in order to try to get ‘demands’ met. 
Murray (2013) also identified that individuals would tend to encouraged others 
who had posted about problems with their consultation experiences to try to talk 
or continue to try to talk to their prosthetist about these. Those offering advice 
tended to come from a position where they themselves had overcome initial 
difficulties and had reached a point where satisfying communication was possible. 
Individuals would sometimes persevere with difficult relationships, but if difficulties 
persisted, switching prosthetists in search for a more compatible relationship was 
an alternative. Norlyk et al. (2013) also explored the relationship between patient 
and professional and described that while individuals received practical support 
from professionals about how to physically function, they felt alone and ‘left to 
themselves’ in dealing with their altered circumstances. Similar comments were 
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provided by Sjödahl et al. (2008) from their interviews with lower-limb prosthesis 
users (n=11), who described individuals expressing the importance of both 
‘technical’ information from professionals as well as empathetic and emotional 
support. Together, these studies indicate the importance of the quality of 
relationships with those close to the individual. These latter studies also indicate 
the additional importance of good holistic working relationships with rehabilitation 
professionals as well as the utility of support groups. 
The fourth area in the framework relates to the social experience of limb absence 
and prosthesis use (Gallagher & MacLachlan, 2001; Murray, 2005, 2009; Saradjian 
et al., 2008; Sjödahl et al., 2004; Sousa et al., 2009). Studies exploring this discuss 
the importance of prostheses and clothing in enabling some control over the 
reactions of others towards an individual’s limb difference. For instance, when an 
individual’s limb difference was noticed by others, reactions could be stigmatising, 
and the perceptible discomfort of others could prompt use of a prosthesis or to 
disguise an artificial limb in order to avoid this. A prosthesis could be perceived as a 
means to enable greater social participation, and to enable it in ‘normal’ ways, as 
persons considered they would be perceived and treated differently depending on 
their use of a prosthesis and whether others recognised their limb difference. This 
could sometimes lead to ongoing concealment in order to be treated ordinarily and 
to be seen foremostly as a person rather than being defined by disability. However, 
such concealment meant that difficulties could arise later with those naïve to 
another’s limb difference when ongoing contact increased chances of discovery, or 
necessitates this, such as with romantic or intimate partners. While initial 
concealing can help individuals avoid being defined by their limb difference, 
revealing could become a source of anxiety as contact increases. Persons would 
sometimes feel they harboured a ‘secret identity’ and that they were torn between 
deception and the potential undesirable consequences of the ‘truth’. 
In their subsequent study, Mathias and Harcourt (2014) found that young female 
lower-limb prosthesis users described an increasing confidence with their 
prosthesis as being linked to the likelihood of revealing their limb difference to 
others. In addition, individuals described choosing not to conceal their prosthesis 
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use when dating, using their upfront-ness about their limb difference as a means to 
screen potentially unsuitable partners. However, even when becoming more 
confident about their prosthesis use, individuals would continue to flexibly switch 
between concealing and revealing, depending on the situation and if they were 
experiencing difficult ‘moments’ (p. 397). Krantz et al. (2008) provide further detail 
to this in their study involving women with congenital upper-limb absence 
(n=unspecified; multiple data sources). The researchers discovered that individuals 
employed a range of stigma-handling strategies that managed the information 
about themselves in order to avoid deviating from what the researchers termed an 
‘ad-hoc normality’ – or what persons consider is normal for a given situation. Thus 
persons would conceal their limb difference depending on whether delaying 
potential discovery was adaptive to the context. At other times, when it was judged 
that interaction with others in a specific situation would be ongoing and the 
importance of their limb difference would not be expected to incur stigma, or 
would quickly diminish over time, individuals would be more likely to reveal their 
limb difference. 
These studies foreground the benefits and challenges of living with prostheses in 
the context of social participation. The value of prostheses in enabling ‘normal’ 
social interaction is evident, but so too are the difficulties persons experience in 
managing concealment and an ongoing risk of discovery. The use of a prosthesis, 
which may inadvertently disguise an individual’s limb difference, may be perceived 
as useful for avoiding stigma, but may also lead to tension if an individual feels the 
need to later reveal this. 
The fifth and final area in Murray and Forshaw’s framework concerns the way in 
which prostheses can facilitate the expression of valued identities (de Oliveira Chini 
& Boemer, 2007; Gallagher & MacLachlan, 2001; Liu et al., 2010; Lundberg et al., 
2011; Murray, 2004, 2009; Saradjian et al., 2008; Senra et al., 2012; Sousa et al., 
2009). Studies linked to this determined that while many equate the loss of a limb 
with the gaining of a label of disability, individuals tended to feel that a prosthesis 
could help rebuff or diminish this. A prosthesis was considered restorative if it 
helped to regain functions displaced by limb loss, such as being able to partake in 
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routine activities once more or returning to work. Self-worth was also boosted by 
the enabling properties of the prosthesis in providing functionality and autonomy 
and partly recovering what persons considered had been lost. Considering the 
possibility of what prostheses could provide enabled favourable comparisons to 
able-bodied individuals, although persons recognised some differences persisted, 
and those who had lost limbs considered they were not altogether the same as 
they were before. As regular and important life events were experienced in ways 
supported by use of a limb, a prosthesis would be ‘woven in’ to lives and new 
identities were forged while others were regained. Similarly, Ostler et al. (2014) 
suggested individuals with lower-limb loss would seek to replace their limb through 
use of a prosthesis, but a return to normality was not always considered to have 
been achieved. While some valued activities could be returned to, there were 
always ways in which limb absence and the prosthesis presented differences to 
prior lives, and the researchers considered individuals would engage a process of 
negotiating a ‘new normal’. 
In this final area, Murray and Forshaw also identified a typology of possible forms 
of prosthetic embodiment that have implications for recovered selves. These range 
from perceiving the prosthesis as a tool, to a part of the body, and also as a ‘part of 
me’. In the former, more conscious and laboured usage characterised conceiving 
the limb as an implement external to the body, while conceiving of the limb as a 
part of the body involved considering how the limb approximated the anatomical 
limb in certain regards. If persons perceived a prosthesis as pivotal to a personal 
and social identity, it tended to be seen as ‘natural’ and a part of the user (see also 
Mills, 2013). These forms of embodiment were variously perceived as adaptive or 
problematic by the individuals, depending on what they sought to achieve with a 
prosthesis. 
In summary of this section, qualitative research investigating the perspectives and 
experiences of prosthesis users reveals a further wealth of insights about what it is 
like to live with limb absence and to use a prosthesis. Furthermore, while the first 
three areas of research identified in Murray and Forshaw’s framework link to much 
of the quantitative work conducted in the field that has explored the impact of limb 
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loss and early prosthesis use, the latter two areas shed some light on the ongoing 
experiences of living with a prosthesis. In particular, the fourth area concerning 
social interaction illuminates what it is like to live with a prosthesis on a day-to-day 
basis, as persons routinely manage their presentation and the information they 
share with others about their limb difference. The fifth area also provides some 
indications about further experiences through discussions of how prostheses 
helped to variously recover identities or helped develop new ones and similarly 
how persons use artificial limbs to regain normalcy or find a ‘new normal’. 
Considering the broader literature in prosthesis use has mainly focused on 
reactions to limb loss and early experiences of prosthesis use, such an 
understanding of the further experiences of prosthesis users is enlightening. 
However, this is an emerging understanding from a modest body of research and 
further work is required to develop a richer understanding of the ongoing 
experiences of living with a prosthesis. 
The next section completes the overview of the literature. This involves discussion 
of prosthetic practice, where there is a focus on ‘outcomes’ research. This leads to 
the premise for the present research. 
Evidence-Based Practice in Prosthetic Services 
Gallagher and Desmond (2007) observe that in the field of prosthetics, there is an 
increasing acknowledgement by prosthetists and other relevant healthcare staff of 
the need to evaluate practice, particularly in the assessment of patient outcomes. 
By doing so, the progress or the status of the individual can be evaluated, and this 
has been linked to improvements in quality of life through consequent efforts to 
improve quality of care and quality of health (Szabo, 2001). Furthermore, having 
measurable outcomes also enables the comparison of treatments, interventions 
and service delivery (Deathe, Miller, & Speechley, 2002) and so helps to enable a 
more cost-effective approach to rehabilitation (Larner, van Ross, & Hale, 2003), as 
well as the potential to inform policy-making and the expenditure of public funds 
(Lindner, Nätterlund, & Hermansson, 2010). 
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However, there is little consensus on what should be assessed after the fitting of an 
artificial limb. Wolfe et al. (2008) note the tendency of research to focus on 
physical outcomes, such as working towards a particular level of mobility in lower-
limb prosthesis users or a level of aptitude in manipulating objects for upper-limb 
users, and this was at the expense of other outcomes, such as the psychosocial (see 
Stevens, Fross, & Kapp, 2009). Gallagher and MacLachlan (2001) describe how 
recent research has sought to redress this, but many contemporary studies that 
have sought to develop psychosocial outcome tools tend to have a narrow focus, 
often exploring a single construct, and that different constructs/outcomes are 
explored across studies, use differing combinations of measures, or examine  
outcomes in different ways to others. Lindner et al. (2010) also note that some 
tools have yet to be validated and so it is not clear whether scores obtained 
actually reflect the individual’s status on a stated dimension. 
Such a multiplicity of potentially important variables, ways they are measured and 
critiques of these measures reinforce the notion that there is no clear guidance 
about what evidence should be translated for use in prosthetic consultations. This 
is an issue if practice is to adopt an evidence-based approach to guiding and 
assessing consultations – something that has been criticised for being lacking in the 
past (Ramstrand & Brodtkorb, 2008). Indeed, Deathe et al. (2002) report that nearly 
a third of centres providing prosthetic services in Canada (n=44) that they 
contacted did not formally assess any particular outcome measure. Turner-Stokes 
and Turner-Stokes (1997) reported comparable findings (n=182), and noted that 
centres cited a lack of time and not knowing what to collect as the reasons for not 
formally assessing outcomes (see also Andrysek, Christensen, & Dupuis, 2011). 
Related to this, a body of research that has developed models for matching 
individuals to assistive technology has foregrounded the unique qualities of the 
individual that are important to attend to when considering particular technologies 
(Scherer, 2002, 2014; Scherer, Jutai, Fuhrer, Demers, & Deruyter, 2007). These 
studies emphasise consideration of the needs, values and goals of the individual in 
determining an optimal match, and therefore present a further consideration for 
prosthetic practice alongside what might be agreed as normative standards for 
40 
 
rehabilitation. An understanding of an individual’s values, preferences, and their 
own conception of their rehabilitation, is to gain an insider account of the user of 
the prosthesis and so to enable the means to better accommodate the individual in 
potential ongoing rehabilitation efforts. This is becoming a more prominent point 
of investigation in recent years, and has been implicated as one of three important 
components in evidence-based practice in order to improve rehabilitation 
(alongside clinical expertise and integrating current research) (Sackett, Straus, 
Richardson, Rosenberg, & Haynes, 2000). However, like the lack of clear 
recommendations for outcomes to measure, similarly there is no real evidence-
based guidance about how professionals should go about trying to understand the 
needs, values or goals of the individual. 
Using a repertory grid analysis, Schaffalitzky et al. (2009) investigated the values 
and preferences of upper- and lower-limb prosthesis users in the US (n=4), in order 
to determine what they considered important in an a limb. The researchers 
discovered a highly nuanced set of preferences and evaluative criteria across cases, 
indicating the individuality of prosthesis users and the corresponding need for 
professionals to treat individuals as such in consultations. NiMhurchadha, 
Gallagher, MacLachlan and Wegener (2013) performed a Delphi study involving 
upper-limb prosthesis users as well as rehabilitation professionals (n=53), and 
reported a disconnect between the research literature and what both professionals 
and prosthesis users considered important in consultations and in prosthesis use. 
The lack of consensus over many of the factors indicates a need for a greater 
understanding between professionals and patients, but additionally, the agreed 
factors, including ‘a patient’s feeling of control over the rehabilitation’, ‘resilience’, 
‘expectations’, ‘sense of humour’ and ‘social skills’, indicate the need to give 
greater scrutiny to these psychosocial and environmental variables that have not 
presently received much attention in the literature. 
This discussion foregrounds the issues facing the translation of research knowledge 
into prosthetic practice. Practice could benefit from this knowledge, providing a 
better understanding of the individuals that come to use artificial limbs and the 
experiences they may encounter, in order to adapt consultation approaches, 
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identify appropriate technology and to consider rehabilitation goals and further 
consultation targets accordingly. However, despite burgeoning research in recent 
years, inconsistencies and a lack of consensus about how to aim for or measure 
‘success’ remain, and these obfuscate broader messages about how to develop 
practice. 
Locating the Present Study 
Taken as a whole, the body of prosthesis use research provides an insight into the 
diverse and important psychosocial features accompanying the use of artificial 
limbs. Common areas of concern are identified and light is shed on the breadth of 
issues experienced by persons that use prostheses. However, there remain some 
significant difficulties complicating an overview of the area. Reports of the 
prevalence of prosthesis use and the frequency of usage vary and are not 
satisfactorily accounted for (Raichle et al., 2008). There is also little agreement in 
terms of the prevalence of clinically significant psychological morbidity in 
individuals with limb absence, either in the early post-amputation period or beyond 
(Desmond et al., 2012; Desmond & MacLachlan, 2006). Divergences in findings may 
be attributable to heterogeneous study samples, in addition to divergent study 
designs, which make comparison and consolidation of findings problematic 
(Cavanagh et al., 2006; Horgan & MacLachlan, 2004; Sinha & van den Heuvel, 
2011). A conclusion that can be drawn from this overview of the literature is that 
the field of prosthesis use identifies a broad range of psychosocial phenomena 
associated with the use of artificial limbs, but a precise understanding of these is 
rendered difficult by the current state of the research. This has consequences for 
informing further enquiry as well as supporting evidence-based approaches to 
practice. 
To address this, developing an original perspective for further approaches to the 
area or for reappraising the evidence is a worthwhile endeavour, and one which 
can come from the development of theory. Theory has properties of guiding 
research and organising empirical knowledge (Marx, 1963) and is therefore useful 
for the field of prosthesis use as it currently stands. Theory also contends with 
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multiple variables, again, particularly useful given the plethora of factors associated 
with limb absence and prosthesis use. Dunn and Elliott (2008) have specifically 
called for the development of theory in rehabilitation psychology to inform the 
multidisciplinary practice of rehabilitation, noting that much of the extant research 
is largely atheoretical, where there is a focus on identifying differences between 
groups but then struggling to account for why such differences exist. 
Theory is often loosely defined and interpreted liberally but there is some 
consensus in the scholarly literature that it goes further than a concept (e.g., Glaser 
& Strauss, 1967; Maxwell & Mittapalli, 2008; Wacker, 1998) and is richer than a 
theme. Taking the definition from Grounded Theory methodology, theory is 
multivariate and consists of concepts, but these are interrelated (the relationships 
constitute hypotheses), and are accounted for by a core theoretical category that 
the concepts stem from (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). The production of individual 
concepts remains useful - indeed as Murray and Forshaw’s (2013) review indicates 
they can be important and insightful ways of being able to consider action in an 
area – but they are limited in scope compared to theory. Theory has the advantage 
of capturing and parsimoniously accounting for a substantial amount of action 
within a given area. If of a sufficient breadth, theory can accommodate what may 
appear to be quite divergent behaviours or experiences of persons, offering a 
conceptually integrative perspective of action in an area. For instance, Philbin’s 
(2009) theory of identity commitment accounts for both acceptance and rejection 
of medications and psychiatric identities in the context of psychosis. Theoretical 
investigations can also flesh out extant concepts, such as those already identified 
by qualitative inquiries, as their variation is explored and accounted for, bringing 
new ways of considering action to light. The potential relationships between known 
or emerging concepts may also be explored to enable an understanding of their 
potential interplay. For example, Charmaz’s (1995) theory of chronic illness which 
explores and connects some familiar notions of chronic illness in new ways to 
understand variation in how persons respond to their condition. 
The development of theory can also prompt thought about directions for further 
work in an area in which it is developed or employed, which may also indicate 
43 
 
expansions of an employed or developed theory. For example, in Cutcliffe, 
Stevenson, Jackson and Smith’s (2006) theory of suicidality, ‘reconnecting with 
humanity’ was described as a pattern of overcoming suicide and which begs further 
investigation for how this could be encouraged in order to reduce the incidence of 
suicide. Research driven by theory can therefore be used to inform research as well 
as for the development of evidence-based practice, where professionals can be 
provided an array of ‘empirically-supported techniques’ that can be derived from 
an understanding of the hypotheses of a theory (Dunn & Elliott, 2008, p. 10). This 
could be especially useful in prosthetic rehabilitation given that a lack of evidence-
based practice has been a point of criticism in the past (Ramstrand & Brodtkorb, 
2008). Finally, carefully developed theory also enables professionals and lay-
persons alike to interpret a variety of scenarios, helping to make sense of them as 
underlying processes are understood (this is explained further in chapter ten, but 
see also Glaser & Strauss, 1967). 
Currently, there is a dearth of theory in the literature on prosthesis use, where few 
studies employ theory to inform their research and fewer have sought to produce 
any. Examples of studies employing theory include Callaghan et al. (2004), who 
developed a tool to assess attitudes and behaviour towards prosthesis use based 
on the theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1991). Callaghan et al. (2008) then 
employed the Common-sense Self-Regulation Model (Leventhal, Nerenz, & Steele, 
1984) to predict prosthesis use and activity limitation. A further series of studies 
that have invoked theory are those from Coffey and colleagues (Coffey, Gallagher, 
& Desmond, 2014a, 2014b; Coffey, Gallagher, Desmond, et al., 2014a, 2014b), who 
have also employed a form of self-regulation (the dual process model; Carver & 
Scheier, 2000). 
In terms of producing theory, three studies were undertaken that used Grounded 
Theory methodology. However, it is questionable about whether these studies 
achieved the goal of the methodology and did in fact produce grounded theories. In 
Oaksford, Frude and Cuddihy’s (2005) study of coping with lower-limb loss (n=12), 
the theoretical product is instead a thematic grouping of coping concepts according 
to their type, and the researchers admit they engaged a post-hoc sorting process of 
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their concepts largely for the purposes of diagrammatic representation (p. 272). 
Similarly, Livingstone, van de Mortel and Taylor’s (2011) ‘path of perpetual 
resilience’, developed from analyses with individuals experiencing lower-limb loss 
(n=5), is actually a phrase coined to express a theme of chronology, produced after 
analyses and that ‘unifies the concepts’ (p. 27). A thematic grouping of concepts 
does not constitute a theory, and goes against Grounded Theory methodology 
which specifies the importance of developing a core theoretical category which is 
then accounted for through sub-core concepts (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Only 
Reed’s (2004) theory of ‘mastering the challenge’ appears consistent with the 
methodology, though this is focused on farmers who underwent upper-limb 
amputations and who were returning to work (n=16). 
This research then, sought to develop new theory in order to inform both practice 
and further scholarly enquiry. To this end, Grounded Theory was selected as an 
appropriate explorative methodology to support the study. Grounded Theory is the 
systematic generation of theory from data in a substantive area, using a rigorous 
approach to data gathering and analysis. The product of a Grounded Theory study 
is rich and relevant theory addressing how individuals in a substantive area process 
and act on a main concern, and captures and accounts for variation in this 
responding. 
Through application of the methodology, an in-depth conceptualisation of a main 
concern of prosthesis users and the actions they employ to manage this concern 
was produced. This encapsulates the theory of prosthesis use that this thesis 
presents and provides a new means of understanding the issues faced by the 
sizeable number of individuals with limb absence that are making use of artificial 
limbs. The decision to use a particular form of Grounded Theory methodology, and 
how I understood and applied this, is explained over the following two chapters.  
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Chapter 3: Study Methodology - Grounded Theory 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I discuss the rationale behind adopting a particular form of 
Grounded Theory methodology in order to undertake a study of prosthesis users. 
This chapter expands on the methodological principles of Grounded Theory, 
detailing how the study was approached and clarifying some areas of contention 
within the methodology. Chapter four continues this through discussing design 
choices, particular method processes and how these were executed during the 
study. 
It is through a discussion of Grounded Theory methodology that the 
epistemological position that underlies this work can also be presented. However, 
in using Grounded Theory there are strong implications for epistemological 
considerations, and so I have chosen to address these together which also helps to 
illustrate how methodology and epistemology can be mutually informative. This is 
achieved by working through the tenets of Grounded Theory methodology and 
reflecting on epistemological aspects where appropriate. 
A brief overview of the discovery and development of Grounded Theory 
methodology is given in order to establish the rationale for adopting the particular 
version of Grounded Theory in this study. This then moves to an exploration of the 
manner in which Grounded Theory studies should be approached, before 
discussion of the credibility of Grounded Theory research products. 
The Origins of Grounded Theory 
The 1967 publication of The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for 
Qualitative Research (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) was a milestone in social research. At 
this time, there was a widespread tendency to regard sociological research as a way 
of verifying and refining ‘grand theories’. Glaser and Strauss challenged this by 
arguing for the need to develop new theory that was relevant and carefully derived 
from data, rather than furthering what they perceived as largely deductive and 
speculative theory (p. 29). Discovery… was therefore published to provide an 
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alternative mode of research that supported the production of systematically-
developed novel theory in a substantive area. 
Glaser and Strauss were particularly critical of research where data appeared to be 
forced to fit an existing theory. In contrast, they argued that by adoption of the 
systematic procedures of the Grounded Theory, the development of an emergent 
theory that had both ‘fit’ and relevance was assured (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). In 
order to proceed with this new methodology, Glaser and Strauss argued that the 
researcher must be open to such emergent discoveries within the data, and identify 
any preconceptions they might have with potential irrelevance. 
Furthermore, as indicated by the title of the 1967 text, Grounded Theory 
methodology itself was claimed to be a discovery. Glaser (2003) later explained 
how it was actually a ‘write-up’ of how the researchers had produced their critically 
acclaimed Awareness of Dying (Glaser & Strauss, 1965) and the subsequent Time 
for Dying (Glaser & Strauss, 1968) after being petitioned by others to reveal how 
they had gone about their investigations (p. 62). Glaser’s background was from the 
University of Columbia, where he learned sociology as a student of Robert Merton, 
and inductive quantitative analysis from Paul Lazarsfeld, and previously he had 
studied techniques of ‘explication de text’ at the University of Paris. Strauss, on the 
other hand, studied sociology at the University of Chicago, under the tutelage of 
Herbert Blumer who was developing Symbolic Interactionism. It was this critical 
meeting of approaches that the discovery of the methodology has been attributed 
to (Glaser, 1992, 2003; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss, 1991). 
At the time of writing, there are a number of versions of Grounded Theory available 
to those who find appeal in the approach. These are significantly dissimilar and so 
to avoid confusion and methodological ‘slurring’ it has been recommended that 
researchers undertaking Grounded Theory clearly state their version early in their 
work (Baker, Wuest, & Stern, 1992; Stern, 2009; Wilson & Hutchinson, 1996). 
I have chosen to adopt Grounded Theory methodology as prescribed by Barney 
Glaser, the ‘co-discoverer’ of Grounded Theory, and as described in his authored 
and co-authored texts (Glaser, 1978, 1992, 1998, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2009, 2011a, 
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2013, 2014; Glaser & Strauss, 1967). This version has been variously termed 
‘classical’, ‘traditional’, ‘orthodox’ or even ‘Glaserian’ due to Glaser’s ongoing 
dominance of this form of the methodology. 
In Grounded Theory, researchers seek to identify a main concern of individuals 
within a particular area and to account for how this concern is resolved. Through a 
systematic approach to the research, patterns within data from this area are 
identified and conceptualised, as well as exploring how the patterns may vary and 
what may account for the variation, and through this a theory of resolving the core 
concern is developed. The particular processes involved are discussed further in 
chapter four. 
While this is the crux of Grounded Theory, there are differences between versions, 
and a critical discussion of the different versions of Grounded Theory and thus their 
divergent key characteristics will help to frame the rationale for this decision and 
will also illustrate my theoretical orientation that guides the operationalization of 
the methodology. In presenting this, brief consideration of Anselm Strauss’s (‘co-
discoverer’ of Grounded Theory) elaborations of Grounded Theory are discussed as 
they are found in the texts he co-authored with Juliet Corbin, as well as discussing 
the more contemporary ‘Constructivist Grounded Theory’ and ‘Situational Analysis’ 
versions that place greater emphasis on epistemological considerations. 
Strauss and Corbin’s Grounded Theory 
Following the publication of Discovery in 1967, the broad guidance given to 
researchers seeking to develop their own grounded theories led to petitions for 
clarification and further instruction on how this could be best achieved. Glaser later 
released Theoretical Sensitivity (Glaser, 1978), in which he elaborated the 
procedures of ‘theoretical sampling’, coding and ‘memoing’, and foregrounded 
notions of ‘theoretical coding’ and ‘theoretical sensitivity’. Strauss responded to 
requests for elaboration through the release of his own book, Qualitative Analysis 
for Social Sciences (Strauss, 1987). However, it was in 1990 that he and one of his 
former students, Juliet Corbin, released their comprehensive guide to Grounded 
Theory in the form of Basics of Qualitative Research: Grounded Theory Procedures 
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and Techniques (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Many scholars agree that this was one of 
the more poignant events in the history of the methodology, as it led to the schism 
between Glaser and Strauss. 
Strauss and Corbin set out to deliver a publication that described how to conduct 
Grounded Theory studies in a clear and straightforward manner (p. 12)2. In 
presenting this elaboration, the authors gave guidance for how a researcher might 
conduct their studies that was in accordance with the original principles of 
Grounded Theory. However, they also presented ideas for analysis, namely a 
process of ‘axial coding’. Whereas open coding in the early stages of a Grounded 
Theory study causes the data to fracture into labelled incidents, axial coding was 
developed as a means to resolve this by putting the data back together in new 
forms through making connections between incidents, concepts, and their 
properties. These connections are made in relation to the ‘paradigm model’; a 
model that prompts the researcher to ask key questions about how data relate to 
each other (see Figure 3) (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Strauss & Corbin, 1990, 1998). 
When Basics… was first published, Glaser wrote to Strauss, imploring him to retract 
the text. In addition to claims of a personal injustice rendered through intellectual 
property infringement and a lack of consultation, he believed the methodology 
itself had been wronged. He dubbed their new version ‘full conceptual description’, 
claiming that following their guide forced creation of theory that was not 
emergent, as he believed Grounded Theory should be (Glaser, 1992). When 
Basics… remained unretracted, Glaser published a text solely aimed at ‘correcting’ 
the propositions within it (Glaser, 1992) and then returned in force to methodology 
writing, producing a succession of texts that gave his own advice to researchers 
considering employing Grounded Theory in their work (Glaser, 1998, 2001, 2003, 
2005, 2009, 2011a, 2012, 2013, 2014). 
While Glaser (1992) gave critical commentary to most of Strauss and Corbin’s 
(1990) work, the crux of his criticism is most strongly levelled at the technique of 
                                                     
2
 This enforces the notion that Discovery was neither of these things. Holton (2009) suggests that it 
is easy to initially see the guidance in Discovery as ‘loose and perhaps even messy or confusing’ 
(p.43), further encouraging researchers to be steered by later elaborations in a chosen version. 
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axial coding and the paradigm model. These allow some structure and stability to a 
study of an explorative nature where a researcher can quickly be overwhelmed 
with the possibility of analyses going in any number of directions, but 
recommending such specific assessments of the data regardless of their relevance 
is said to lead to deduction and preconception in the production of theory (Glaser, 
1992; Kendall, 1999). For example, by compelling the researcher to consider data in 
terms of ‘consequences’, ‘intervening conditions’, or ‘action strategies’, attention 
may be diverted from what may be prominent in the data, and equally may be 
directed to areas that may not be relevant at all. Furthermore, Glaser suggested 
following the process would result in ‘an over-conceptualisation of a single 
incident’ (Glaser, 1992, p. 40). 
In grounded theory we do not link properties and categories in a set 
of relationships denoting causal conditions, phenomena, context, 
intervening condition, action/interactional strategies and 
consequences. This would be preconception and forcing theoretical 
concepts on data to the max. The grounded theorist simply codes for 
categories and properties and lets whatever theoretical codes 
emerge where they may. To use this model out of hand will merely 
give the appearance of making the analyst think systematically 
about data and relate them in complex ways. In actuality it teaches 
the analyst to force a full conceptual description on data with no 
questions about whether the links are relevant to any emerging 
theory that really explains how the participants process their main 
concerns. (Glaser, 1992, p. 63) 
As will be discussed in the next chapter in the section on theoretical coding, it is 
more congruent with Grounded Theory principles to instead consider such ways of 





Figure 3. Strauss and Corbin’s (1990) paradigm model 
 
Despite indications of inconsistencies with original Grounded Theory principles, 
researchers adopting this version of the methodology have produced a plethora of 
insightful studies (see Strauss & Corbin, 1997). Kendall (1999) notes that Strauss 
and Corbin’s version appears to excel best where depth of description and 
exploring all possible contingencies within the data are desirable qualities in a 
study, and so where ‘full conceptual description' may be a desirable quality in a 
study. As Glaser (1992) suggests, such an approach ‘is fine, but it is not grounded 
theory’ (p. 3). Furthermore, in Discovery, it was emphasised about the integration 
of the theory that it ‘is best when it emerges, like the concepts. The theory should 
never just be put together’ (p.  41). Given the value of potentially emergent 
concepts, and moreover, an emergent theory that could account for a range of 
actions in the substantive area of prosthesis use, Glaser’s methodological 
elaborations appeared to be a better approach for this study. 
Epistemology-Driven Remodellings 
In recent years, some have questioned the theoretical underpinnings of Grounded 
Theory. Among these, Bryant (2002) felt that Grounded Theory had fallen behind 
the times and needed to be revitalised, claiming that it was ‘steeped in a scientism 
largely undermined in philosophical terms in the 1970s and 1980s’ (p. 34). Bryant’s 
arguments draw on the changing state of methodological discussion in qualitative 
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research where there is a growing body of literature that is conscious of 
epistemological positions and their potential impact on qualitative research 
strategies. ‘Positivist’ Grounded Theory methodologies as advocated by both Glaser 
and Strauss, Bryant argued, required rethinking. 
There are two prominent versions of Grounded Theory that have since emerged 
that foreground epistemological concerns. These are useful to consider, both in 
relation to reinforcing the decision to use classical Grounded Theory methodology 
and as a basis to discuss epistemological concerns and how to manage these. In 
one of these versions, Kathy Charmaz, a former student of Glaser, looked back to 
Grounded Theory’s Symbolic Interactionism roots and argued for a reworking (or 
‘reclaiming’) of the methodology along ‘social constructionist’ lines (Charmaz, 2005, 
2006). This version eschewed what was labelled as a traditional ‘naïve realist’ 
perspective that Glaser and Strauss were said to advocate (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). 
Charmaz (2006) instead proposed Constructivist Grounded Theory, a remodelling 
driven by interpretivist philosophies that advocates relativist considerations of 
multiple social realities. 
Constructivist Grounded Theory encourages viewing the production and analyses of 
data as the result of the shared experiences between the researcher and the 
sources of data. This encourages researchers to acknowledge that they are part of 
what they are studying and not separate from it, prompting considerations of a co-
constructed reality between researcher and participant (Charmaz, 2006). In order 
to achieve this, Constructivist Grounded Theory researchers are encouraged to take 
a ‘reflexive’ stance, such as noting their dispositions that may potentially shape the 
data, and by viewing any analysis as firmly situated in time, place, and culture. 
Constructivist Grounded Theory researchers should also emphasise eliciting 
participants’ ‘definitions of terms, situations, and events’ in order to realise the 
implicit meanings and assumptions of those in a substantive area (p. 32). By 
employing these techniques, researchers are said to be able to interpret the 




Constructivist Grounded Theory, as presented in Constructing Grounded Theory 
(Charmaz, 2006), is an attractive reworking of Grounded Theory, as unlike 
Discovery it is expressed in a clear and carefully paced form. Charmaz also comes 
across as a researcher deeply attuned to her participants, demonstrated in one way 
through her efforts to preserve their voice in her resulting work (see Charmaz, 
1973, 1991, 1995). To an extent, the same can be said for the second epistemology-
conscious version of Grounded Theory: Situational Analysis (Clarke, 2005). 
Situational Analysis, developed by Adele Clarke, a former student of Anselm 
Strauss, is an extension of the ideas of Strauss in his work on social worlds. It 
primarily differentiates itself from traditional accounts of Grounded Theory 
methodology by acknowledging the ‘postmodern turn’, stating that analyses are 
locked to a specific time and place. Therefore, strikingly, the generation of theory is 
absent from Situational Analysis, replaced by social ‘maps’ that encourage the 
researcher to consider differences over commonalities in concepts, and emphasises 
exploration of the situational, social world, and positional aspects of substantive 
areas. 
Clarke states that an emphasis on investigating variation is absent in Glaser and 
Strauss’ individual methodological accounts, and by contrast, is the central strength 
of her reworking (p. xxxiv). While there is some truth that overt statements about 
the search for variation were somewhat overlooked in Discovery…, variation is 
central to Grounded Theory. According to Glaser (2001), a concept is only properly 
understood when the way it varies is understood. Furthermore, theoretical 
sampling, the process by which more information on a conceptual pattern is 
obtained by the researcher, is a method process specifically employed as a means 
of seeking and accounting for variation. 
Clarke (2005) also states that the products of Grounded Theory methodologies 
advocated by Glaser and Strauss are modelled through a basic social process (the 
form taken by the theory is a processual model of stages), and this form is imposed 
and limits their flexibility. Despite the large proportion of extant Grounded Theory 
studies utilising the basic social process (e.g., see Glaser & Kaplan, 1996), it is but 
one theoretical coding family (these are explained further in chapter four) which 
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Glaser suggested could serve as a means of helping to relate concepts to each other 
and structure a theory (Glaser, 1978). Glaser (1978, 2005) has outlined a number of 
other possible coding families a researcher may find have good emergent fit for 
modelling a theory, and he noted that there may be many more, such as the 
‘typology’ and ‘continuum’ families, which particularly foreground the variability of 
phenomena in their structure3. 
Aside from these particular qualms, the claim that objectivist/positivist 
perspectives overlook important features in an analysis is a recurring feature in 
epistemology-driven revisions of Grounded Theory. In a sense, this can make these 
versions appealing, and yet the same can be achieved with Grounded Theory as it 
was originally conceived. Glaser suggests that features such as bias and the impact 
of the researcher have a place in Grounded Theory studies, but only when analyses 
indicate their relevance. Thus rather than foregrounding them as in Constructivist 
Grounded Theory, they should be considered as just one potential form of data 
ready to be subject to the constant comparative method of Grounded Theory 
analysis (Glaser, 2007a). 
Furthermore, claims of being able to better explore data using particular 
epistemological lenses can, paradoxically, be limiting. In response to the 
announcement of Constructivist Grounded Theory, Glaser (2002b) called it a 
‘misnomer’, claiming that centralising constructivism leads to an obsession over 
continual attempts to escape bias as the researcher is required to repeatedly 
explicate the effects of a particular time, place and people that data originates 
from. Additionally, foregrounding a particular epistemological perspective leads to 
the danger of falling foul of the same problems of axial coding: that there is the risk 
of demoting or overlooking what might be important emergent aspects of analyses 
in favour of procedurally investigating specific factors that are thought to impact 
analyses (such as interpretation), regardless of their relevance. 
                                                     
3
 A typology was created in what could be considered the first ‘official’ grounded theory (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1965). In this study, Glaser and Strauss developed a typology of awareness of dying 
contexts to account for the variation in awareness of dying. 
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It is also interesting that proponents of epistemology-driven Grounded Theory 
state that they hold the products of classical Grounded Theory studies in high 
regard (e.g., see Bryant, 2003; Charmaz, 2006), when one might expect criticism of 
‘biased’ or ‘naïve’ interpretations. Instead, the conceptual products of older 
Grounded Theory studies are still revered and enjoy ongoing relevance (e.g., the 
use of awareness contexts from Glaser and Strauss’ (1965) study in Carlander, 
Ternestedt, Sahlberg-Blom, Hellström, & Sandberg, 2011). 
This leads to a further point of discussion, that supporters of epistemological-
remodellings, in particular those that favour a postmodern approach, indicate that 
conceptual work derived from particular persons, times, and places, are limited to 
these confines; that ‘situated knowledge’ is produced (Clarke, 2005, p. 294). In 
contrast, Glaser (2002b) argued for a ‘conceptual reality’ where concepts could be 
seen to fit with differing situations in differing times. He argued that concepts such 
as ‘credentializing’, ‘cultivating’, ‘spiritual power abusing’ or ‘pseudo-friending’, 
which were developed in Grounded Theory studies, would ‘just go on, no matter 
the bias[ed] take on them that may emerge’ (p. 4). More emotively, he wrote: 
Conceptual reality DOES EXIST. For example, client control is real; 
cautionary control is real; social structural covering is real. These 
processes and a myriad of others discovered in Grounded Theory 
research, impinge on us every day. Just go to the doctor, drive a car 
or go into surgery and/or take on the Catholic Church and the reader 
will see the reality of these researches and apply the conceptually, 
generated theory. (p. 8) 
While Glaser’s notions of concepts being ‘real’ may grate with contemporary 
epistemological discourse, his point was more that concepts developed through a 
grounded theory, once understood by others, could then be observed beyond this 
immediate data. So conceptual work derived from data from particular prosthesis 
users could be understood by researchers and individuals in a substantive area 
alike, and that this would have some resonance with them where they may 
consider the concepts elsewhere. An advantageous reading of this argument 
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therefore, is that concepts are ‘real’ in the sense that their fit with what is actually 
going on in a situation is achieved. 
In addition, part of the reason for undertaking a Grounded Theory study was to 
develop a theory of prosthesis users that would have some fit and utility when 
considering prosthesis users more broadly. This is therefore a key strength of 
Glaser’s Grounded Theory that epistemology-driven remodellings struggle with. 
Consequently, epistemological revisions do not provide a persuasive argument for 
adopting an alternative Grounded Theory methodology. Constructivist Grounded 
Theory and Situational Analysis highlight some useful techniques and 
considerations for the data, but these are merely possible tools to employ in a 
Grounded Theory study, analogous to the coding families. At the worst, an 
overemphasis may confuse or stifle researchers into trying to determine every 
property of their positionality, referred to by Glaser (2001) as the ‘reflexivity 
paralysis’. In sum, as Philbin (2009) identifies, once Grounded Theory is understood 
as being capable of utilising any epistemological position, such remodellings 
struggle to differentiate themselves and offer anything more than the classical 
version. Rather than addressing the difficulties posed by commitments to openness 
and flexibility that accompany the methodology, there is likely a greater appeal in 
challenging an imagined straw man of a naïve Grounded Theory, setting oneself up 
as a ‘champion in a fight against positivism and objectivism – those perennial “reds 
under the bed” in qualitative methodology literature’ (p. 36). These difficulties, 
posed by the methodology and dealt with insufficiently by other forms of Grounded 
Theory, form the basis for the next section. 
Not Knowing and Being Open 
While Glaser’s elaborations of Grounded Theory can be received as the basis for 
rejecting epistemological-remodelled versions of the methodology, there remains 
some vagueness around how to manage issues of relevance, flexibility and 
openness that these versions highlight and that are important to clarify in a 
Grounded Theory study. For instance, when or how the relevance for incorporating 
particular lenses (e.g., constructivist, feminist) is ‘earned’ or ‘indicated’ by analyses 
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is an important consideration (see Clarke, 2005, p. 75). Addressing this involves 
understanding how to approach and engage a Grounded Theory study. 
Glaser (1992) suggested that researchers approach their studies at a point of ‘not 
knowing’ (p. 50). Some have taken this idea of ‘now knowing’ to a logical extreme, 
suggesting it implies a tabula rasa approach, and is thereby a naïve and unrealistic 
instruction (e.g., Clarke, 2005; Dey, 1999). It is fair to say we cannot ‘un-know’ the 
things we may know about something and cognitive psychology teaches that 
understanding novel phenomena requires the accommodation of existing schema 
to build upon (Piaget & Cook, 1952), thus questioning the possibility of pure 
induction. But this was not what Glaser was getting at. While seemingly sceptical of 
this approach, Dey (1999) admits that ‘there is a difference between an open mind 
and an empty head’ (p. 251) and this is what Glaser was recommending when he 
suggested that a researcher ‘should just not know as he approaches the data’ (p. 
50). ‘Not knowing’ can be practically received as adopting a stance of acceptance 
and possibility, and likewise doing one’s best to avoid pre- or early commitment to, 
or rejection of, theoretical possibilities. 
This has implications for addressing a constructivist/‘objectivist’ debate, and I find 
it useful to believe that an appropriate position can be found somewhere between. 
A belief in discovery, linked to ‘not-knowing’, informs this, as discovery, to me, 
means a stance of considering a level of induction is possible, whilst acknowledging 
that existing knowledge or the tendencies of a researcher will always have some 
degree of influence. This is not an area explicitly addressed in the methodology, but 
something I believe is important for a researcher themselves to understand and 
delineate so they might recognise how phrases like ‘earned relevance’ might 
actually work in practice. 
With an approach of openness to discovery, upon entering the field I adopted a 
strategy of asking broad, open-ended questions to stimulate participants to share 
their experiences with me, trying to give them the best platform for discussions to 
go all manner of directions. I then began to analyse the data with regard to all 
manner of theoretical possibilities, some which remained for further analyses, but 
many of which did not. Glaser (1998) noted that at this point, the researcher must 
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grapple with ‘chaos’, not knowing what the emergent theory may look like, and 
they must code and memo the data in ‘all ways’. So there can be moments when a 
particular perspective can appear a useful tool to draw upon in analyses, but 
techniques of the method such as the constant comparative method (elaborated 
further in chapter four) that continually require a researcher to check the fit of 
conceptual work as analyses go on, keep this deductive element in line (or reveal 
“bias distortion” as Glaser, 1998, p. 142 put it). In some instances, writings in 
various directions did not continue to ‘pattern out’ in the data, and so these lines of 
inquiry were not pursued further. At other times, they did, and their inclusion was 
‘earned’. 
Fostering openness requires that a researcher must believe in the possibility of 
discovery and tread lightly in the presence of data, considering what may be 
conceptually novel and downplaying the conceptually known. To this end, 
particular epistemological or theoretical perspectives were not invoked from the 
outset of the study, but I took time to familiarise myself with many over the course 
of the study, and where they appeared useful ways of exploring the data I engaged 
them. This is a position consistent with Grounded Theory methodology, linking an 
initial ‘not knowing’ with possibility and discovery through openness. It is also a 
way of interpreting ‘emergence’, a further contentious term ubiquitous in 
Grounded Theory methodology writings. 
For instance, a theoretical product of a Grounded Theory study is said to be 
‘emergent’, and this is an important part of the methodology, with Glaser even 
writing an entire text that discussed the concept of emergence, pitting it against a 
‘forcing’ opposite (Glaser, 1992). In Grounded Theory, when ‘emergence’ is 
employed to describe the development of a theory, it refers to what comes from 
the dynamic relation of analyses and data. Emergence does not ‘just happen’ but is 
thus worked, and a main concern and resolving theory are said to be emergent 
because they come from the work that goes in to analysing the data through 
identifying patterns, conceptualising these, and returning to the data to inform the 
way that analyses can be refined. However, an emergent theoretical product does 
not result from specific questions asked of the data, or the application of 
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predetermined frameworks, but instead is from worked analyses where the 
researcher has strived to keep open throughout and consider the data for various 
possibilities, and followed these through with adherence to the specific method 
processes. Emergence thus goes right through a Grounded Theory study and is 
underpinned by being open. 
The Credibility of Grounded Theory Studies 
For those engaged in critically analysing and furthering the broad field of qualitative 
methodology, a dominant and ongoing concern is about how to ensure and convey 
quality research products. One of the more widely-known addresses to this 
problem was given by Lincoln and Guba (1985, 1999), who suggested that a matter 
of ‘trustworthiness’ is the core concern of qualitative researchers. 
How can an inquirer persuade his or her audiences (including self) 
that the findings of an inquiry are worth paying attention to, worth 
taking account of? What arguments can be mounted, what criteria 
invoked, what questions asked, what could be persuasive on this 
issue? (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p. 290) 
For Lincoln and Guba, managing trustworthiness means ensuring ‘credibility’, 
‘transferability’, ‘dependability’ and ‘confirmability’, which roughly match up to 
conventional criteria of ‘internal validity’, ‘external validity’, ‘reliability’ and 
‘objectivity’ respectively. The authors suggest that these could be achieved through 
a number of processes, such as ‘member checking’, where work is taken back to 
the participants involved a study to test theoretical categories or interpretations. 
An ‘audit trail’ is another measure such that others reading the work would be able 
to see each step of the research process in reaching the final product, including 
decisions and justifications for each decision. ‘Referential adequacy’ was also 
recommended whereby a researcher would identify a portion of relevant data to 
be left out of analyses, then to be returned to after to compare a research product 
to in order to identify inconsistencies and gaps. 
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So there are a number of additional processes that can be attached to a qualitative 
inquiry to encourage trustworthiness, and while these appear sensible 
recommendations in the pursuit of good qualitative research (some consider it the 
“gold standard”; Polit & Beck, 2014, p. 322), it is questionable about the lengths a 
researcher must go to in ensuring and conveying credible research. For Glaser 
(2003), this was too far: 
It is, of course, the almost hysterical pursuit of trying to solve the 
worrisome accuracy problem by an external, unrelenting 
accountability requirement imposed on honesty, skill and 
ability.....Their *Lincoln & Guba’s, 1985+ hysterical approach to the 
worrisome accuracy quest forgets that we are all human after all 
doing the best we can. QDA [Qualitative Data Analysis] and GT 
research, both, are always as good as far as it goes and both 
stimulate further research to help, in part, corrections to make it 
better. (p. 147) 
So Glaser took issue with these measures and with Lincoln and Guba’s lumping in of 
Grounded Theory with other forms of qualitative inquiry, having described it 
himself as a ‘general’ method, able to work with qualitative or quantitative data (or 
both) (Glaser, 1998). He vociferously claimed it to be a methodology distinct from 
other forms of qualitative analysis, and this has implications for both the way of 
going about the research as well as how the research product might be considered: 
…This discussion, however it may be relevant to Qualitative Data 
Analysis (QDA) as it evolves into constructivism, is not applicable, 
even relevant to GT (see GLASER, 2002b). First, LINCOLN and GUBA's 
(1985) discussion's underlying pattern simply focuses on changing 
views of worrisome accuracy, but always accuracy. It does not 
address the abstract nature of GT, which does not deal in facts or 
findings, but generates concepts that apply as explanations. The 
concepts are not facts, as I have reiterated over and over. They are 
variables that vary and are modifiable. They are integrated into a 
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theory, which results in interrelated categories and their properties, 
highly applicable but not factual. (Glaser, 2004, para. 2–3) 
QDA and Grounded Theory have very different goals. QDA is concerned with 
descriptive detail, and thus accuracy is an appropriate, indeed, a fundamental 
condition. However, Grounded Theory is concerned with the conceptual and the 
development of theory through this. Therefore, an assessment of a Grounded 
Theory should focus on the theoretical product of the research, where criteria 
more attuned to conceptual critique would be appropriate. Grounded Theory 
provides four criteria for this kind of conceptual evaluation: 
Does the theory work to explain relevant behaviour in the 
substantive area of the research? Does it have relevance to the 
people in the substantive field? Does the theory fit the substantive 
area? Is it readily modifiable as new data emerge? (Glaser, 1998, p. 
17) 
Grounded Theory has these clear evaluation criteria to judge a study by, and are 
supplemented by ‘conceptual parsimony’ and ‘scope of explanatory power’ (Glaser, 
1992). The criteria also double as guiding principles throughout analyses to help 
craft a credible research product. In this way, provided the researcher has paid 
careful attention to these, and provided this is apparent to a reader also aware of 
the evaluation criteria, credibility is established. 
According to Glaser (1998), ‘fit’ is synonymous with validity. In this manner, 
conceptualisation must adequately reflect the contributing patterns of data, and 
concepts are honed through the constant comparison of incidents, codes, 
theoretical categories and properties of categories that improve the 
appropriateness of the conceptualisation. ‘Workability’ is the need to ensure that 
the concepts and their relationship to each other sufficiently explain the full 
process by which a core concern is resolved by the individuals in a substantive area. 
‘Relevance’ pertains to ensuring that a research product is recognised by those 
involved in the substantive area, as the theory and the constituent concepts should 
have an attraction that provokes instant ‘grab’. ‘Modifiability’ means ensuring that 
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a theory is flexible in such a manner that any further data or other theory, no 
matter how contrasting, can work with the present theory, ensuring its ongoing 
utility. Glaser asserted that ‘new data never provide a disproof just an analytic 
challenge’ (Glaser, 1998, p. 19) and in this way, grounded theories should be able 
to work, or adapted to work, with all manner of data. It is through considering 
these criteria during analyses in a Grounded Theory study and reflecting on how 
these were achieved afterward that the credibility of an emergent theory can be 
understood. 
The Style of Grounded Theory 
Finally, the way that grounded theories are presented is important to discuss, in 
order to explain the stylistic choice of this thesis. One of the ways Charmaz’s (1973, 
1991, 1995) Grounded Theory research is appealing is through her emphasis on 
retaining the voice of the individuals that contributed to her work, and this is 
achieved through use of many of their accounts in her work and using them at 
length. This was a point of contention for Glaser (2003) who considered that her 
work was little more than a collection of accounts accompanied by ‘a nod to pure 
GT by some conceptual description’ (p. 178). According to Charmaz (2006), the 
Constructivist Grounded Theory approach she then went on to advocate placed 
such emphasis on ‘stories in service of analyses’ because they could provide 
‘counterpoints’ to an ‘authorial voice’ and that of a ‘disembodied technician’. 
Charmaz was apparently concerned about ‘silent authorship replete with assumed 
neutrality, objectivist pretensions, and an absent author’ (p. 174) and so working 
closely with numerous included accounts was one way of foregrounding an 
interpretivist position, reflecting ‘voice *that+ echoes the researcher’s involvement 
with the studied phenomena’ (p. 174). However, arguments for and against CGT 
aside, the actual style of these works remains perfectly compatible with Grounded 
Theory methodology. In fact, it may be preferable to some, like myself, who wish to 
give illustrations of the interchangeable indicators of concepts, bringing life to what 
would otherwise be largely dense and heavy-going conceptual writing (e.g., see 
Glaser & Kaplan, 1996). 
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The form of the analytical part of this thesis is therefore inspired by the works of 
Kathy Charmaz, and also those by David Karp (e.g., Karp, 1997, 2001, 2006). Karp 
often writes with an unattributed analytical style that is suggestive of employing 
Grounded Theory processes, though his work has been compared to a ‘generic 
inductive qualitative model’ and contrasted with Grounded Theory in order to draw 
out the differences (Hood, 2010). Nonetheless, like Charmaz, Karp writes in a way 
where accounts are carefully employed to introduce and to break up conceptual 
and theoretical discussions, and to illustrate the variability of patterns in a 
substantive area. This makes for compelling reading and is a stark contrast to 
grounded theories that involve purely conceptual writing and which are more akin 
to technical manuals of phenomena (see Glaser & Holton, 2007). 
There can, of course, be a tendency to depend on accounts, or to suggest these are 
‘proof’ or ‘evidence’ of concepts (see Hopwood, 2014, for a commentary on this), 
yet a good rendering of a grounded theory may just as easily be stripped of 
mention of any interchangeable indictors and still stand up to its criteria of 
evaluation. It is a balanced, careful use of quotations and illustrations that can help 
form a grounded theory that is readily observable as credible, and as a bonus, 
makes it potentially more palatable to other qualitative researchers who are used 
to seeing participant accounts in scholarly works. 
Therefore, once it has been clarified that Grounded Theory processes are 
understood and adhered to, the final presentation of a Grounded Theory may take 
a range of styles. The style of this thesis differs from many traditional grounded 
theories and yet remains congruent with the principles of the methodology. In 
providing and working through accounts to break up the density of conceptual 
work, I hope to encourage readability and to also give a sense of some of the 
analytical processes of Grounded Theory in action. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I sought to give clarity to both Grounded Theory methodology and 
the reason for selecting the particular form of the methodology. The merging of 
epistemology and methodology remain popular in qualitative research practices, 
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and each perspective can have useful insights about how to approach data. For 
instance, post-modernist principles raise the question of how appropriate it is to 
abstract concepts from a particular context, and how far this can be taken. 
However, in this study these perspectives were treated as theoretical sensitivity 
resources with which to consider the data rather than serving as a guide for the 
conduct of the study. 
Grounded Theory methodology as originally elaborated by Glaser and Strauss 
(1967) and subsequently by Glaser (Glaser, 1978, 1992, 1998, 2001, 2003, 2005, 
2009, 2011a, 2013, 2014) remains a strong approach to research that is appropriate 
for this project. It includes the flexibility to incorporate constructivist and post-
modern perspectives as and when appropriate, and so to not be driven by these, 
therefore going beyond versions that are. I neither rejected nor consciously 
adopted an overarching epistemological or theoretical framework in beginning this 
Grounded Theory research. Instead, the methodology allowed me to commence 
the collection of data with prosthesis users that I could analyse in an ‘open’ 
manner, a key benefit being to then consider various theoretical options that could 
be helpful in understanding the data and when developing the emergent theory. 
The next chapter continues this discussion of methodology, exploring the 
application of the method processes.  
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Chapter 4: Applied Grounded Theory 
Introduction 
In this chapter I discuss the methods employed in undertaking the study and 
developing the emerging theoretical product. This involves reflecting on the 
premise of the research, discussing the parameters of the study, how to access the 
study population, ethical considerations, and the techniques used to obtain and 
analyse the data. Specific study design and analytical processes are elaborated, 
enabling an overview of how the theory was developed. 
As outlined in the previous chapter, a Grounded Theory study is said to work best 
through a process of ‘doing’ and this is a two-part revelation for the researcher, as 
it is only in the application of the methodology that the researcher can truly know 
both the concerns of those in a substantive area and the intricacies of the 
methodology itself (Glaser, 1998; Holton, 2009). This praxis approach is part of the 
‘delayed action learning curve’ of extended immersion with the methodology 
before a good understanding is possible (Glaser, 1978, 2001, 2003). Accordingly, 
this chapter is framed in a manner that reflects the gradual development of the 
study design and the analytical product, with critical considerations at each stage of 
the process. 
Particular consideration is given to three processes of Grounded Theory that are 
known to be particularly challenging. Hood (2010) refers to these as the 
Troublesome Trinity of Grounded Theory, which are: 1) theoretical sampling; 2) the 
constant comparison of data to theoretical categories; and 3) focusing on the 
development of theory via theoretical saturation of categories. These fundamental 
aspects of Grounded Theory differentiate the methodology from a generic 
qualitative induction process and are the elements that many are said to struggle 
with that instead result in ‘Grounded Theory approaches’. Adherence to the full 
methodological package is necessary for the production of credible theory (Glaser, 
1998), and so particular detail is given to each of these processes to underscore the 




Preconceptions and a Literature Review 
One of the more widely-known principles of Grounded Theory is the assertion that 
a researcher should not immerse themselves in extant theoretical literature in a 
substantive area prior to data collection and analyses in that area. As was noted in 
the last chapter, doing so risks miring theoretical sensitivity by obscuring an ability 
to remain open to emerging main concerns, particularly those that may be novel to 
the literature. Existing theoretical perspectives may be adopted in the formation of 
a theory, and this would occur on a preconceived rather than emergent basis. 
While Glaser recommended researchers steer clear of any theoretical literature in 
the substantive area prior to beginning a study, he approved of substantive non-
theoretical readings and also recommended immersion in other theoretical works 
to enhance a researcher’s theoretical sensitivity. Researchers may enhance their 
theoretical sensitivity from the theoretical literature in a substantive area, but this 
vastly increases the chances of preconceptions creeping into an analysis, hence the 
warning to avoid this. Dey (1999) and Clarke (2005) note that most researchers are 
typically somewhat informed about the theoretical works in an area they work in, 
and so will have a literature review of sorts going already. Glaser (1998, 2001) 
sought to address these concerns, as well as to acknowledge the pressures of 
funding and ethical applications that often require evidence-driven rationales in 
order for studies to be supported. He suggested that when possessing pre-existing 
theoretical knowledge or knowing that this could be gained prior to analyses, a 
researcher should ask themselves to honestly consider how entrenched they feel 
they are, and how capable they consider themselves of conducting an ‘open’ 
grounded theory that will not be compromised by this knowledge. One way of 
managing assumptions or pre-existing theoretical knowledge of an area is to write 
about this so as to have a record of prior assumptions as well as to compare 
analyses to (Glaser, 1998). 
Preconceiving of an emergent theory is a possibility, but not an inevitability; 
however it is made more probable the more the researcher is read in a specific 
area. As Strauss (1969) said about his decision to use ambiguous terms in his work 
on identity, doing so enabled him to ‘sense that I could better look around the 
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corners of my problems, and be less likely to slide down the well-worn grooves of 
other men’s thought.’ (pp. 9-10). Thus the less immersion in theoretical writing in a 
topic, the less likely a researcher is to find themselves searching for or repeating 
the work of others, and the more able they can be to consider what may be novel. 
If taken as a chronological account of the development of the emergent theory, the 
layout of this thesis is misleading then, in that chapter two presents a review of the 
literature, including conceptual work in the area, when in fact this was actually 
delayed until the end of analyses when I began assessing how the emergent theory 
might fit with existing works, as specified by the methodology (Glaser, 1998). 
However, from a presentation point of view, it made sense to include this 
information when introducing the area of prosthesis use. In fact, when 
commencing this study, I did not arrive with any knowledge of conceptual work in 
the area, and only atheoretical substantive works were included to support funding 
and ethical applications. As a researcher relatively new to the field, and given this 
state of affairs, I felt capable of being open about the conduct of analyses. 
Design 
Study Aims 
Even with the best intentions, Grounded Theory studies are said to often begin 
‘research framed - inculcated in a theoretical framework – consciously or 
unawaredly’ (Glaser, 2005, p. 3). So even if substantive theory is avoided, 
researchers may still harbour suspicions of processes they believe may occur. 
Considering the premise of the research enables recognition of how vested 
interests in the research may hinder or take precedence over emergence. I admit 
that I was initially drawn to studying users of prostheses through wondering about 
the effects of modern adaptive technologies on the individual, and this is 
somewhat reflected in my funding application. However, in then employing 
Grounded Theory methodology to facilitate the study, I was conscious that my 
assumptions may not feature in the emergent concerns of prosthesis users. A 
compelling argument for Grounded Theory is how there are many cited cases of 
Grounded Theory studies that end up revealing an entirely different concern of the 
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individuals under study to that which was initially suspected (Glaser, 1998, 2011b). 
Therefore it is important to try to be open and to ensure that study aims remain 
broad and congruent with Grounded Theory principles. 
Accordingly then, the aims of this study were to: 
I. Identify and explore a main concern of individuals that use prostheses; 
II. Develop a theory that can effectively and credibly account for the way or 
ways in which individuals process and manage their concern. 
Inclusion/Exclusion Criteria 
Individuals that were aged 18 years or above that were using an upper- and/or 
lower-limb prosthesis and that had been using an artificial limb for at least one 
month were invited to take part in the study. Participants needed to have sufficient 
command of the English language to be able to express themselves and be capable 
of giving informed consent to take part in the study. 
The amount of time per day or week that the individual used their prosthesis for 
was not important, provided the participants considered themselves to be actively 
engaging with the limb, as opposed to a person who owned a limb but never used 
it, and so was arguably not a ‘user’. I also felt it important to ensure sufficient time 
had elapsed to ensure the individual had gained some familiarity with a prosthesis, 
and after discussion with researchers in the area, a period of at least one month’s 
prosthetic usage was deemed necessary for an individual to be eligible for inclusion 
in the study. This was in order for the user to have spent time with their prosthesis 
and so be able to talk meaningfully about life with an artificial limb. It is also fitting 
with studies that have explored the psychosocial aspects of assistive technology 
use that have ensured participants possessed their devices at least one month prior 
to investigations (Brandt, Iwarsson & Ståhl, 2003; Chen et al., 2014). 
Inclusion was limited to only those using upper- and/or lower-limb prostheses, 
meaning the exclusion of those who only used different kinds of prostheses, such 
as breast, penile or facial. The potential relevance of the resulting theory to other 
groups of prosthesis users is discussed further in chapter ten. These limbs could be 
whole artificial limbs (e.g., such as those that could be used by individuals that have 
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undergone a hemi-pelvectomy) or could be just part of a limb (e.g., for below-wrist 
limb absence). 
The literature in the field sometimes divides between upper- and lower-limb users, 
or between those with acquired or congenital limb absence, or loss of a limb 
through trauma or non-traumatic amputation (see Kratz et al., 2010). In this study, 
inclusion was informed on the basis of the research and by Grounded Theory 
principles – there was a need to understand users of prosthetic limbs, meaning 
individuals were sampled regardless of the region of their prosthetic limb, or the 
aetiology of their limb absence. A substantive area can take into account any group 
or groups of people, and so an emergent main concern will be an important 
concern for all persons involved, although sub-groups may have differing concerns 
if investigated separately. If, over the course of analyses, it is not possible to 
ascertain a main concern, then a project may need to be rethought. As it turned 
out, a main concern was established for prosthesis users, validating this decision to 
be inclusive. 
Identifying Participants and Recruitment 
Prosthesis users are a dispersed population and so present a challenge to sample. 
In this study, I recruited participants from a number of settings. An Irish prosthetics 
and orthotics centre connected me with a number of their clients, as did a 
consultant for an international artificial limb provider. Other participants were 
recruited through adverts and appeals to participate in the study via amputee 
support groups. 
One organisation agreed to place a small advert in their newsletter, whereas others 
contacted individuals directly, passing on letters of invitation (Appendix A). For 
instance, clients at the prosthetics and orthotics centre were given the letter at the 
end of their consultation. All participants were provided with the same study 
information, giving a detailed breakdown of the nature and intentions of the study 
(Appendix B). Those consenting to take part were then invited to meet at a location 
of their choosing. If I was unable to meet with participants face-to-face, telephone 
(VoIP) interviews were arranged. In the case of two participants who lived in parts 
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of the world where significant time zone divergences meant phone calls were not 
possible, discussions were conducted via email. 
The Sample 
Twenty-four participants were directly involved in the study: 19 male, 5 female. 
This sample size is congruent with extant Grounded Theory studies (Wilson & 
Hutchinson, 1996) though size is ultimately determined by the point at which 
theoretical completeness is reached, rather than going by a predefined number of 
participants or a particular volume of data (Glaser, 1998). 
These individuals were aged 18-62. Five individuals had congenital limb absence 
and 17 had acquired limb absence (two were unknown). Thirteen participants had 
lower-limb absence, two of which were bilateral, and ten had upper-limb absence, 
all of which were unilateral. One individual had bilateral lower-limb absence and 
unilateral upper-limb absence. All participants except for this individual used 
prostheses where a limb was absent. This individual did not use a prosthesis for his 
upper-limb absence. A table of participant demographic information is included in 
Appendix C. 
These individuals were each engaged in unstructured interviews, nine of which 
were conducted face-to-face, thirteen by telephone, and two by email. In addition 
to interviewed participants, sixteen autobiographical texts and one anthology of 
short autobiographical accounts were also included in the study, as well as 
seventeen blogs and forum posts from four discussion forums written by prosthesis 
users. Details of these further sources of data are also included in Appendix C. 
Data Collection 
To identify a main concern of prosthesis users and the way that prosthesis users 
process and manage this concern, an advantageous starting point is through 
engaging first-hand with those using prostheses. To this end I sought to conduct 
one-to-one interviews with individuals. Though interview data is the most common 
source of data in Grounded Theory studies (it is often the only source of data), 
other forms of data can be useful, hence the inclusion of readily accessible 
autobiographical and internet data. A core tenet of Grounded Theory is that ‘all is 
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data’, meaning that all forms of information linked to a substantive area are 
potentially relevant to analyses, and even those outside a substantive area may be 
useful for comparative purposes. In this study, while face-to-face and telephone 
interview data was the primary and starting source of information, this was 
supplemented by the autobiographies and internet data. The management of each 
of these kinds of data are discussed below. 
Interviewing 
Interviewing is the staple method of data collection in Grounded Theory (Backman 
& Kyngäs, 1999), as it allows the researcher to enquire about a main concern. 
Interview sessions can assume a style of being structured, semi-structured, or 
unstructured. This can be thought of as a continuum of control and focus over the 
interview scenario to a loose, unguided exploration of emergent issues. There are 
advantages and disadvantages to either extreme, but pertinently to Grounded 
Theory it is important to be aware that the more structured an interviewing 
process is, the greater the risk of precluding discussion of the issues that could be 
most important to the participant. An advantageous interviewing style in a 
Grounded Theory study is therefore one that enables the flexibility and versatility 
to invite discussion that may go in any number of directions, and one that enables 
actively pursuing or investigating leads put forward by participants. I therefore 
began with an unstructured interviewing style, asking open-ended questions such 
as ‘what is it like for you having a prosthesis?’, aiming to give participants a broad 
scope to respond. 
I asked broad questions in this vein, others of which can be found in a copy of the 
interview schedule (Appendix D). Since it is not possible to know in advance the 
main concerns of the participants of which to explore, I came to use the schedule 
mainly as a prompt for less forthcoming interviewees, and a guide for questions to 
begin interviews before participants’ responses provided the basis for further 
questions. 
To reduce the perceived formality of the interview situation, I offered to conduct 
interviews in more naturalistic settings, where possible, accompanying participants 
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to locations that they were familiar and comfortable with in order to put them at 
ease and so facilitate discussion (Ross, Renold, Holland, & Hillman, 2009). To this 
end, interviews took place in limb-fitting centres before or after consultations, or 
hotel bars or cafes. While this was not possible with the telephone interviews, I 
attempted to call at times when participants had said they would be at home and 
free to take the call, and encouraged emailed participants to reply only when they 
felt they had time to do so. 
Glaser and Holton (2004) assert that Grounded Theory can incorporate any form of 
interviewing style; the most appropriate emerging as the study advances. This 
leaves the researcher open to consider various techniques. I opted for an 
unstructured style, intending that this would give participants a broad scope to 
take discussions in various directions. I also sought to minimise my contribution by 
listening more and using interviewer silences to encourage interviewee disclosure. 
These techniques required balancing and avoiding overuse, where interviewees 
could perceive a quieter interviewer as disinterested, detached, and silences 
uncomfortable. 
Holstein and Gubrium (1995) recommend a more active interviewer approach. One 
feature of this is where the interviewer invites multiple perspectives on a topic 
through encouraging discussion of alternate viewpoints. This enables comments on 
a range of takes on an experience. However, while gaining multiple perspectives on 
a topic of discussion may be illuminating, it is reminiscent of axial coding and the 
practice of asking questions of the data that may be at the potential expense of 
relevance. Instead, I tried to find a balance between the poles of an over- and 
under-active interviewer, maximising the opportunities for participants to talk 
whilst retaining enough engagement to explore contributions and to ensure 
interviewees understood I was genuinely interested in their contributions. 
Before I brought interviews to a close, I invited a final disclosure of any topic the 
interviewee felt pertinent for further discussion or that had not been discussed, 
asking questions such as ‘is there anything we haven’t covered that you think I 
should know?’ This frequently prompted substantial extensions to the interviews, 
as participants appeared to consider whether they felt they had gotten their 
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accounts across appropriately, and added to this accordingly. Often, responses to 
this were of a different nature to the main discussion, as if the participants 
recognised that they had crafted the direction of the interview themselves, only to 
find when reminded of the nature of the interview that there were other things of 
relevance that had not fitted with the conversation but nonetheless deserved 
mention. 
Recording and Transcribing Interviews 
All interviews were audio-recorded for the purposes of re-listening and 
transcribing. These are acts Glaser specifically advises against. Instead, the 
researcher is recommended to write ‘session notes’ during an interview and 
directly after it (Glaser, 1998). Transcribing, he argued, takes too much time, and 
the act of recording can undermine or restrict a sense of confidentiality (Glaser, 
1998, 2001). However, these were more minor arguments in support of a greater 
concern of Glaser’s that researchers could become more preoccupied with 
inclusivity and ‘data accuracy’ at the expense of data collection and conceptual 
analyses. In Grounded Theory, the main purpose of conducting any initial 
interviews is to discover a main concern and the core category that resolves it, and 
then to account for the variation within this concept. These were things Glaser 
argued would come quickly, and then a researcher would hear over and over again 
in different forms. These indicators of patterns will be recurrent by their nature, 
and so a researcher should not worry about ‘missing’ anything if interviews are not 
fully recorded, transcribed and coded as they will encounter them at some point 
during subsequent data collection and analyses. This also means such efforts are 
redundant if a concern and core category are quickly identified and analyses should 
instead turn to exploring these through selective coding and theoretical sampling 
(elaborated below). 
However, as with the warning against engaging a theoretical substantive literature 
review prior to commencing analyses, it is the spirit of this message that is 
important and understanding this allows the flexibility to adhere more or less to 
Glaser’s advice. As explained in chapter three, I intended to employ some 
quotations to help express some of the categories and variation within the theory, 
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so I explained to participants how I would find it beneficial to record the interview 
and to potentially use their words to this end, and all consented to this. In face-to-
face interviews I then attempted to play down any perceived formality brought 
about by the intrusion of the recorder in face-to-face interviews by ensuring the 
device was out of sight. It was my hope that in the telephone interviews, as 
discussions progressed, participants would forget about the recorder. 
I also felt that when re-listening and transcribing interviews, thoughtful 
consideration of the data could also potentially cut down the time taken to come 
across the conceptual patterns within the data. In addition, I also found that an 
undistracted reflection during re-listening not only promotes deeper consideration 
of a discussion, but it can help to improve an interviewer technique when re-
listening to one’s own conduct becomes difficult. These points led me to the 
decision to record and fully transcribe all interviews. 
In terms of the session notes, I suspected writing these within the interview 
situation would have been too much for an unseasoned interviewer like myself, 
who would be focusing on what the participants were saying and responding 
accordingly, and I would also be less comfortable as an interviewee if an 
interviewer was making notes while I spoke to them. Instead, I limited my session 
note writing to only after interviews had ended, where I noted my thoughts on the 
interview, about what had been said and any pertinent observations I had made. 
Autobiographies 
Autobiographical texts were a further source of data which I drew on over the 
course of this study. Like interviews, such data could be explored in early analytical 
phases and/or later drawn upon to elaborate variation within theoretical 
categories. These texts were analysed in a similar manner to the text from 
transcribed interviews, as was the internet data, and this is discussed in the analysis 
section below. I sourced these texts through searching bookseller catalogues for 




In addition to interviews and autobiographies, the internet presents a potentially 
rich source for data. I reasoned that because prosthesis users are a relatively small 
and dispersed population, these individuals are likely to use the web as a means of 
recording their experiences and connecting with each other. A brief search 
confirmed this, revealing a myriad of blogs and discussion groups varying in 
member numbers and forum activity. Using variations of ‘amputee’ and ‘prosthesis’ 
as keywords I came across a number of sites which were compared to the 
inclusion/exclusion criteria of the study. Seventeen blogs and four discussion 
forums were included in the study (see Appendix C). 
However, data on the internet comes with its own distinct methodological 
considerations. Potential participants may be approached for data directly or in 
real-time, such as in a chat forum or by the researcher posting a call for information 
on a community page. New data may be obtained in this way, but may also be 
obtained through browsing existing discussions and blogs. In both cases it is 
difficult to verify participant demographic information. My inclusion criteria 
specified that individuals needed to have been using a prosthesis for a period of at 
least one month, and this was not always clear with internet data. Where it was not 
possible to ask individuals directly, I therefore strove to check whether blogs 
contained posts going back at least one month that suggested the individual had 
been using a prosthesis then, and likewise examined forum member post histories. 
There are also a number of unique ethical considerations to be aware of with the 
use of internet data that merit discussion outside of the main ethics discussion. 
Robert Kozinets, in his development of a form of internet ethnography he terms 
‘netnography’, discusses a number of these considerations (Kozinets, 2009). He 
notes that currently, there is a dearth of ethical guidance for web data collection 
and usage, and so researchers are best advised to take a conscientious approach 
when interacting with internet data. The British Psychological Society (2013) also 
offer some brief guidance for online research, but Kozinets discusses the principles 
of good practice at length in his text, and on this basis I employed his advice as the 
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guiding source for working with internet data, on top of Grounded Theory 
procedures. 
Of these points, a few are worth clarifying. When conducting research studies 
online, consideration of a community is paramount, and the researcher should be 
aware that when they engage with users, they are entering a realm that some 
consider a safe haven for discussion between likeminded individuals. Many users 
consider these areas to be private and may not take kindly to intrusions from 
outsiders, even if it is clear that these discussion groups are not invitation-only or 
password-protected –they are readily accessible to anyone (Kozinets, 2009). With 
this in mind, and with an awareness that those with limb absence are routinely 
bothered by so-called ‘devotees’ (see Aguilera, 2000), I contacted moderators to 
seek permission to post prior to inviting comments in threads, and then announced 
my presence and intentions when posting. 
The use of internet comments or posts as quotations also merits consideration. In 
interview scenarios, permission to record can be sought and quotations can be kept 
anonymous. On the internet however, some have expressed disdain upon 
discovering that comments they have made in an area they have considered private 
have been used elsewhere (Kozinets, 2009). Permission to quote may be requested 
from the original poster, but this is not always possible, particularly when posts 
date back over the years and accounts become inactive and disconnected from 
posters. Complete anonymity is also problematic, as the powerful nature of search 
engines mean that quotations can be traced back to their original source with 
relative ease. Kozinets recounts a study where a number of members of an online 
community were disgruntled with the fact that some of their group had taken part 
in an online ethnographic study. Some of these displeased individuals took it upon 
themselves to search and map out all used quotations in the resultant publication 
to the identities of their posters, presumably to highlight and ostracise the 
individuals that were willing to speak publicly about their group (p. 144). Kozinets 
considers that this kind of response would normally be confined to close-knit 
groups or where discussions are often of a strongly personal nature, and while 
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prosthesis user communities may share these qualities, I discovered that members 
welcomed my presence. 
Computer Assistance 
There is much discussion of the use of computers and software in Grounded Theory 
projects. This is something Glaser (1998) also had something to say about. He 
expressed concern that researchers would believe that software packages such as 
NVivo (QSR International Pty Ltd, 2012) could help out with Grounded Theory 
analyses, and this is understandable given the increase in data analysis features 
with each version and that QSR advertise it as ‘research software for analysis and 
insight’. While some qualitative inquiries may find these features of automated 
analysis useful, Grounded Theory requires the careful identification and 
conceptualisation of patterns from incident data which is beyond the most complex 
of current software algorithms. It is a fundamentally human task in its complexity – 
for instance, even at a simple level, phrases may differ yet share the same meaning, 
and contemporary programs are not yet close to mastering this beyond isolated 
instances. Within passages of text, across varying contexts, such patterns can easily 
go unrecognised. Proponents of computer-aided analysis in Grounded Theory that 
are aware of this suggest that programs are made best use of when they instead 
are used to help organise the research, such as through keeping track of multitudes 
of codes that are often generated in an analysis (e.g., Bringer, Johnston, & 
Brackenridge, 2006; Hutchison, Johnston, & Breckon, 2009). I certainly appreciated 
their utility when encountering this in my own analyses. 
When limiting the role of software to that of organisational, Glaser (1998) 
remarked that software programs such as NVivo could be seen as an ‘elegant 
pencil’ for analyses (p. 185), and provided usage does not inhibit the fluidity of 
analysis, it has the potential to bolster efficiency. I found this to be the case when 
using NVivo to organise my work, as after uploading data to the package and 
beginning coding, I could quickly view summaries of my work to-date, which helped 
me to identify patterns in the codes I had produced and then attach memos to 
these. It was also beneficial to be able to quickly go from a concept I had memoed 
about and trace it back through codes that had contributed to this, to the data, 
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ensuring I kept my writing grounded, and also to point to potential illustrative 
quotations that could be employed in the write-up. In sum, I found it useful to have 
a sort of virtual scrapbook in which to house various forms of data and to store and 
index my analyses, the indexing facilitating further analyses, but the actual 
conceptual work underpinning this remained my sole manual task. 
Ethical Considerations 
Ethical approval for the study was obtained from the Dublin City University 
Research Ethics Committee. To avoid undue pressure to participate when recruiting 
participants to the study, I contacted professionals and group leaders to help 
recruit individuals on my behalf. On this basis, leaders and staff contacted their 
members or clients and distributed the study information sheet to those individuals 
that expressed an interest in participating. Participants would then either contact 
me directly via telephone or email, or leaders would forward me the contact details 
of interested individuals. I would then either email or telephone these individuals 
and re-iterate the details of the study, confirming their continuing interest before 
arranging a time to conduct the interview. In cases of phone interviews, some of 
these interviews followed immediately after, but where it was possible to meet the 
individuals, we arranged to meet at a location convenient and acceptable to the 
individual. In both scenarios, prior to commencement of the interview, I enquired 
whether they had any questions about the study and requested consent. All 
participants were asked to sign a consent form prior to their involvement in the 
study and in the cases of telephone interviews, consent was requested verbally and 
again through return of scanned consent forms via email. 
Prior to the interview, participants were reminded that they could withdraw at any 
time from the study without penalty. All participants were assured of 
confidentiality throughout the study. The only personal data requested were 
participants’ names, their email addresses, and telephone numbers, in case further 
contact with them to explore topics was necessary. These details were stored 
separately from the interview data. 
I explained to participants that when I produced the final thesis, pseudonyms 
would be used and any potentially identifying details would be removed. However, 
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I did remind participants that if a person referred them to the study, then they 
would naturally have an idea of their involvement, and it was also a small possibility 
that given the relatively small population of prosthesis users and specific prosthetic 
configurations, that some accounts would be recognisable to familiar others even 
when anonymised. I reassured participants that I would do my best to ensure any 
material quoted would be devoid of specificities where possible. No participants 
revoked their consent. 
Interview data was recorded through an audio-capture device and copied to a 
computer, whereby the original recording was erased and the stored file encrypted 
to ensure confidentiality of all electronic records. No hard copies of the data exist 
and only the research team had access to the recordings and transcripts. These 
were labelled for erasure for five years after their creation, as per DCU personal 
data policy. 
It was anticipated that participants would be at minimal risk to harm since the 
research employed non-invasive data collection procedures. However, I recognised 
that during interview sessions it would be possible that discussion may move 
towards sensitive topics, such as if a limb had been lost, which some may find 
distressing to talk about. In the event that a person became upset as a result of 
participating in the study, the information on the study information sheet directed 
the individual to relevant support systems (see Appendix B). 
Analyses 
Analyses in a Grounded Theory study are iterative and incremental. In brief, the 
process begins with open coding where substantive codes are produced through 
comparing and contrasting incidents to determine patterns. These conceptual 
patterns are explored and their relationships with other patterns established. 
During this process, a concept that appears to account for many of the other 
concepts is also emergently developed. This is labelled as the core concept which 
organises the entire theory and is the category of action that manages a core 
concern of individuals in the substantive area. At this time, open coding switches to 
selective coding to help explore further concepts relevant to the core and to 
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reconceptualise and ‘saturate’ those presently identified. When all variation within 
the core category is accounted for then the theory can be said to have reached a 
level of ‘theoretical sufficiency’. This section provides detail for each of these steps 
as I moved from the data towards the emergent theory, and examples of these 
processes in action are given in the appendices. 
First, it is important to recognise the way in which a Grounded Theory analysis is 
underpinned by the constant comparative method. This is the process of comparing 
incidents throughout data to determine patterns that form the basis for the 
creation of theoretical categories. Constant comparison occurs at all levels of an 
analysis, not just to identify categories, but to refine them through comparison 
with others, other properties, and incidents. Glaser and Holton (2004) note the 
three important ways that constant comparison occurs: 
Incidents are compared to incidents to establish underlying 
uniformity and its varying conditions. The uniformity and the 
conditions become generated concepts and hypotheses. Then, 
concepts are compared to more incidents to generate new 
theoretical properties of the concept and more hypotheses. The 
purpose is theoretical elaboration, saturation and verification of 
concepts, densification of concepts by developing their properties 
and generation of further concepts. Finally, concepts are compared 
to concepts. The purpose is to establish the best fit of many choices 
of concepts to a set of indicators, the conceptual levels between the 
concepts that refer to the same set of indicators and the integration 
into hypotheses between the concepts, which becomes the theory. 
(para. 53) 
The constant comparative method is true to its name and takes the researcher 
from data and conceptual fragments to a final unified theory. It also guarantees the 
‘groundedness’ of an emerging theory through ensuring that properties of 
theoretical categories arise only through comparison of incidents in the data (or 
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between conceptual products that have originated from incident comparisons), and 
hence that each aspect of the theory has earned its inclusion. 
Open Coding 
I began analysing the data through open coding. This is a substantive coding 
process that involves going over the data, identifying incidents and appending 
codes that conceptually reflect the content of an incident (Glaser, 1978, 1992, 
1998, 2001). Though painstaking, line-by-line coding has been recommended to 
encourage ‘full theoretical coverage’ (Glaser, 1978), whereby the researcher is 
encouraged to carefully pore over the data and generate numerous codes as they 
go, which may often be for the same incident. This way the researcher is said to be 
‘running the data open’ (Glaser, 1978). For example, (depending on the data) an 
incident could be coded as ‘restraining oneself’ as well as ‘avoiding involvement’. 
Early into my analyses, I took line-by-line coding rather literally, and quickly found 
that assigning a code to each sentence of my data was not the most useful way of 
coding. For instance, I found that in some transcripts, some interviewees appeared 
to say very little in a sentence, or that what was being said was taking place over a 
couple of sentences. Conversely, sometimes a code appeared relevant to one part 
of a sentence and another code to another part. So the density of codes tended to 
vary and thus I sought a more flexible approach to coding. Remembering that 
Glaser often worked with interview session notes and not transcripts helped me to 
identify this. In his coding advice, Glaser was almost certainly not advocating the 
coding of all sentences within a transcript. Rather, the suggestion of coding he 
made in his 1978 text was in regard to coding the recommended session notes that 
a researcher was encouraged to make during or after interviews and the field notes 
that could be made in other situations. By their nature, this would make the notes 
more selective, concise, and non-repetitious, and so such a process of coding all 
sentences makes more sense. 
With this in mind, I kept to line-by-line coding in the sense that I considered each 
line of the data, but determined that any portion of data could be considered to be 
a single incident. This enabled me to code half sentences, multiple sentences 
together, or entire paragraphs (examples of my open coding are given in Appendix 
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E). However, I was conscious to ensure that my unit of analysis did not enlarge so 
as to become too much of a conceptual impression (Glaser, 1998). This ‘overview 
approach’ runs the risk of losing the precision of what is going on and instead 
incorporating a professional opinion of the data (Glaser, 1978). Therefore, although 
I kept analysing each line of my data, I only (and always) coded where one single 
thing could be said to be occurring in the data, which kept incidents focal, and 
coding plentiful and consistent. It is notable that the language around coding 
advocated more recently by Glaser has begun to emphasise coding ‘incidents’ and 
less about sentence coding, further inferring compatibility with my interpretation 
(Glaser, 2001). 
In this initial open coding, I sometimes had recourse to use in-vivo codes with the 
data. In-vivo involve the participants’ own language, and I found it useful to include 
such terms to better familiarise myself with accounts of prosthesis use and to 
retain meaning in my coding. As interviews and analyses progressed, I was able to 
better understand the meaning imbued in these terms by the participants and felt 
more comfortable using my own. 
Despite the strategy of coding incidents appearing to initially work well, a single 
transcript generated over 50 apparently unconnected codes and led to an 
unmanageable amount over multiple transcripts. After some deliberation, I realised 
that I had not been conceptualising nor coding according to the Grounded Theory 
principle of constant comparison well enough. Since coding in Grounded Theory is 
the pursuit of patterns via comparative analysis, I had instead provided quite 
descriptive labels to each incident without considering them at a more conceptual 
level, particularly in regard to each other, from which to discern fewer codes that 
can span multiple incidents. This is a common pitfall in Grounded Theory analyses, 
particularly for the researcher new to the methodology (Higgins, 2006; Holton, 
2010; Philbin, 2009). There was also an element of ‘conceptual foppery’ (Glaser, 
2002a) where I had attempted to code but with comparison lacking, leading to the 
same issue. Returning to the open coding, I aimed to better invoke comparison and 
to consider incidents using the three important questions in Grounded Theory 
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coding that would help improve fostering conceptualisation. Glaser (1998) defined 
these as: 
1) What is this a study of? 
2) What category does this incident indicate? 
3) What property of what category does this incident indicate? 
Asking these questions when coding helps to encourage consideration of the 
individual incident as well as in comparison to other data and keeps coding at a 
conceptual level (Glaser, 1998). However, Holton’s (2010) explanation was of some 
comfort to my former efforts: 
As a grounded theorist develops her conceptual coding skills, she 
can more readily dispense with the initial descriptive codes and 
employ conceptual-level coding from the outset of the open coding 
process. This takes skill in conceptualisation as well as a ready 
arsenal of conceptual labels; both are developed over time and with 
continued practice. (p. 26) 
In a way then, my first forays became practice at conceptualisation which I sought 
to improve upon. With the above guidance, I was able to move forward and 
backward across the data and my initial coding, comparing incidents and codes and 
adjusting and forming new ones where relevant. I often returned to refine codes 
given to patterns of incidents as I progressed through the transcripts and soon 
found I was managing a much more reasonable quantity of codes. This enabled a 
clearer view of the emerging categories and consequently clearer directions for 
theoretical sampling. However, before discussion of theoretical sampling, 
consideration must be given to the important process of ‘theoretical memoing’, 
where much of the work is done in composing a Grounded Theory. 
Theoretical Memos 
When conceptualising a pattern, theoretical memos are written. These memos are 
said to be the ‘theorising write-up of ideas about codes and their relationships as 
they strike the analyst’ (Glaser, 1978, p. 83). They are the spaces for discussion of 
the possible linkages of incidents or codes and for postulating how a theory may 
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develop, and potential leads for theoretical sampling (Glaser, 1998). In short, they 
keep track of the emerging theory. 
Glaser referred to memos as a ‘moment capture of an idea’ (Glaser, 1998), written 
at any time, and he advocates the freedom to construct these however the 
researcher sees fit. Initially, Glaser recommended they normally accomplish at least 
one of five goals: (1) helping to raise the data to a conceptualisation level; (2) 
developing the properties of each category which begins to define it operationally; 
(3) presenting hypotheses about connections between categories and/or their 
properties; (4) beginning to integrate these connections with clusters of other 
categories to generate the theory; (5) beginning to locate the emerging theory with 
other theories with more or less relevance (Glaser, 1978). However, he later 
suggested that formalising memo requirements could ‘stifle emergence’ (Glaser, 
1998, p. 179) and these guidelines may instead be interpreted as common useful 
purposes of memos, but that memos may take any form in service analyses toward 
the emerging theory (Glaser, 2014). 
In practice, I found it useful to focus my early memos on the naming and describing 
of a pattern, trying to justify this with reference back to the data and to the 
contributing code(s). An example of an early memo like this can be found in 
Appendix F, along with some more mature memos. As analyses progressed, these 
memos began to be re-writes of earlier memos, refining my writing of patterns and 
their relationships to others. ‘Sorting’, a process of comparison and consolidation 
of memos, then helps to refine the structure of a theory. Memoing was also an 
integral part of the final write-up, as they reflected maturing analyses and the 
shape of the developing theory. 
Theoretical Sampling 
As the constant comparison processes of analyses in a Grounded Theory study are 
engaged, concepts and their properties emerge through coding and writing about 
these patterns through theoretical memoing. Once a pattern has been 
conceptualised, indications are made about a concept, but what is gleaned from 
the data may only inform a partial understanding of the concept. Theoretical 
sampling is therefore employed to seek out data to further elaborate concept 
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dimensions. It is important to clarify that theoretical sampling is not a search for 
‘negative cases’ but instead for variation in a pattern and to understand what 
accounts for this. According to Glaser (1998), ‘it is the “where next” in collecting 
data, the “for what” according to the codes” and the “why” from the analysis in 
memos’ (p. 157).  
During analyses, I sought to theoretically sample incidents in new and existing data 
to help explore concepts. Like other patterns, ‘just normal' was therefore 
theoretically sampled for, but following the conceptualisation and identification of 
this as the core category of the theory, theoretical sampling was delimited to 
identifying the variability of only the concepts involved in the theory. As these 
concepts account for the core category of the theory, then in a sense, theoretically 
sampling for any of these was always part of a search for variation on ‘just normal’. 
For example, a pattern that began life as ‘protective aversion’ had been 
conceptualised to account for incidents where individuals did not do certain things 
in order to protect their ongoing ability to use their prosthesis. After identifying 
this, theoretical sampling led me to determine protective aversion occurring in 
different forms that could be conceptualised as distinct concepts within a concept 
of protective aversion. In doing this, I also came across incidents where protective 
aversion did not occur, and persons using a prosthesis would press on with an 
activity even in the knowledge that there was a high likelihood of detrimental 
consequences. This enabled me to conceptualise a further related pattern of non-
avoiding, and accounting for the difference between the two drew me closer to my 
core category through understanding what motivated these acts. Similarly, when 
the core category was established, I theoretically sampled for black-spotting, an 
evolved version of protective aversion, and which I had re-conceptualised as how 
persons identify situated threats to their ability to continue to be just normal. I 
therefore sought to explore the variability in how persons respond to these 
identified threats in order to keep just normal. As an account of black-spotting, I 
had established protective avoidance, and what later became known as vigilant 
risk-reducing, but it was through theoretical sampling that I identified the further 
distinct responding to situated threats that was conceptualised as fail-safing (these 
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are further individually explained and the relationships between these explored in 
chapter six). After no more variation became apparent while theoretical sampling 
for incidents concerning black-spotting, I felt I had a good understanding of the 
concept, and thus a part of how persons overall manage being just normal. 
Theoretical sampling was therefore a process which was continually engaged 
throughout the analytical period. Whenever I conceptualised a pattern, this was 
from comparison of incidents that I understood was a pattern of something 
occurring, but like in the black-spotting example I was aware that I may only have 
understood part of how this pattern varied. Thus I sought to inquire further as to 
how persons resolved being just normal, exploring each pattern within the theory 
in order to try to gain a fuller account as to how persons manage the concern. 
A process of theoretical sampling therefore is repeatedly employed until the 
cessation of further unique properties of a theoretical category. This is the point of 
so-called ‘theoretical saturation’ when no further variability in the theoretical 
categories appears present in theoretically sampled data (this is further explored in 
the section below on theoretical saturation/completeness). 
Theoretical Coding 
It is said that the least understood aspect of Grounded Theory methodology is 
theoretical coding (Glaser, 2005; Hernandez, 2009). However, theoretical codes are 
the essential integrating elements of an emerging substantive theory and so 
deserve thoughtful consideration. These codes model relations between patterns 
and concepts, giving shape to the theory, whether that of a process, a typology, a 
continuum, or an ‘amplifying causal loop’, etc. (Glaser, 1978). They can be any form 
of proposition that suggest how the substantive codes that are derived from the 
data may fit together, thus providing the form of the final theory. 
Glaser (1978, 2005) often discusses theoretical codes in terms of ‘coding families’ 
such as the oft used ‘Six C’s, comprising ‘context’, ‘condition’, ‘cause’, 
‘consequence’, ‘covariance’ and ‘contingency’. Considering such families stimulate 
further ways of thinking about the form of the emerging theory – for instance, if 
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analyses indicate that a cause may be relevant between patterns, considering the 
other five ‘c’s’ may indicate further thought for the development of the theory. 
Glaser (1998) said about theoretical codes that ‘they are emergent and weave the 
fractured story turned into concepts back to an organised whole theory’ (p. 163). A 
further claim of another quality of Grounded Theory being emergent should not 
come as a surprise at this stage, but Glaser drew attention to this to encourage that 
persons should not automatically draw upon ways of relating concepts that may be 
regularly employed in the literature in the substantive area, instead considering 
those which are best fitting – those which have ‘earned relevance’, as indicated by 
worked analyses with the data. 
To assist in this emergence and considered fit, reading outside of a substantive area 
is encouraged, as this will help to develop sensitivity to potentially useful 
theoretical codes that can help draw the theory together (Glaser, 2005). In fact, a 
Grounded Theory researcher is recommended to have a wealth of theoretical 
codes from which to draw upon (Glaser, 1978), and so this can be problematic for 
an early researcher such as myself. Accordingly then, in accompaniment to analyses 
of the data, I read theoretical works not directly related to the area that were 
informed by my conceptual writing and of general interest. For instance, when I 
began to conceptualise around notions of normality and self-appraisals, this 
prompted me to read more deeply in the theoretical literature on self and other 
relations such as that discussed in Symbolic Interactionism (Blumer, 1986; Mead, 
2009). So too with decision-making literatures when I was conceptualising how 
individuals chose whether to change their prosthesis or to stay with the limb they 
had. Considering the way that self-relations and decision-making were modelled in 
the literature appeared relevant and helped me to think about my own analyses, 
spawning many further memos, though I ultimately did not explicitly draw upon 
this structuring. 
Despite the importance of theoretical codes, Glaser (2005) notes that a grounded 
theory is not flawed if it does not appear to utilise any. Many Grounded Theory 
studies do not appear to explicitly invoke theoretical codes, yet their usage is 
implicit and unavoidable as a theory necessarily consists of relationships between 
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concepts in some form. A researcher not noting the use of such codes may simply 
not have been aware of the codes they themselves were employing during the 
development of their theory. So though theoretical codes are an integral aspect of 
a grounded theory, their explicit identification is less important, but contemplating 
these may facilitate developing a theory if it provides useful considerations for 
further thoughts on modelling and for theoretical sampling. 
In this study, I did not identify the theoretical coding of the theory until much later 
on in analyses, yet this was helpful in developing the theory. The final form of the 
theory is that of a core concept which has three ‘modes’. That is, the core category 
takes three distinct, yet related dynamic forms. This is somewhat distinct from a 
typology in the sense that types may reflect the varying forms of something, 
whereas modes may do this but also reflect the manner of the action involved. To 
think of this a different way, there can be types of bicycle (e.g., road, mountain, 
fixed-gear, folding, tandem) and modes of cycling (e.g., leisurely, competitively, for 
fitness), and modes in this way indicate different kinds of cycling and where the 
purpose is important to consider. The difference between types and modes may be 
modest, but considering the phenomenon through a dynamic arrangement which 
varies, as a modal arrangement foregrounds, helped me to develop the theory by 
stimulating thinking about the nature of the differing modes, and so this helped me 
to refine those I had identified and to consider whether there were other modes of 
the core category, and how these might relate to each other. Considering ‘modes’ 
also facilitated capturing something of the action involved in the resolving of the 
concern when naming the theoretical categories, and this is important in a 
grounded theory and further addressed in chapter 10 (on the section on the ‘fit’ of 
the theory). I am not aware of a theoretical code of ‘modality’ being mentioned in 
Grounded Theory methodology, and so other Grounded Theory researchers 
developing their own theories may find it useful to glean this from this work or to 
study other models of modalities. 
A Core Category and Selective Coding 
During analyses (Glaser, 1998, contends this can come earlier or later), a core 
category is ‘run into’ (Glaser, 1998, p. 138). Up until this moment, concepts may 
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have been developed that may appear linked or separate, but the core category is 
identified as the pervading and organising concept that sits at the centre of a 
theory and accounts for the action within other categories. It helps to integrate 
identified concepts and is the key latent pattern of action that speaks to a main 
concern of the participants. In addition, Glaser (1978) stated that a core must relate 
meaningfully and clearly to other categories and have ‘grabbing’ implications for 
formal theory. To help this emerge, Glaser and Holton (2004) later recommended 
three sensitising questions to consider when working with the data: 
1) What is actually happening in the data? 
2) What is the main concern being faced by the participants? 
3) What accounts for the continual resolving of this concern? 
At this point it is important to note that a core category may be one of a number 
within a substantive area. That is, individuals likely have multiple significant 
concerns and likewise there are multiple core categories. However, a theory must 
contend with a single core category (Glaser, 1978), even if multiple theories can be 
derived from the same data. A case in point is Glaser and Strauss’ original grounded 
theories, the first of which involved ‘awareness contexts’ as the core (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1965) and the second ‘dying trajectories’ (Glaser & Strauss, 1968), both of 
which were developed from the same data. 
In this study, I contended with a number of possible core categories, memoing 
about these and their relations to other concepts. These were emergent 
‘possibilities’ that I necessarily worked with for periods during analyses, testing 
their fit and whether they would ‘pattern out’. Of course, all were ultimately 
rejected until one was determined to fulfil Glaser’s (1978) core category criteria, 
accounting for the variation across and within identified concepts, and had best fit 
with the emergent main concern. I was aware that a prolonged period could be 
required to identify an appropriate core, having been cautioned by Glaser (1998) 
that ‘it takes many misses to get to core and relevances’ (p. 182). 
Some grounded theories contain core categories that appear to link to a concern 
more closely than others. That is to say, some theories contain core categories that 
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more or less express a conceptual concern through the core itself. For instance, 
‘solutioning’ in mathematical students quite plainly indicates a concern of coming 
across situations that require solutions, and ‘moral reckoning’ as a core action of 
nurses is a giveaway of a concern of needing to manage issues of a moral nature, as 
was the case in Nathaniel’s (2006) grounded theory. In other grounded theories, a 
concern may become more apparent once the detail in the core and thus the 
constituent sub-core categories and their properties are expressed (e.g., “offsetting 
the affective filter”, in Chametzky, 2013; or “mutual intacting”, in N. Elliott, 2010). It 
is therefore arguable that there may be some cases where analyses do not prompt 
a need to distinguish a concern from a core category, particularly if forcing doing so 
for the sake of coming up with differing terms is detrimental in expressing both the 
concern and resolution. To take this study as an example - persons that use 
prostheses express a conceptual main concern about being just normal (explained 
further in Chapter 5). This is a significant concern that preoccupies prosthesis users, 
and was discovered to be resolved via diffuse modes of action that enable a person 
to live just normally. It is almost redundant to state then, that a concern of being 
just normal is resolved by actions effected to ensure a person can be this way. 
Therefore, though somewhat against tradition, but in-line with Grounded Theory 
principles, a concern and core category of participants in this study was considered 
to relate to living just normally: They were concerned about being just normal, and 
in resolving the varied ways in which this concern is brought about, they are 
implicated in various modes of actions to live just normally. 
Once identified, the core category then helps to refine existing concepts as they are 
reconceptualised with regards to this pattern (concepts are reconceptualised into 
categories of the emerging theory). In this study, early on I identified patterns of 
participants comparing themselves to others in different ways, and so I memoed 
about these, but these patterns were then returned to and reconsidered when the 
core category of ‘just normal’ was determined to account for these comparisons 
and enlightened the purpose of doing so. This can be observed in the first sample 
memo in Appendix F, which was later re-conceptualised in the third sample memo. 
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When a core category has been recognised, open coding ends and selective coding 
begins. This entails limiting data collection and coding to only that which is relevant 
to the emerging conceptual framework (the core and categories that relate to the 
core) (Holton, 2010). Selective coding helps to delimit the scope of analyses by 
focusing theoretical sampling to just seeking variation in terms of the core category 
and thus the concepts within the theory (see Appendix G). This continues until the 
process of constant comparison yields no further properties or elaborations of the 
categories, and so theoretical saturation is said to have occurred (Glaser, 1978). 
Theoretical Saturation and Theoretical Completeness 
When analyses of data from theoretical sampling determine no further variations 
of a particular theoretical category, it is said to be ‘saturated’ (Glaser, 2001; Glaser 
& Strauss, 1967). This is a proposal that has been criticised by some, and Dey (1999) 
in particular has taken issue with the idea of saturation, claiming that a notion of 
saturating categories implies a kind of comprehensive analysis which is at odds with 
a methodology that delimits and does not seek to code all data. Dey’s issue is that 
saturation is a subjective claim on the part of the researcher and instead that 
researchers should consider a ‘theoretical sufficiency’ (p. 257) towards categories. 
However, Dey misunderstands the methodology as analyses towards a theory that 
is intended to reflect action in a substantive area will always need to be delimited 
at some stage. Instead, Grounded Theory promotes starting out with openness, 
working through early analyses to develop a range of concepts, before elaborating 
and refining those that recur, and in regard to a core category. Theoretical sampling 
enables those elaborations but also is a process that indicates cessation when 
significant conceptual variation appears to have been captured. Importantly, this 
occurs with the proviso that an emergent theory should be modifiable and so open 
to further variation that could at some point arise. As Glaser stated, a grounded 
theory is ‘as good as far as it goes’ (Glaser, 2003, p. 147), and by this, Glaser is 
suggesting that if the concepts and thus the theory have utility – if they have 
workability and resonance – then this is the sought after state that theoretical 
saturation relates to, rather than any implications that it is comprehensive of all 
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data that could be encountered and that it is a ‘know everything’  theory (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967, p. 73). 
In this study, theoretical saturation was judged present when no further evidence 
of variation within the core category could be determined in theoretically sampled 
data – both new data and the data already collected that was analysed for further 
variation. As the theory revolved around the core category, saturating this meant 
the saturation of the sub-core categories too. When this occurred, the theory was 
deemed ‘theoretically complete’. 
Conclusion 
This chapter reflects a commitment to the methodologies of Grounded Theory 
upon application. The basic principles of freedom and openness, emergence and 
flexibility helped to develop the theory that was systematically derived from the 
accounts of prosthesis users. It has been through extended immersion in the 
Grounded Theory methodology literature and the actual application of the method 
processes that I fully recognised that a credible theory of how prosthesis users 
process and manage a core concern could only be produced through thoughtful 
consideration of each part of the Grounded Theory methodological package.  
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Chapter 5: The Emergent Theory - ‘Just Normal’ 
Introduction 
In this chapter, the main theoretical contribution of the thesis is presented and 
defined. More specifically, the main concern and resolving core category that 
analyses helped to ‘emerge’ are discussed in detail. This discussion gives an 
understanding of the overall theory and sets the stage for further exploration of 
the particular components that make up the theory, which are then explored in the 
subsequent analysis chapters. 
Introducing the Concern 
A main concern of the prosthesis users involved in this study is whether they were 
‘just normal’ – this is a concern that persons are able to be and live in a way they 
perceive is right, such as it being fair and sufficient, and that this is how things 
generally will be for them. The ‘just’ naming of this concept accounts for qualities 
of ‘reasonableness’ and ‘good-enoughness’, and also foregrounds how such a way 
of being is not viewed by persons as an excess or that it must necessarily be an 
optimal, but rather a standard of how things at least ought or should be for that 
person. The ‘normal’ of just normal pertains to the state of being that a just-ness 
defines. It is the way in which things should typically be for a particular person, or 
the day-to-day regularity of the way in which that person lives. 
When persons have just normal concerns, these relate to things about themselves 
and their experiences in the world that need to be of a right and reasonable nature. 
The particular areas for a particular individual that can be just normal or not just 
normal are therefore potentially limitless (although they may be delimited through 
use a particular conceptual framework – i.e., through the WHO’s ICF). For 
prosthesis users, areas of concern may commonly pertain to aspects of their 
prosthesis use or the relationship they may share with a prosthetist. A prosthesis 
can also enable a person to live just normally. Consider an individual with lower-
limb absence who believes that they should be able to get about without the need 
for crutches. They may perceive it as only right that they are able to walk about 
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largely like others, and that this is informed by them having some conception of 
prostheses that indicates that this is a possibility. They may therefore see it is as 
just normal to possess a prosthesis in order to be able to get about in this way. To 
another, having a prosthesis that enables walking may similarly be viewed as 
necessary, but they might view an ability to run as also a requirement of being just 
normal. For this person, to gain a prosthesis that can only afford walking would not 
be ‘good enough’ because it is insufficient to only be able to walk and unfair not to 
be able to run if they perceive it possible to do so. So what it means to be just 
normal can vary between people, and between situations, and there are many 
dimensions of just normal for prosthesis users that go beyond mobility. 
A concern of just normal manifests clearly at times when it is threatened or 
violated. One way this can be observed is when users of prostheses petition 
authorities, insurers or third-party providers to sanction payment of a particular 
prosthesis or part of a prosthesis, and when their petitions are denied. Such a limb, 
or part of a limb, may be determined by the individual to be the means to live just 
normally, in that the particular person perceives that a particular prosthesis can 
provide a sufficient level of enablement and that it would not be right to have less. 
But when financiers appear unwilling to sanction more than what one interviewed 
individual referred to as ‘the cheapest of the cheap’, then to accept a lesser 
solution instead could be to live in a way that is not just normal because of its 
insufficiency. For example, Alan, a lower-limb prosthesis user, spoke to me about 
his frustrations with his health authority who financed the prostheses he used. He 
had been refused a prosthesis of his choosing, instead being offered what he saw 
was a much poorer solution: 
They wanted to give me the same leg as they would give an 80 year 
old that doesn’t use the leg quite often. Well I use my leg for 15 
hours a day! That’s completely different to someone that might only 
use it for an hour or two and take it off! 
Alan’s frustrations lay in being told to use a leg that he felt was not suitable for him. 
He was aware of different prosthetic options; he asserted ‘the technology is there’ 
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and yet being recommended to use one that he perceived was suited to older, less-
active individuals, and thus one that could only support such a lifestyle, was not 
right because this was not how Alan lived and felt he ought to be able to keep 
living. Alan used his leg for 15 hours a day and this was something he felt he should 
be able to keep up. The recommended leg would not even meet this standard. In 
addition, knowing that there were various types of prosthetic legs out there and 
that different legs suited different people, Alan was angered by being 
recommended the leg of an older person. To be treated as if prosthesis users were 
a homogenous group where ‘one basic size fits all’, when he knew this was not the 
case, was an injustice. His circumstances were ‘completely different’ and he felt 
this necessitated a completely different prosthesis. Thus the recommended leg 
might help an older person to live just normally, and Alan identified that ‘it might 
be alright for them’, but it would not do for him. If Alan had accepted this 
prosthesis, he would have been unable to live in such a way that he felt he ought to 
be able to because of the limitations in this limb, and knowing that there were 
alternatives that he could be using would not be right; in sum he would not be 
living just normally. 
To give another example in the same context, consider Alison’s account. Alison is a 
50-year old lower-limb prosthesis user who has used prostheses for her entire adult 
life. One of her legs was amputated as a teenager and as part of her rehabilitation 
she was fitted with a prosthesis that she has replaced every couple of years when it 
comes to the end of its usable lifetime. At one time, her insurance provider that 
was financing her limb started to request a proof of necessity each time a 
replacement was needed, which Alison found was at odds with what she felt was 
reasonable. She described this: 
It’s a little bit demeaning to have to go and… say *the insurer+, when 
I need a new limb for years and they’d want a consultant’s note to 
say, oh she needs a new limb. Now I eventually tried to negotiate 
with [the insurer]. You know, come on. It’s not going to grow back. 
You can see I’m only looking for one every three or four years, and 
I’m not trying to abuse anything. And eventually I got a note from 
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them saying, ‘look, okay, we’ll abandon that.’ And that’s why I 
stayed with [them], no matter what way the prices go. 
Alison perceived that being asked for proof of the need of a replacement limb each 
time she needed one was not right. She suspected they did not understand how 
prostheses worked – ‘It’s not going to grow back… I’m only looking for one every 
three or four years’ – and in addition did not trust that Alison’s need was genuine – 
‘I’m not trying to abuse anything’. To be asked for proof each time was to have her 
integrity challenged, as if she was thought to be trying to take advantage of the 
system. So to keep up this process each time she needed a new limb financed 
would be to perpetuate a process that Alison saw was not right, and so motivated 
her to do something about it. 
In her account, Alison was compelled to act through a concern that evoked the 
fairness of a way of living that she felt the actions of her insurer called into 
question. Just normal in this way pertains to the judged appropriateness of a way 
of being that entails meeting conceptions of fairness and justice. However, being 
just normal is also about living in ways that are sufficient and ‘good enough’, and 
where a moral judgement may not be so apparent. To be sure, if something about a 
person falls beneath a level of what they consider it ‘ought’ to be, then any 
expectation to continue with this insufficiency is therefore unfair, and likewise if 
something is perceived as unfair it is because it falls beneath the standards of what 
is perceived to be sufficient. So these aspects are intrinsically linked in conceptions 
of just normal, but at times one may be more salient than another. 
Alan’s earlier account further illustrates the dynamic between sufficiency and 
fairness, as there was insufficiency in the limb that was recommended to him, and 
unfairness that he was being treated as if individuals with limb difference were all 
the same. However, Alison’s account illustrates how a just-fairness element can be 
more prominent and become the driver of action. It may therefore be useful to also 
illustrate the way in which a just-‘good enoughness’ component is foregrounded in 
a concern about being just normal. For instance, Roy is a 41-year old lower-limb 
prosthesis user who has attended a limb-fitting centre for many years. He 
described the different prosthetists he had been assigned to over the years, but 
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how moving between was something that could not always work out well. He 
explained: 
If you get used to a person, just say… I work with Dan, he’s fantastic. 
I work with Megan: absolutely brilliant. I could be with one person 
for one year and then all of a sudden I’m with a new person. …It 
pisses me off big time. Now the limb fitters I’ve had, I’ve been very 
very lucky, except for one. I had a bit of a bad experience with him. I 
won’t mention his name, but he’s not there anymore. He’s gone, 
thank Christ. He hadn’t got a clue. He made the leg too tight: I 
couldn’t breathe. He made it too loose: it was falling off. And I just 
told him to get lost. You’re not making the limbs any more. So I had 
to get Dan to make it, and Dan took over my case. 
As Roy describes, although he would periodically be assigned to a new prosthetist, 
this would often work out, and he considered this some good fortune. The 
prosthetists he had worked with could get him up and walking each time with little 
delay and he was happy with the outcome of his consultations. However, Roy’s luck 
ran out when he was assigned a prosthetist who he felt was not up to task. Roy had 
described his difficulties earlier in scheduling and attending consultations, so to be 
kept there for longer than he was used to while the prosthetist tried and tried to 
zero in on an appropriate fitting, at a cost to Roy’s time and patience, was not 
acceptable to him. Roy knew what consultations could be like, so to endure 
something he deemed well below this was something he felt he should not put up 
with. This individual did not meet Roy’s standards of what it was to be a competent 
prosthetist and so Roy dismissed him. Working with someone who could get him up 
and going in a timely fashion was just normal for Roy, and he acted to regain this. 
An issue of sufficiency is also foregrounded in Lorna’s account. Lorna is a 51-year 
old bi-lateral lower-limb prosthesis user. She described the progress that had been 




The last time that I’ve been meeting them *prosthetists] -it’s a huge 
leap forward- they’ve given me a silicone sock on the left one, which 
is just the straight down one with the bit on the end. It has helped, 
but I’d still like more. What I would really love is if they would make 
moulded ends in the socket, when I put in my legs, so it’s like 
shooting your leg into a boot. If it’s got silicone on the ground down 
there, that would be fantastic. Beautiful, gorgeous, and very very 
comfortable. The whole business. …And what they’ve done the last 
time now is they’ve kind of chiselled out a little bit where my bone 
[in the residual limb] goes… you’ll be grand for a couple of hours, 
but then eventually when my weight will settle in it, it’ll go further 
and further. So I need it to be softer and softer at the end, but at the 
minute I’m stopping… I’d say been back and forth *attending 
consultations] about eight times now, with these particular ones. 
And I wouldn’t be finished. Well I am finished now because I’ve kind 
of given it up for a while, it’s like ok, I can’t do this anymore. But I 
will go back and keep at it. But then you don’t want to be 
permanently at the door, like ‘Hi! It’s me! *laughs+ I’m still not right! 
I’m still not right! I’m still not right…’ 
Lorna felt that she had been making progress with adjustments to her prostheses, 
but had ‘given it up’ temporarily despite still experiencing problems with her 
prostheses. She had stopped because she ‘couldn’t do’ the back and forth of 
modifications and going home to test these for a while before returning for further 
modifications. She also did not want to feel that she was pestering her prosthetist, 
with whom she shared a good relationship and felt that this was necessary for the 
consultations to work. Keeping going back made Lorna ‘feel a nuisance’, testing the 
patience of the staff there. So she had stopped attending consultations despite 
there still being things that she would ‘really love’ to have. However, Lorna later 
described how she could do ‘everything I need’, that she didn’t feel ‘disabled in any 
way’ because of her prostheses. The limbs she used, despite their imperfections, 
enabled her to live in a way that she considered good enough. In this way, her 
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prostheses were sufficient and with them she could get by – she realised there 
were ways the limbs could probably be improved further and this was something 
she would ‘go back and keep at’, but for now they ‘work fine for me, grand for me’ 
– they would ‘just about’ do. 
As these accounts illustrate, just normal is a prevailing concern, and so persons act 
to manage this concern, such action constituting the core category of the theory. 
However, through analyses, three modes of resolving this concern were 
determined. In one mode, persons are aware of threats to being just normal and 
act on these in order to remain this way. This is conceptualised as preserving and 
accounts for the varied ways in which persons ensure their ability to continue just 
normally. Redressing is the second mode and entails bringing about and bringing 
back just normal when this is perceived not to be occurrent. The third mode of just 
normal is persevering, accounting for the ways in which persons keep just normal 
and resolve difficulties within a just normal state of being. Together, these three 
sub-core categories express and account for the variation within how persons live 
just normally. 
Over the page, a diagram is given to illustrate the just normal and its relationship 
with the constituent categories of preserving, redressing, and persevering, and also 
the concepts that constitute these. The next three analysis chapters are dedicated 
to exploring each of these categories in turn.
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Chapter 6: Preserving (Being ‘Just Normal’) 
Introduction 
In this chapter, a category of actions is conceptualised around efforts to ensure an 
individual stays just normal. This is when persons consider themselves to be just 
normal, but are aware of potential threats as a consequence of being a user of 
prostheses, and which threaten their ability to keep this way. Consequently, 
individuals act to protect their just normal status, and they do so in a variety of 
ways, as threats manifest themselves in a variety of forms. Without this proactivity, 
individuals could quickly find their ability to live just normally disrupted. In this 
chapter, this category of preserving being just normal is accounted for through 
patterns of black-spotting, conserving, and sufficing. These are now each discussed 
at length. 
Black-spotting 
In using prostheses about daily life, individuals can encounter situations that are 
risky to them as users of artificial limbs due to a particular limitation of their limb. 
Engaging these situations runs the risk of an adverse outcome which threatens 
their living just normally. In a sense, this is analogous to when areas of roads are 
identified as black spots because they possess features that pose a particularly high 
threat to the safety of road users. For instance, areas of roads with tight bends are 
sometimes designated as black spots because there is an elevated risk of motorists 
being involved in road-traffic collisions due to this unusual road condition. Through 
the recognition of such hazardous areas, the notion is that road users can act 
accordingly to avoid unwelcome incidents. A similar pattern is found in prosthesis 
use, where there are specific situations where the limitations of a prosthetic are 
most strongly foregrounded. This term was repurposed then, to convey how 
prosthesis users engage in identifying and responding appropriately to prosthesis-
specific black spots: they are involved in black-spotting in order to reduce the 
likelihood of an unwelcome outcome. 
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Whereas motoring black spots are confined to specific geographical areas, the 
scope of black spots for prosthesis users varies, and may refer to specific activities 
such as walking on a prosthesis in icy conditions where agility may be particularly 
tested, or more broadly, such as being out in public locations, where unwanted 
attention may be drawn to an individual’s physical difference. In keeping with the 
motoring analogy, Neil, a 57-year old upper-limb prosthesis user, gave an account 
of how he identifies driving with his prosthesis as a black spot. 
My view of the prosthesis is ‘ok, what else can I try? What else can I 
do? What shouldn’t I do?’ [laughs] 
What kinds of things shouldn’t you do? 
Grab onto the steering wheel of the car when driving. There’s no 
flexibility… there’s almost zero flexibility to the wrist. That’s the only 
real drawback. *For+ the functionality for the hand, you’re trading off 
flexibility in the wrist. It far outweighs it as far as I’m concerned 
though. You can’t turn the wheel far- you may not be able to turn 
the wheel far enough to avoid an accident. And you can’t release it 
fast enough, if you have to make a turn quickly. The response time is 
just not fast enough. It makes it more of a hazard driving… 
With his prosthesis, Neil is enabled to live as a two-handed individual, but 
limitations in his dexterity mean that he cannot react as quickly or dynamically with 
his particular prosthesis compared to a biological hand, and this puts him at risk in 
situations where this is important. The danger of not being able to respond 
adequately means that Neil therefore identifies the entire activity of driving with 
his prosthesis as hazardous, because of the threat to his just normal living if he 
were to be involved in an incident. 
Black spots may be identified through experience or perceptions of risky 
encounters. Neil had received indications from others about the unsuitability of his 
prosthesis for driving, but it was in testing it out on a short trip that the risk was 
fully realised. Mel, a lower-limb prosthesis user, instead imagines a variety of 
circumstances that are potential just normal black spots. For one, she considers 
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black spots that may result in damage to her limb, deprecating her enablement, 
such as taking her prosthesis to the beach where she perceives sand could easily 
get stuck in the joints. If this was to happen, Mel’s prosthesis would function less 
well, or break entirely, and this would impact her mobility; an integral aspect of 
Mel’s just normal living. 
Black spots may also be identified through a particular experience that is projected 
to other situations, as Mel also provided an example of. For instance, she perceives 
that lifting young children up, as is sometimes practice in her job working in a 
nursery, is similarly something to think twice about because of the danger of falling 
with them if she fell because of her prosthesis. Mel experienced falls in other 
situations before, and so considers her impaired stability and her ability to regain 
her balance with the limb as aspects that make managing children in this way 
particularly risky. Not only does she risk injuring the child or herself if she were to 
fall, but this could also have wider implications for her retaining a role that expects 
the safe care of children. For Mel, looking after and working with children is 
something she has always done, something she feels she can and should keep 
doing, and thus such situations that threaten her just normal way of living like this 
are areas to be wary of – she is conscious of her stability and so is engaged in black-
spotting accordingly. 
Black-spotting enables individuals to manage threatening situations in various ways 
in order to stay just normal. Two ways of doing this, as similarly may be observed in 
motoring, are through avoiding the black spot, or engaging it differently. The choice 
of action is contingent on how a person perceives it is just normal to manage the 
situation, but both manage the threat. For instance, a black spot may be identified 
and avoided if avoidance does not compromise an ability to live just normally. This 
was what Neil did when he recognised driving with his prosthetic hand was 
hazardous. However, if engagement with an activity is instead important to being 
just normal, or rather that a lack of engagement is problematic, individuals will 
engage the black spot but with a particular approach to ensure the threat is 
managed. For example, while still wary of falls, Mel would ‘lock’ her prosthetic leg 
into a fixed position to reduce her risk of falling, and this gave her the confidence to 
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pick up the children she worked with. These acts of preserving are part of black-
spotting, as persons are conscious of hazards to staying just normal and act in just 
normal ways following their identification. These particular courses of managing 
black-spotting are explained in individual discussions below. 
Protective Avoidance 
One way that black spots are managed is through a pattern of avoidance. This 
occurs when situations are identified that present a threat to just normal living, and 
where this is unaffected by avoiding the black spot. A lack of engagement thus 
protects an ongoing ability to live just normally, and importantly, avoiding also does 
not compromise this. 
Rob is a prosthesis user who gives an account of protective avoidance. He is a 34-
year old sports coach who uses two lower-limb prostheses. Rob described how he 
used to enjoy playing football with his friends on a regular basis until one of his feet 
broke during a game. Despite being fitted with limbs intended to cater to an active 
lifestyle, Rob’s prostheses could not survive the barrage of forces they were subject 
to while playing football and suffered damage that rendered one of them unusable. 
Since he and his prostheses were restored to full-working order again, Rob said 
how he had ‘eased off’ from playing altogether because of the elevated risk of 
damaging his prostheses. In damaging a limb to the extent that it becomes 
unusable, as Rob perceived playing football risked, Rob loses his best means of 
getting about, albeit temporarily. He described the impact of losing this aspect of 
his enablement if he was to continue to play. 
I’d be in a spot of bother to be perfectly honest with you. If two of 
them broke, you’d be in serious trouble. Even down to- I couldn’t get 
in and out to work. If you think about it logically, I don’t have a 
wheelchair. I haven’t been in a wheelchair since I was in hospital, 
which was the mid ‘80s. So how do you get around? You’re really 
stuck. The parts come from the States and all sorts of stuff, so it’s 
not exactly ring up *the prosthetist+ and it’ll be here tomorrow. 
They’re the kind of issues. They’re at the back of your mind. It’s the 
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worst case scenario. I certainly don’t think about it every day, but it 
is a real [worse] case scenario if something happens. 
Rob described himself as an ‘active enough’ person, a person able to ‘get in and out 
of work’, and moreover someone that can just ‘get around’: ‘I’m not out doing 
energetic things all the times, but I’m in here, in there, everywhere - the shops and 
all that.’ This is Rob’s just normal mode of being, but with one of his prostheses out 
of action, he would struggle to live this way; as he says himself, he would be stuck. 
‘Imagine that [it’s] a reasonably good day and you can’t do anything. So it’s 
certainly not up my street to be like that now.’ This loss of activity and capability 
and fundamentally being restricted is the threat that Rob referred to as prompting 
‘the fear factor: The bravado goes out the window.’ So to prevent this, Rob protects 
his enablement through avoiding black spots that present an elevated threat. This 
preservation comes at the price of avoiding activities he would otherwise engage 
in, like football. However, Rob says about football that he just played socially, ‘just 
for a bit of craic, just for a bit of fitness’. So through picking up other activities he 
perceived had a lower risk of damage but could enable him to keep socialising and 
keep fit, the loss of football was not at odds with what he perceived as just normal. 
Rob’s account is an illustration of the common focus for protective avoidance 
where situations are avoided that could otherwise lead to the loss of prosthetic 
enablement. This was why Mel avoided going to the beach with her prosthesis, and 
why others variously avoided excessive forces on their limb, or situations where 
there was a risk of water damage to electronic parts, or other ways in which 
function could be deprecated. Others protectively avoided black-spots where other 
facets of their just normal living were threatened. For instance, Julie, a 36-year old 
lower-limb prosthesis user, described her experiences in dating. 
2011 was one of the worst years of my life for many reasons… and 
let’s not forget dating. One time I was with a guy and I let it slip I had 
a fake leg and you could just see it in his face. Like he didn’t even try 
to hide his disgust. He made these lame excuses and just got up and 
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left me there! That was a blind date a friend had set up. I’ve forgiven 
her now! …Some guys just freak out when they realise. It’s just a leg!  
There was one guy who tried to ignore it but I could tell it was really 
bothering him. You just get this feeling and I could tell. He was 
making a real effort not to look at it or talk about it and then after 
that night he never contacted me again. … It made me feel so bad. 
Like less than a person. 
Being made to feel this way was not something Julie felt she should have to put up 
with. In everyday life, because others would not often know or realise her limb 
difference, they treated her ordinarily. But going out on dates, Julie had revealed 
her limb difference, and this often led to situations where she was made to feel 
bad. 
I know some people can be fine but there are definitely some that 
can’t handle it and it’s not fair on me. They just make me feel like a 
freak and I’m not a freak. 
Julie considered herself different due to her limb difference, but this was far from 
the disparaging extreme of a ‘freak’ that dating situations often made her feel like. 
To be treated this way was just not fair, and so she decided to cut this out of her 
life in order to protect herself from such harm. 
That was that time [dating]. It really got to me. I was in a dark place. 
I had this leg and I stupidly naively thought I would be ok but other 
people couldn’t handle it. So I decided no more and I stopped dating 
altogether. I just don’t go in for it any more. I have these friends who 
are always trying to set me up but I just keep playing it down. I’ve 
got my friends to go out with. I’m quite happy! 
To keep just normal, Julie chose to avoid dating. This was not an easy decision, but 
after being downtrodden time and time again, and recognising the emotional toll it 
was taking on her, she began to avoid putting herself forward for dates and evaded 
being set up by her friends. This meant that she avoided situations where she was 
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made to feel abnormal and bad about herself, and though she lost this social aspect 
about her life, she reminded that she still had her friends to go out with, and did so, 
and so sustained this quality and kept herself just normal. 
As Rob and Julie’s stories illustrate, persons will preserve their just normality by 
black-spotting and then by avoiding putting themselves in risky situations that are 
identified. This is one way that black spots can be managed. However, there are 
conditions when a black spot must be engaged, and so different acts of preserving 
are employed. 
Vigilant Risk-Reducing 
While black spots may be avoided, sometimes individuals knowingly engage with 
them anyway. This variation occurs when engagement with the situation is 
important to the extent that to avoid it would not be just normal. Given that 
‘preserving’ may often be associated with conservative, risk-averse activity, the 
apparently contradictory notion of potentially jeopardising the thing that is sought 
to be preserved is therefore interesting. However, in these cases of engaging black 
spots, being just normal means engaging the situation in some way and so this is 
preserved through engaging but also through addressing the threats of the 
situation. Two forms of engaging black-spots are identified here, the first of which 
is identified as a process of adapting one’s conduct to reduce the likelihood of an 
adverse outcome. This is termed vigilant risk-reducing. 
An example of this is given by Pat. Pat is a 62-year old retired lower-limb prosthesis 
user who described difficulties in getting around where he lives out in the 
countryside. His particular prosthesis has limited flexion, which means that walking 
over uneven ground can easily cause him to lose his balance and fall, and this has 
caused injuries in the past that has resulted in days of pain and forced rest while he 
recuperates. 
[I’m] very aware – when you’re on tilted surfaces. Very aware if 
you’re on an uneven surface. … The hoof marks in the ground I’m 
constantly avoiding because it’s going to do me – it’s going to catch 
me if I’m not looking. … You just know the consequences if you 
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stand on one, or on the side of one – you’re going to go. And I have 
gone over the top. … The worst is because the ankle doesn’t bend, 
and when you fall you tend to give everything a yank and then you 
have two or three days of pain, suffering. You just have to endure it. 
So I’m careful. I’m much more confident in things that I used to do, 
but I can spot a lethal situation, whereas *my wife+ wouldn’t. She 
probably does now, but other people wouldn’t. 
Pat continues to do the things he did prior to his limb loss, including going for walks 
around his home and maintaining his land in the country, because these activities 
are important to him – they are what he has always done and how he likes to 
spend time with his wife. Doing these things requires him to be able to take on any 
surface - ‘I’m talking about all terrain’ - and so if he were to try to do so without 
consideration of his limited ankle flexion in these situations, he would likely fall. 
Hoof marks and other surface anomalies will ‘do him’ and he will be in pain and 
unable to do anything for days. Instead, Pat black-spots about the areas he goes 
and intends to go and when he needs to walk on uneven ground, he does so with a 
heightened vigilance, attending to the ground and to his walking more than he 
would otherwise: ‘It just requires a bit more thought.’ He is vigilant in such 
potentially risky situations by committing more attention to managing the 
limitations of his prosthetic agility and so catering for difficulties using the limb on 
this terrain. In doing so, Pat does not entirely insulate himself from danger, but he 
does diminish the risk of falling to a level that he feels is acceptable. In this way, his 
vigilant risk-reducing keeps him from a perceived inevitability of injury and retains 
his ability to keep engaging in the activities that are important to him. 
Pat’s example is illustrative of one of the ways that prosthesis users black-spot and 
then engage these situations differently due to undesirable outcomes that they 
perceive themselves to be at greater risk of because of their limb difference. Their 
vigilance through greater care and attention while in the situation reduces the risk 
of falling foul of the black spot and keeps these situations as viable possibilities, 
which can be a requirement of a person’s being just normal. In his autobiography, 
Richard Riley, a lower-limb prosthesis user, gives another illustration of vigilant risk-
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reducing. He described how he minimised the risk of danger of falling when using 
bathrooms by developing a specific limb for the purpose. 
What do you do when you travel? If you are staying at a hotel or 
motel, they will often have handicapped accessible rooms that have 
extra large showers to accommodate a wheelchair and even some 
rails to hold onto. What do you do if the place you are staying 
doesn’t have an accessible room or you are staying with relatives or 
friends? For me, the answer has been to have a shower leg. A 
shower leg is a simple prosthesis that is designed to receive minimal 
damage when it gets wet. I have made many shower limbs, using 
either an existing socket or a new one fabricated specifically for this 
function. I like to have a pelite (soft white foam) insert inside so that 
it can be worn with no sock or liner if necessary. I use a SAFE II 
waterproof foot (Foresee Orthopedic Products, Oakdale, CA) that 
gives good traction on slick surfaces. Sometimes I even melt a tread 
pattern onto the bottom with a hot knife and this gives the best 
traction. I use a suspension sleeve that is as waterproof as possible, 
and I find that if I hang the leg upside down after use, the 
suspension sleeve dries rapidly. The shower leg allows an amputee 
to stand in the shower, freeing up both hands. What a concept! For 
the first time since I had become an amputee, I was able to wash my 
hair with both hands. This may not sound important but if you are 
an amputee this frees you to be able to travel anywhere secure in 
the knowledge that you will be able to negotiate any bathroom with 
a minimum of danger. (Riley, 2005, p. 138) 
For many prosthesis users, bathrooms present a risk of getting water into limbs 
that should not get wet, and for lower-limb prosthesis users that must therefore 
remove limbs in order to shower there is a consequent danger of falling. Having a 
substitute shower limb is a way of ensuring enablement is protected (and thus 
preserving being just normal) by avoiding the need to bring a non-waterproof limb 
into these environments, reducing the risk of falling by improving stability. For 
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Richard, ensuring he had his ‘shower leg’ with him at these times gave him the 
freedom and peace of mind to be able to travel, knowing that he could more safely 
use bathrooms other than his own. 
A further, distinct form of vigilant risk-reducing to preserve being just normal is 
camouflaging the use of a prosthesis. As Julie’s account of dating indicated, others 
can react in hurtful ways when they notice an individual’s limb difference. Even 
prosthesis users that described enjoying ‘showing off’ limbs said that the tendency 
to be stared at or treated differently because of their limb difference was 
unwelcome. Mark gives an account of this. Although apparently willing to talk to 
me, Mark, a lower-limb prosthesis user, complained about having to deal with the 
repetitive curiosity of others about his prosthesis use: ‘…it’s part asking the 
questions and you’re going [groans] another after another question… it’s painful, 
and duh duh-duh duh-duh, you know, that kind of way?’ He also gave a striking 
example of the change in a behaviour of a colleague who discovered his prosthesis 
use: 
I was working all summer one place in Boston doing all kinds of 
everything, and suddenly this guy I worked with finds out I’ve a fake 
leg and he goes, “Oh, no, here - let me go up the ladder.” “Dude - 
I’ve been doing this for the last 3 months - excuse me?!” You know 
what I mean? It’s really quite interesting that people misunder…: 
“now [that I know,] you must not do this.” 
For Mark, the attention drawn to his prosthesis and being treated differently all of 
a sudden when others discovered his limb difference is understandably 
unwelcome. He finds it unfair that his limb should become a focal point of others’ 
perception of him, and unfair when he detects that others attempting to block him 
from particular activities, regardless of any good-natured intentions. However, a 
prosthesis can go some way to disguising an individual’s limb difference as most 
tend to at least provide the basic outline of an absent limb, and this can be further 
improved by using covering clothing or by cosmetic coverings that more accurately 
mimic biological limbs, and to the extent that limb difference may be apparent at 
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first glance. Alison, a lower-limb prosthesis user, said about public encounters that 
she felt ‘old enough and bold enough to handle whatever’, but still preferred to 
conceal her prosthesis use from others. She tended to wear covering clothing over 
her prosthesis, minimising the chance of discovery. This meant she did not present 
as an individual with limb difference and so could expect ongoing ordinary 
treatment: ‘People wouldn’t treat me any differently. But I think it’s probably easy 
not to treat me differently because I know I look like any 50 year old looks and I 
move well and all that sort of thing.’ When others familiar to her discovered her 
limb absence, she felt that many tended to see her in a different light, associated 
with disability and inability: ‘they kind of say, “My god, and you’ve always done 
everything!” Which I have!’ Alison found this frustrating because she perceived that 
others would then tend to see her in an unable light, regardless of her prior 
behaviour. So, black-spotting encounters with naïve others, Alison would reduce 
the risk of being discovered by camouflaging her limb difference, and then being 
vigilant in these situations to ensure her disguise would remain intact. In a blog 
post, Kate Sawford, a 31-year old lower-limb prosthesis user, also described her 
reasons for camouflaging in public, and explained the particular ways she was 
vigilant about avoiding discovery: 
Today, I continue to choose pants over shorts, mostly. I suppose this 
is because I want some control over my first impression on people. 
My gait is good enough that unless a person pays close attention, 
my artificial leg goes undetected. There are other things that I do. 
Without thinking. Almost. When I sit with people on a couch, I will 
sit to their left so my ‘real leg’ is closest to them. And I will often 
walk just behind people if I’m concerned about appearing awkward, 
such as when walking on uneven or sloping ground. There are 
people I have known for years who don’t know about my leg, and in 
some instances they have found out only because I’ve told them. We 
all do it: We form associations with the people that we know 
according to particular characteristics. These characteristics can be 
physical or associated with personality. We describe people to 
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others according to these characteristics. And I suspect most of us 
have had the thought ‘I don’t want to be known as the *blank+ girl.’ I 
am comfortable with my artificial leg, but I am uncomfortable with 
the idea of being described according to it. I’m happy to be ‘the tall 
girl’, or ‘the blue-eyed girl’. Just not ‘the-one legged girl’. And I’ll 
take pretty much anything over ‘the disabled girl’. (Sawford, 2013) 
Kate reduced the risk of detection by being careful about the way she dressed and 
how she acted and positioned herself relative to others. This was a particularly risky 
black-spot that she had identified, perceiving that any unwanted associations could 
be enduring. However, these were situations with others that she wanted to 
experience – avoiding socialising was not an option, and so she kept vigilant, 
monitoring the positioning of herself and others in order to maintain what she 
described as her ‘sleight of hand’. 
Similarly, Peter Thomas, a lower-limb prosthesis user whose account is recorded in 
Sabolich and Sabolich’s collected short autobiographies, remarked of his own 
camouflaging that ‘I can think of no greater compliment than when an old friend 
seriously asks me if my new shoes are too tight or if my feet are cold.’ (Thomas, 
2001, p. 131). Others mistaking Peter’s prosthesis for a biological limb was a sign 
that he was getting on well in his presentation as someone with two legs and so he 
could expect to be more likely to be treated ordinarily. This was something he 
sought to maintain, rather than the ‘disabled friend or family member’ (p. 131). 
So, actions that lower the risk of black spots disrupting being just normal, such as 
watching one’s step, remembering to pack a shower leg, or being careful about 
positioning relative to others, enable an individual to keep in ways that are 
important to them. Vigilant risk-reducing does not provide immunity from risky 
situations identified through black-spotting, but it does diminish the chance of a 
bad outcome to a level such that persons perceive they can engage the situation 




For persons using prostheses that seek to preserve their being just normal, black 
spots may be identified that can be neither avoided nor have the risk of the 
situation reduced. For such black spots, a person may not have the means to 
diminish the risk or they may be unable to do so if doing so means compromising a 
sense of just normal, similar to how avoiding it might. In other words, despite their 
hazardous nature, it is just normal that these situations are ‘done normally’. In 
these cases, a third form of managing black spots is to instead address the impact 
of the outcome itself. This is a process of fail-safing, the result of which means 
persons can engage black spots and even if the unwanted outcome were to occur, 
they have the means of staying just normal. 
For example, Mark, a 46-year old lower-limb prosthesis user, described how he 
goes ahead with activities such as hiking up mountains despite knowing that the 
conditions are particularly testing for his limb. He uses prostheses intended to be 
suited to his pursuits, yet he has suffered numerous breakages in the past to the 
point that he considers it an inevitability of engaging such activities. However, to 
avoid such pursuits or to do them at a lesser intensity is for Mark to concede an 
inability to hike ‘properly’ or to hike at a standard that he feels he should be able to 
meet. So hiking, and hiking ‘normally’ is a part of Mark’s being just normal and he 
keeps at this. But being stuck on a mountain if his prosthesis breaks is something 
Mark recognises he must manage. To do this, he ensures he has a means of 
managing any breakdown if one were to occur. Mark’s rucksack is laden with tools, 
duct tape and other bits that allow him to perform quick repairs that will get him 
home and so avoid him being stranded or needing to call for assistance. He can 
then get by for long enough to get home to perform proper repairs himself, or 
perform intermediary fixes while he waits for an appointment with his prosthetist. 
While Mark does not see this as an ideal state of affairs, he recognises that the 
limbs he uses have a tendency to break while hiking and during other activities he 
values, and so rather than not doing these or doing them at a lesser level, he gets 
on with them, ensuring he has the means to address breakdowns, should they 
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occur, thereby retaining these activities as viable pursuits, and so preserving being 
just normal. 
So black spots that may need to be engaged and for which it is not permissible or 
possible to address risk, can instead be managed by having a means to deal with 
the impact of the undesirable outcome. This process of fail-safing can require an 
element of planning to ensure the means to protect against the outcome are to 
hand, such as Mark having his supplies to deal with breakage. Others suggested 
how they would variously take ‘back-up’ limbs to black spots which posed a threat 
to their prosthesis so they had something to fall back on, should something go 
wrong with their primary limb. Mel, a lower-limb prosthesis user, had attempted to 
fail-safe in her preparations for a holiday, after identifying this as a potential black 
spot, but ended up vigilantly risk-reducing when she was not able to gain the 
means to do so: 
I’m supposed to go on holiday and I kind of said “do I bring the 
expensive leg with me or do I just bring the other one?” -Just if 
something happened to it. Because I looked into kind of getting leg 
insurance but nowhere really does it *laughs+. I think there’s places 
in England now, but you kind of have to give them every little thing 
that’s in the leg, components and all. I wouldn’t have a clue, you’d 
have to get onto Germany [where it the limb was manufactured], so 
I just said “I’ll just be careful for the moment!” 
To give another illustration of fail-safing, consider Lisa’s account. Lisa Brewer is a 
44-year old lower-limb prosthesis user, living in the US, who keeps a blog about her 
experiences with limb difference. In one post, she disclosed her decision to get a 
firearm. 
People ask me all the time if I can run with my prosthesis. It is not a 
running leg and was not meant for the impact of running, so I always 
say, “not really….I kind of look like a deranged penguin when I try – a 
fast, awkward waddle” and then I laugh.  Recently, I started to really 
think about it.  I am a 45-year-old, below the knee amputee with a 
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degenerative bone condition in both legs AND deathly severe 
asthma…..I literally could not run if my life depended on it.  That is 
NOT ok with me. Unfortunately, our world is changing.  Criminals are 
getting bolder and life is getting more dangerous.  I am a very 
trusting person and believe in giving people the benefit of the doubt, 
but that doesn’t mean I am naïve. I am a little, female, amputee who 
drives a vehicle that is frequently targeted in parking lots.  If I am 
walking to my car, especially if I am in shorts, I am a prime candidate 
to victimize.  However, if someone chooses to attack me, I will not 
sit by and idly take it.  I will fight back and change that attackers 
mind as to what “easy prey” is. (Brewer, 2013d) 
Lisa had come to identify situations where she felt she was at a higher risk of 
becoming a victim of crime, exacerbated by her limb difference. But she concluded 
there was little she could do to avoid being targeted, lest she never venture out 
alone or avoid parking lots entirely – neither viable options for her staying just 
normal. So to have a means of dealing with this, in this case to give herself the 
ability to ‘fight back’, she applied for a concealed weapon permit. Lisa had never 
considered carrying a gun before, but believing she was likely to be targeted in 
these kinds of environments prompted her to take action: 
What concerns me is being here for my daughter’s wedding…..my 
son’s college graduation….Lauren’s high school graduation….my first 
grandchild and the list goes on.  I have chosen to protect myself in a 
way that suits me. … I am able to defend myself against verbal and 
mental attacks just fine. As a matter-of-fact, I just did so today. I will 
never be a victim in those arenas, but when it comes to a physical 
victim, I was vulnerable and that was not ok to me, so I did 
something about it. 
So in Lisa’s case, while she remained appearing ‘vulnerable’, if she found herself 
targeted, she considered that a gun could keep her safe, thwarting any attacks. A 
similar example of managing unwanted public confrontations is given in Sabolich 
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and Sabolich’s collected autobiographical accounts by Holley Howard (2001), a 
lower-limb prosthesis user. After losing her leg and being fitted with her prosthesis, 
Holley found herself encountering unwanted remarks and curious stares of others 
that made her feel bad about herself. Going out in public had become a black spot 
for Holley, yet feeling unable to stop this from occurring, Holley recounted how she 
then determined to respond: 
As long as I feel good about myself and my appearance, I’ve fought 
the battle and won… I’ve had my share of stares from John Q. Public, 
but I’ve found the best thing to do is stare right back at people until 
they realise I do feel their stares and don’t appreciate them. If I hold 
my head in shame, then they have won. (p. 226) 
This became Holley’s prepared response to counteract being made to feel bad, and 
enabled Holley to come out on top of the situation. Other individuals interviewed in 
this study also described having fail-safe quips to respond to undesirable stares, 
comments or questions about their limb difference. This was something also found 
across the discussion forums, where it is common to encounter threads about 
sharing favourite ways of responding to public naivety or ignorance in order to 
withstand the frustrating or disparaging effect they can have on an individual. 
In summary of black-spotting, the identification of these risky situations is 
necessary for persons to then act appropriately toward them in order to continue 
to live just normally. Such acts of preserving can variously entail the (protective) 
avoidance of black spots, engagement that involves vigilantly risk-reducing, or fail-
safing that is intended to ameliorate or counter the impact of a potential adverse 
outcome. The choice of black-spotting response is that which is most accessible and 
dependent on how an individual perceives it would be just normal for them to 
manage the given situation. 
Conserving 
In many of the interviews conducted in this study, individuals made a point to state 
that they could do more or less anything they wanted to, and that no activity was 
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beyond them. This was often also a strong message in the autobiographies. 
However, while there are indications that prosthesis users can do anything, doing 
everything can be problematic. This is where a different, distinct form of preserving 
being just normal can be identified, as persons manage the limits they find 
themselves living within as prosthesis users. For instance, compared to a biological 
limb, using a prosthesis may mean tasks can take longer to complete and may be 
more fatiguing when there is a need to carry the weight of a limb or if there is 
discomfort when using the limb. Other aspects of prosthesis use such as the 
maintenance of a limb can mean additional time and effort is required. These 
elements mean that an individual may find time and energies disappearing faster 
than expected, and so they must cater for this in order to keep up their ability to do 
the things important to their living just normally. These depleting qualities can 
include the time a person has to do particular activities, or their energy levels 
before fatigue. Or it might be an individual’s tolerance before discomfort caused by 
a prosthesis means they can use it no longer. Or it may be the power or the lifespan 
of the limb itself. Thus there are a variety of exhaustible qualities that individuals 
must manage if they are to ensure that just normal living is not disrupted by 
premature exhaustion. The various ways that persons consequently preserve to 
avoid this is through acts of conserving. 
The limits of time and energy can be particularly salient for individuals with 
acquired limb absence, who may have a routine they are they are trying to keep up 
since gaining a prosthesis. In her autobiography, Lenor Madruga, a lower-limb 
prosthesis user, described the mismatch between her intentions and her ability to 
do everything, which she had done prior to her limb loss. 
By the end of that year I was ready for a physical breakdown. I was 
worn out. I realised that if I wanted to continue doing the things that 
really mattered to me, I would have to rearrange my priorities. I 
would have to do only the important things; not do anything and 
everything… (Madruga, 2000, p. 171) 
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With her prosthesis, Lenor was capable of individual activities, but doing 
‘everything’ together wore her out. Trying to live in the same way as she did prior 
to her limb loss was too exhausting for her, building to a point of breakdown. Other 
interviewees finding themselves fatigued to such an extent described needing an 
extended period of time to recover while energies returned or incurred injuries 
abated. Trying to do things in the same way as before or just in the way that one 
might assume they would after gaining a prosthesis can consequently lead to an 
overall reduction in ability if time is then needed to recuperate following fatigue. 
Lenor came close to this, and realised the long-term problems if she kept on as she 
was. Others described being confined to bed or forced to remain in the house while 
they recovered from fatigue or pain. Such ‘overdoing it’ can consequently lead to 
an inability to be just normal. However, as Lenor illustrates, one way to keep just 
normal and also keep from exhaustion is to give consideration to how time and 
efforts are being invested. Lenor considered what she spent her time doing, 
determining to cut back on the things that were not essential in order to ensure she 
could keep up the activities that were. In this way, she conserved her energies to 
keep up what was important to her, and so she kept just normal. 
Alison gives another example of this. Alison is a 50-year old lower-limb prosthesis 
user who has used prostheses since her mid-teens. Because of this, she does not 
struggle with trying to keep up with a prior bodily-intact lifestyle in the same way 
that Lenor describes. However, Alison is faced with similar issues in trying to live 
just normally. She gave one example of this: 
I have two dogs. If I take the two dogs for a long walk, that’s fine and 
then I might do the same the next night and I might do the same the 
next night. But after four nights I might feel that little thing [residual 
limb wound] beginning to open up again and I’d be thinking, oh, 
bloody hell, I’m not doing that again, because it’s more important 
for me that I get in and out of work, that I’m able to look after my 
kids … that I’m able to sort of do the things I absolutely have to do. 
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When she uses her prosthesis for extended periods, Alison finds that the skin on 
her residual limb breaks down and can cause her considerable pain. She is forced to 
take time to recover while she heals and this can stop her from getting on with 
other things important to her just normal living. To be unable to get in and out of 
work and to unable to look after her children is not a way that Alison desires to be. 
Having tried with limited success to address this problem over the years with 
various different prosthetists and prosthetic solutions, Alison recognises that she 
can only do so much on her prosthesis before pain sets in, and instead manages by 
similarly prioritising her activities. She enjoys walking her dogs, but when there are 
things she ‘absolutely’ must do, like being able to look after her children and get in 
and out of work, Alison conserves by relegating lesser activities, doing them less 
frequently, or only when they will not threaten her ability to live just normally. 
The mismatch between a level of assumed possible activity and what is actually 
possible may arise from what individuals expect to be able to do with their 
prosthetic enablement, and this may be a recurrent issue if changing between 
prosthetic solutions and not knowing what a new prosthesis will be like. Lenor and 
Alison illustrate the ways in which prosthesis users may conserve in response to 
detecting warning signs of impending exhaustion in order to ensure they can keep 
just normal. Activities of lesser importance are not necessarily ruled out, as to do so 
may be to violate staying just normal, but instead may fall lower on a priority scale, 
where they may be undertaken less frequently or at times when persons judge 
undertaking them will not pose a threat to being just normal. 
Other strategies of spacing-out activities, punctuating days or activities with rest 
breaks, and being more efficient with one’s movements were also given as ways in 
which individuals conserved energies in order to do the things important to them. 
I have to get up a bit earlier, going to work and stuff as well, just 
making sure the leg goes on right, because there’d be bits like 
massaging it beforehand, physio, and whatever. But that’s just the 
extra little bit of time. Getting ready. Going out now isn’t too bad 
now, but I’d be very tired after getting ready, so I kind of do it in 
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stages. I’d get up and have my wash, my hair and whatever, then 
kind of I take a break, put the leg on, then take another break. So it 
doesn’t tire you too much? Yeah, because then I’d be no use when I 
get out. (Mel, lower-limb prosthesis user) 
There’s only so much I can do in a day before my stump becomes 
sore. It’s even worse if your stump is sore when you put it on in the 
morning. I find you can do more if you take rest breaks because 
pressure doesn’t get the chance to create a sore or an angry red 
area of skin. My friends don’t consider that once a sore has 
developed it will only get worse if you wear your prosthesis. So the 
idea is not to let one develop. So I do some of the housework then 
sit and rest a while. If I am walking round a shopping mall I stop and 
sit for a while. It can be annoying but in the long I can get more 
done. (Carl, 49, lower-limb prosthesis user) 
If I wanted to go dancing with my husband on a Saturday night, I 
would relax that day and not sap my energy with grocery shopping 
or general house cleaning. I learned to shop the day before and 
maybe clean the house the day after so that I could be rested for the 
dance. If I want to do some baking, I do it in the morning because 
I’m rested. (Madruga, 2000, p. 171) 
While I’m at the kitchen sink standing and waiting for the cookies to 
bake, I organise dinner. I clean the upstairs rooms of the house just 
after I’ve finished with my morning bath and dressing. Then, I’m 
prepared to go downstairs for the rest of the day. (p. 171) 
Illustrating a further form of conserving, Rob, a lower-limb prosthesis user, said 
when he noticed he was starting to get tired while out during the day, this would 
prompt him to give greater consideration to the route between where he was and 
where he needed to get to next that resulted in the least energy expenditure. This 
kind of more considered path-finding meant that he wasn’t ‘wrecked’ or 
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‘knackered’ when he arrived and could still do the things he needed to do in a state 
he felt he should be able to do them in. 
In addition to this, prosthesis users may need to be mindful of the energy level of a 
prosthesis itself. A growing number of prostheses, upper and lower, incorporate 
electrical power sources to provide and assist function, such as the popular 
Ottobock C-Leg and Touch Bionics i-limb hand. Myoelectric prostheses in particular 
are electrically powered limbs that run off the charge of a battery. Neil, a 57-year 
old upper-limb prosthesis user, spoke of his concern about his myoelectric 
prosthesis running out of power. He would use his prosthesis for a full day and was 
worried that if he kept using it into the evening, the battery could deplete entirely, 
rendering it unusable. He gave a light-hearted example of what could happen if this 
were to occur: 
Sometimes I’ll stop at a grocery store on the way home to pick up 
items and you know, I’ll talk to the wife and she’ll say ‘oh by the way 
– on your way pick up something’ and by that time I will have had 
the prosthesis on close to 12 hours and my big concern is I’m going 
to come home with the grocery cart one night because the battery 
died when I was grabbing hold of the bar! [laughs] Kind of a comedic 
image, but you’ve got to think about it, you know! If the battery died 
while I’m holding it, how do I get out – I’m stuck. 
Neil’s example conveys a more serious concern of getting stuck, or needing a limb 
to work when it has run out of power to do so, and this was echoed by a number of 
other prosthesis users. To contend with this, he is mindful of his exertion with his 
prosthesis relative to his expected activity. So, if he is expecting to use it later into 
the day on a single charge, conserves charge through using it less frequently or at a 
lower intensity to ensure there is enough power to use it later on. If he uses it more 
intensely during the day and finds he has need of it later, he will be mindful of the 
reduced level of charge. This ensures he does not risk full depletion and if he finds 




In a similar way, Rob, a lower-limb prosthesis user explained the ‘shelf life’ of his 
legs and how this could vary depending on what he did with them. 
These are two years old next month in November and I know they’re 
starting to come to the end of their shelf life. Before that I had a set 
of legs that had to last four years because I had other issues, I had to 
fight to get back on it [medical finance scheme], then I actually lost 
my job, that’s how I got back on it. I was able to fit it in that window. 
But those type of legs, I really wore them to their last dying soles of 
it. To be honest, it’s not out of really being a real conservative, I had 
no chance in that regard, I just couldn’t afford to buy new legs. The 
reality is they did last me that long but I’m also very careful with the 
legs. They’re literally-they’re more important than your mobile 
phone. You wouldn’t come in and throw your phone down on the 
ground. You do take care of them. … The way I describe it to people 
that ask me or my mates, how long do they last for, and I say well it 
depends how active you are. So if you’ve got a brand new top dog 
pair and you wear them all the time, and you’re really active in 
them, they wear down. If you buy a brand new car but it ages five or 
six, seven years in one year, all of a sudden you’re driving something 
that’s not road worthy. And that’s the equivalent. If your runners 
wore down to a certain level, you could have all sorts of issues with 
your feet and so on like that and then they’re no use to you. That’s 
the same with the legs. 
Because Rob was limited to getting new prostheses at particular times, and he 
noted that this did not necessarily match the lifespan of the limbs to keep him just 
normal, he was conservative with them in order to make them last. Rob treated his 
limbs with care, but he also avoided activities that would wear them down more 
quickly. He was keen to avoid deprecating his limbs to the extent that he was 
forced to use something ‘not road worthy’, causing him problems in his comfort, fit 
and what he could do with them. 
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So in order to keep just normal, persons must be mindful to avoid exhausting the 
means to keep this way, conserving depletable qualities, such as their time, effort, 
or tolerance to discomfort, or the power or lifespan of their limbs. Doing so ensures 
enough remains to keep just normal before these can be renewed. Conserving may 
involve the rescheduling or prioritising of activities, or becoming more efficient 
with travel or the way activities are conducted. Running out can be a particular 
threat to individuals new to prostheses or to a new prosthetic solution, where they 
may be less knowledgeable about the demands or the limits to their prosthetic 
enablement and how these can be best managed. 
Sufficing 
There are times when a person may be presented with, or prompted to consider, 
changes to their circumstances, and which have implications for the way they live 
just normally. In prosthesis use, the change may be about whether features to an 
individual’s prosthetic enablement could be improved upon. So individuals could 
return to limb-fitting centres to seek new limbs, to seek adjustments to current 
limbs, or they may even try a different prosthetist that they hope can provide a 
better solution. There can also be a tendency to perceive that the more modern the 
technology, the more benefits the user will receive, and so individuals may perceive 
newer prostheses as superior and seek these. However, despite a perceived 
potential for improvement, when persons live just normally with a prosthesis, there 
can be a tendency to avoid change because of the threats to remaining just normal 
that changes can result in. Change is not guaranteed to be wholly satisfactory, and 
even if one aspect of enablement is improved upon, another may turn out to be 
worse, and run the risk of leaving an individual in an overall poorer condition. This, 
then, is another context for preserving being just normal, and thus in response to 
potential change, individuals suffice. 
Mark, a 46-year old lower-limb prosthesis user, described his sufficing when he 
explained his reasons for deciding not to seek changes to his limb. 
I’ve seen there are things that you can attach to nerve endings or 
whatever to make it do this or that, and I’m kinda going, you know, 
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I’ve had it *the prosthesis+ for how long, and if I start doing that, 
mmm might be better… mmm might not be either! And sometimes I 
might have to re-learn how to walk again… Ack! Do I really want to?? 
Mark had described seeing the latest in prosthetic limbs being demonstrated online 
and so knew that there were newer limbs out there that could potentially improve 
aspects of his enablement. However, he had been using the same kind of limb for a 
long time, working with his prosthetist to ensure he had the best setup for doing 
the things important to him. A new type of prosthesis was stepping into the 
unknown, and moreover an unknown where all manner of difficulties could arise, 
and which could potentially leave him worse off overall. So Mark considered these 
new possibilities but ultimately rejected them, sufficing with what he had in order 
to preserve being just normal. 
To illustrate further, Natasha, a 43-year old lower-limb prosthesis user, explained 
her rationale for preferring to avoid seeking changes to the socket of her 
prosthesis. 
I just think that when you’ve got comfort, I think it’s a good idea to 
keep it as close and comfortable for the person and maybe make 
small changes, not make these big drastic changes that might upset -
because you’re walking on it all day and it’s such a crutch and you’re 
so reliant on it, you know. 
Natasha’s prosthesis enabled her to get around and do what she needed to do, but 
a big problem for her had been ensuring comfort. Over a number of consultations 
Natasha had eventually secured a solution that afforded a satisfactory level of 
comfort when she used her prosthesis, and she was reluctant to do anything to 
undo this. If she sought to try to improve anything else, this could risk discomfort 
which would limit how much time she could spend on the limb, and so limit what 
she was capable of. Similar to this, Carl, a 49-year old lower-limb prosthesis user, 




I don’t know that I will ever be completely happy about my setup. I 
think I will always find something I want improved… *But+ it took me 
a lot of effort to get this setup and it is working reasonably well. It 
[is] a real hassle just to get it in alignment. If anything changes I may 
end up with a gait that will cause back pain and my health will really 
suffer. When my back is hurting it’s so hard to achieve things. So I 
am kind of happy just to leave things as they are. 
Having invested a lot of time and effort trying to get a satisfactory prosthetic 
solution, Carl was reluctant to try anything to threaten this progress. While there 
could be further improvements, the risk of the unknown was too much for him to 
gamble with, and he lamented not being able to know more about alternatives: ‘I 
realize there may be problems with the kind of foot I want… I wish there was a shop 
were you could just go and try new components and feet.’ Sufficing instead keeps 
Carl away from the potential of being in pain and unable to achieve things as a poor 
outcome of change may result in. He felt his health was on the line in risking 
change, and to end up with poor health was not living just normally. So as Carl says, 
although he wasn’t completely happy with his setup, he was ‘kind of happy’ to 
leave things as they were because of the threat of something worse, and in doing 
so he preserves his being just normal. Part of sufficing then, is recognising that 
while change could lead to improvements, if a person can live in a way they see as 
reasonable and ‘good enough’ with a prosthesis, then change is to be avoided 
because of the jeopardy to this ‘crutch’ for just normal living. 
However, Carl also identified a further motivation to suffice. In discussing how he 
felt that his current setup would be one to suffice with, he described: ‘In the end I 
kind of settled for a foot I could live with.’ So Carl had a foot he could abide, and a 
setup that worked ‘reasonably well’. Change then, was not a necessity. This 
illustrates another dimension of sufficing, that if a prosthetic solution helps to 
support a person to be just normal, then things are already ‘good enough’ and 
persons need not change. A prosthetic solution therefore may not be optimal, and 
indeed there may be some issues about it, but if it enables a person to live just 
normally, to change is to unnecessarily risk this. 
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To illustrate sufficing in a different way, Ann, a lower-limb prosthesis user, and 
long-time user of a prosthetics and amputee forum, gave her reasons for sticking 
with what she had: 
What I find is that if the prostheses are comfortable and letting me 
do what I want to do, I really don't want any changes made ... now 
whether this is just because I am a bit set in my ways or perhaps 
because I've had too many new prosthetists wanting to try out new 
innovations on me and them not working, I don't know ... but usually 
what I see is people just really wanting their prostheses to allow 
them to get on with the everyday things in life without too many 
problems… (Ann, 2013) 
The way Ann saw it, if a person could get about and do regular things comfortably, 
then they were living just normally and this was the prosthesis fulfilling its 
objective. Ann’s solution enabled her to do this, and so she had grounds for 
sufficing rather than seeking or consenting to changes. Furthermore, she had 
experienced ‘innovations’ that had been ‘tried out’ on her in the past, and the 
experimental nature and mixed outcomes of these caused her to be cautious about 
change. So unlike Carl, who had invested a lot of effort to build up to his level of 
sufficiency and who had sufficed to avoid jeopardising his progress, Ann’s sufficing 
was informed by her experience of ideas working and not working. This prompted 
her to stick with what she found could do the job, thus preserving her being just 
normal. 
Ann’s account also hints at a further property of sufficing; that as well as not 
seeking improvements, it also includes a resistance to change when this is 
recommended by others. Commonly, this will be from professionals involved in the 
selection, tailoring and fitting of a prosthesis, and who an individual may 
periodically return to for maintenance and replacing their prosthesis. A prosthetist 
may believe there is a more appropriate solution for the individual, but if an 
individual believes that their solution is good enough, they may resist any 
recommendations or suggestions. So there are potential grounds for difficulties in 
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the relationship between person and professional if there is not a shared 
understanding of what the person requires to live just normally, and thus an 
understanding of what is sufficient for them. Additionally, a professional may 
consider that the person may not know about potential options for change, and 
this may prompt discussion. On this basis, suggestions for improving prosthetic 
enablement can result in tension between prosthesis users and their prosthetists. 
Natasha provides an account of this happening to her when she was recommended 
to switch away from a solution she felt was working well. 
…they [the prosthetists] probably see me coming in with this really 
old fashioned thing and think well we can bring this girl into the new 
world, we’ll improve her life so much and she’ll be like, thanking us, 
and that’s exactly their intentions: good and honourable. It’s just 
that I think if I hadn’t had the [current solution], I’d be bringing them 
chocolates and flowers! 
When Natasha was recommended to accept a new prosthesis, she described 
feeling pressure to do so. Mike, an upper-limb prosthesis user, had described a 
similar situation as involving the ‘intimidation factor’: ‘They come in their lab coats 
– they’re a doctor, you know, they should know more than you. … Sometimes 
there’s a little bit of an intimidation factor that I don’t even think the prosthetist 
realises.’ Yet Natasha felt her life didn’t need improving by the prosthesis and that 
adjusting her ‘crutch’ was risking too much. She didn’t need or desire being 
‘brought into the new world’, particularly knowing that a new limb could lead to an 
inability for her to live just normally if it turned out to be worse. In the end, feeling 
the pressure of the recommendation and being unable to articulate what was 
sufficient about her limb that meant she needn’t gain a better one, Natasha 
consented to being fitted with the new prosthesis. However, while she accepted 
the recommendations of her prosthetist and gained the new leg, in private, she 
continued to suffice with her old limb. Natasha speculated that had she not had her 
good-enough present limb, she may have been more accepting of the new leg. 
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In the same vein, a recent online article by lower-limb prosthesis user, Emily Rapp, 
gives a similar account of sufficing: 
I was a true cyborg, a half-robot, as I gradually gained access to the 
kind of advanced technology that was totally out of financial reach 
for me even 10 years ago. I now have about seven legs — all paid 
for, in part, by insurance — with a range of sockets, abilities, knees, 
hydraulic systems and general prosthetic superpowers. I only wear 
one. I call this favorite leg my “Harvard leg,” which is so named 
because while I was a student at Harvard, I had a stellar insurance 
plan that paid in full for every piece of “durable medical equipment” 
I accumulated. This leg, made in 1998 by my best prosthetist, Bill, is 
still my favorite. I like its shape, its fit, the way the heel strikes the 
floor. The leg has survived two blown-out knees, four foot 
replacements and a few “repaints.” It has carried a baby, been too 
big or too small, depending on varying periods of diet and exercise, 
biked thousands of miles (in a spin room) and done a lot of 
downward-facing dog poses in yoga. It’s not the most 
technologically advanced, so I find myself weirdly aligned, at 38, 
with the Vietnam veterans I knew as a child — guys who didn’t want 
new legs, and who were happy with the old wooden contraptions 
because “they work just fine.” (Rapp, 2012) 
Emily’s favourite leg was the leg she liked for its shape, fit and the way ‘the heel 
strikes the floor’, indicating that despite her other limbs being more technologically 
advanced, they did not match up on these dimensions. Because of this, and 
because she had been using her favourite leg for so many years, overall the other 
legs fell short and so despite ‘accumulating’ new limbs over the years, Emily would 
only use this one. This ‘old contraption’ worked ‘just fine’, keeping her just normal, 
and so Emily preserved this through continuing to suffice with this prosthesis 
instead of moving to the more modern alternatives. 
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Zane, a lower-limb prosthesis user, spoke of sufficing for comfort, rather than also 
moving with technological developments: 
At the amputee conferences there’s -my god there’s over a dozen 
exhibitors of different prosthetic companies and you know it’s just 
overwhelming. And then because it’s such a technologically driven 
society here in North America and everyone thinks technology 
solves every problem. I’m sure for a lot of prosthetic consumers they 
have this idea that if I get the best quote unquote “leg” my life is 
going to be a whole lot better, but in terms of what I need... I mean I 
tried [a particular new prosthesis]: I didn’t like it… as I said before 
the most important thing is comfort so I’m willing to stick with what 
I’ve got. 
From Zane’s account, as well as Natasha’s and Emily’s, it is clear that individuals 
have particular requirements in a prosthesis that trump a quality of modernity. In 
fact, this can be a point of pride in indicating that the ‘old reliable’ still enables just 
as well or better than the latest technological advances in prosthetics, particularly 
when newer technology is often associated with being better. 
Thus when prosthesis consider themselves to be just normal with aspects of their 
prosthesis use, they will suffice rather than seek or consent to changes. Change, in 
order to improve one’s circumstances, can be too risky because of the threat of 
ending up in poorer circumstances, and which would consequently not be just 
normal to endure. Even when improvements may be recommended by others, 
individuals will be inclined to suffice if change is related to risk and redundancy. In 
this way, rather than an endless pursuit of seeking better and better levels of 
enablement and optimising one’s own prosthetic solution, when an individual is 
able to live just normally, they will suffice in order to preserve this. 
Summary 
It is a common desire to be just normal, and when threats to this are perceived, 
they will be acted upon in various ways in order that persons preserve being this 
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way. At the beginning of this chapter, black-spotting was discussed as a process of 
identifying situated threats to a person’s ability to live just normally. Individuals 
respond to identified black spots through protective avoidance, vigilant risk-
reducing, and fail-safing. The form of response is determined by the fit between a 
course of action and how an individual perceives it is just normal to manage the 
situation. 
Conserving, the second form of preserving being just normal, pertains to the need 
to be mindful of limited resources or tolerances that prosthesis users may have and 
which are involved in living just normally. Becoming more efficient, economising, 
prioritising and other strategies that conserve resources or extend tolerances are 
employed to ensure that individuals are able to do the things important to being 
just normal instead of encountering exhaustion. 
In the closing of this chapter, sufficing was explored to account for the way in 
which individuals preserve their just normal status by avoiding change to their 
prosthetic enablement. Change, when a person is already just normal, is redundant, 
and worse, can risk a poorer outcome and so the possibility of losing one’s just 
normality. 
These patterns account for the various salient ways in which prosthesis users 
preserve their just normal way of being, managing dangers to this as they are 
perceived. However, as was mentioned in the discussion on black-spotting, threats 
must be recognised in order to manage or pre-empt them, and so persons may find 
themselves at first encountering difficulties before they identify them as something 
to be managed and to be mindful of their occurring again. Experiencing something 
it is judged not right - or not just normal - to experience can therefore lead to acts 
to rectify this and so regain a sense of being just normal. Such acts of getting back 
to just normal are explored in the next chapter in a discussion of redressing.  
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Chapter 7: Redressing (to ‘Just Normal’) 
Introduction  
Persons desire, need, and feel they should be able, to be just normal, and so if they 
perceive that they are not just normal, they will be motivated to change this. This 
chapter explores actions that are characterised by efforts to change one’s 
circumstances in order to be just normal when this is judged not to be the case. 
These are acts of redressing. 
In redressing, persons may suddenly find themselves faced with things that are not 
‘right’ in the sense that they are violations of what they consider just normal, 
prompting change to what is right. This is further clarified in a discussion of righting 
what’s wrong. Redressing may also involve the correcting of things that have 
strayed to a point where they are discovered to have fallen ‘out of keeping’ with 
how they ought to be, and so persons are implicated here in restoring the balance. 
Finally, persons may seek redress, but attempts at change may not always be 
successful, and so re-coursing is a process of altering the approach of redress yet 
toward the same goal. Together, these give an account of the salient patterns of 
redressing as persons strive to live just normally. 
Righting What’s Wrong 
Persons may encounter things that go against what they perceive to be just normal 
for them; things that are at odds with what they perceive is fair or sufficient to live 
with, and as such must be rectified in order for the individual to live in a way that 
they see is right. So, individuals make efforts to change things that are not right to 
things that are right, and right in the sense that they are aligned with how they 
perceive things ought to be for them. This is a process of righting what’s wrong in 
order to redress the way a person lives, and there are varying ways that prosthesis 
users go about righting what’s wrong. 
Consider Paul Martin’s account. In his autobiography, Paul described his 
experiences with his first limb in the months following the amputation of his leg. 
After resolving to demonstrate that his acquired limb absence was not going to 
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hold him back, he decided to get a prosthesis as part of getting ‘back into the pack’ 
and living without limits (Martin, 2002, p. 79). With this leg, Paul attempted some 
of the sports he had done prior to his accident, but found that this leg was 
incapable of enabling him enough for these pursuits. So Paul sought a leg that was 
capable of getting him back into sports. His second limb could better cater for the 
activities he tried, and for a time this appeared to work out for him. However, after 
some further tests, he determined that though he could take part in some sports, 
running was still beyond him: 
I could play hockey and I could ski, but I still couldn’t run. The foot 
absorbed too much energy and the suspension system worked 
insufficiently, which was the biggest problem. Duct tape or nor duct 
tape, I could only take a dozen strides or so before the leg would 
loosen and “piston”. Pistoning results from insufficient suspension 
where the residual limb slides in and out of the socket during each 
stride. The induced rubbing and abrasion leads to discomfort, 
blisters and miserable pain when repeatedly bearing full body 
weight. (p. 82) 
Despite some problems when playing hockey and when skiing, Paul could still take 
part in these activities, and so this was good enough for him. However, the 
pistoning problem that led to discomfort when running was too much to bear, but 
Paul was not prepared to give up on this. Prior to losing his leg, Paul was not a big 
runner, but when he discovered that he was incapable of running at a level he felt 
he should be able to, he was motivated to do something about this because it did 
not fit with the mantra he had developed for himself. To be limited in this way, 
even though some other sports remained open, was a violation of what he 
perceived was his ‘right’ way of being. This was the wrong that Paul sought to right 
by finding a limb that could help him to run. So Paul had cause for redress when he 
found his second limb struggled with sports, but he sought redress again when he 
discovered he could not run. This was further illustrated in a conversation between 
Paul and his prosthetist, when the prosthetist told him while fitting the new leg 
that he would have him running marathons within a couple of years. In response, 
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Paul said ‘I laughed. I had no intention or desire to go that distance.’ (p. 84). For 
Paul, despite going for a leg capable of running, this was not because he intended 
to be a marathon runner, or even a ‘runner’, but merely to right the wrong of 
having this door shut to him. 
Paul’s account illustrates the way in which prosthesis users may discover aspects 
about their enablement which are lacking and in violation of what it is for them to 
live just normally. When faced with such discoveries, contacting a prosthetist to see 
if changes can be made is often the first port of call when trying to right the 
situation. Paul also illustrates that having the potential to be able to do something 
can be the focus for redress, that perceiving restrictions or barriers can also be seen 
as wrongs to right, even if the individual does not have immediate plans to act on 
these. Part of living just normally then, can be about having this agency, even if 
some options are unlikely to be chosen. 
Emily Rapp presents an account of righting what’s wrong in a different way. Emily 
was born with proximal femoral focal deficiency in her left leg, and has used 
prostheses for most of her life. A significant proportion of Emily’s autobiography 
from which this account is taken concerns Emily’s desire to be ‘normal’, and which 
she considers is in conflict with her limb difference. As she described starting to 
accept that limb difference would be with her for life, she describes resolving 
instead to ‘pass in able-bodied society’, ensuring she appeared ‘as normal as 
possible’ and so would be treated accordingly (Rapp, 2007, p. 135). The main way 
in which such ‘passing’ was achieved was by using a prosthesis that could afford an 
appearance as close to normal as possible. However, around the time Emily went to 
university, her bodily anxiety began to increase as she perceived that her body was 
coming under greater scrutiny with her peers and with potential partners. She 
started to feel unable to ‘pass’, and described this on the way to a social gathering. 
I felt sure I was about to be exposed for who and what I was, 
although I had no words at that moment to explain what this meant 
to me. What I knew for sure was that I felt entirely alone in this car 
with my new friends, headed for a crowd of yet more people. … I 
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knew I’d never be able to compete in the strange, secret world I was 
about to enter with these girls. I would never be able to play by the 
same rules. Maybe I would always be running from boys instead of 
sauntering up to them with naïve confidence tinged with 
nervousness as my friends did. I knew, as we sped through the 
abandoned gas stations and warehouses on the edges of town, that 
someday someone was going to want to see this leg, with a 
miniskirt, without any skirt, with the leg off. I felt a horrible, hollow 
feeling deep in my chest. (pp. 141-142) 
Passing required appearing as ordinary as possible, and as much as Emily tried to 
perfect other aspects of her appearance, she kept coming back to the prosthesis 
itself. 
I felt so helpless in my difference that I was utterly disgusted by it. 
You’re pathetic, I told myself. If I had only one leg, the least I could 
do was make it perfect. How hard could that be? I had trained as a 
skier and developed strong, lean muscles. I had gotten lazy; if I 
wanted to fit in, I needed to try harder. If I couldn’t have two real 
legs, I would alter the rest of my body to suit my desires. Back to the 
calorie books first thing tomorrow, I thought. Back to doing my 
homework days ahead of time. Back to the long workouts that left 
me exhausted. Now what to do about the problem in this moment? 
What to do about the leg? (p. 140) 
However, Emily did not know what to do about her leg. She had sought to right 
things by going to her prosthetist for help, but the outcome was never satisfactory. 
However, around this time, Emily met Samantha, a lower-limb prosthesis user also 
born with PFFD. Samantha did not appear to have to make as much effort to ‘pass’, 
coming across physically and romantically untroubled, impressing Emily, and Emily 
thought this due to her prostheses, which she saw as superior to her own. 
Samantha looked and appeared to live well, and these were qualities Emily badly 
wanted for herself. 
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I was amazed by her “gear,” as she called it, and remembered the 
way I had mythologized the Texas leg, as if possessing it would 
change my life. I remembered pressuring Vince [Emily’s prosthetist] 
and challenging him when the leg didn’t fit right. Now here it was–
strap-free and leaning against the wall in my new friend’s closet. (p. 
155) 
With the ‘mythological’ limb now an obtainable reality, Emily suddenly saw a real 
means of passing. Seeing Samantha’s prosthesis also drew Emily’s attention to the 
particular deficiencies of her own leg, which then became harder to live with 
knowing there was an alternative. 
None of her legs used the detestable waist strap that had plagued 
me for years and given me rashes, sores, and other headaches; it 
frayed and smelled bad and created weird bumps in my butt and 
hips when I walked. Next to Samantha, in my clunky wooden limb, I 
felt like a dilapidated robot. Samantha’s legs were built on advanced 
technology, not on outdated models that had been developed for 
war veterans decades before. She moved well and with confidence 
and was not afraid to wear shorts or skirts. (p. 155) 
Samantha was living in a way that Emily not only desired, but now needed to be in 
order to be just normal. To persevere with her ‘clunky’ limb, when she knew that 
there were prostheses out there that could better help her to pass in the way she 
felt she should be able to was not right. So Emily contacted a prosthetist in her 
quest for redress. 
“This is what I want,” I said, showing Dr. Elliot Samantha’s 
instructions. “This. I need a man who can make this.” My pulse 
raced. Please, I thought. Please. “Okay, Peanut,” he said. “We can do 
that.” I burst into tears. Finally, after years of hoping, it seemed that 
transformation would be that simple. The secret, festering hope I’d 
harboured that my life could change dramatically had not been 
unfounded after all … I was ready to ditch my wooden leg as quickly 
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as possible. I wanted a state-of-the-art prosthesis and an updated 
body that was beautiful and mobile and, of course, as normal as it 
could be. Yes, I admired Samantha’s athleticism, but what I really 
wanted was to be pretty and real looking enough in order to pass 
more effectively. (p. 157) 
Emily sought to right her situation by seeking the ‘state-of-the-art’ prosthesis. Her 
current leg, deemed an insufficient means to help her pass, and unfair to be 
lumbered with when she was aware of legs that could help her pass, was the wrong 
that she sought to address when she put her request to Dr. Elliot. Shortly after 
getting this new prosthesis, Emily described returning to university. 
The fall of my sophomore year, I walked onto campus bursting with 
confidence and prepared to experience a corresponding renaissance 
in my love life. With this new leg, I believed I could compete in the 
dating game just like everybody else. I couldn’t wait. (p. 158) 
Redressing involved Emily and Paul approaching their prosthetists to try to improve 
their enablement, and while Emily was initially unsuccessful, perceiving that she 
had done all she could meant that while she continued to struggle with her 
appearance, her actions were just normal. Persons will be bound to pursue redress 
if they perceive the option and need to do so, and even if unsuccessful, doing so 
means they have acted just normally. Paul and Emily’s accounts also illustrate the 
way that redress need not necessarily be contingent on knowledge of particular 
solutions, but is about engaging the pathways perceived to potentially lead to being 
just normal, in this case contacting those who may have this knowledge. 
Later in Emily’s account, when she became aware of the prosthesis she saw could 
bring her closer to the ‘normal as possible’ appearance that she felt compelled to 
strive for, living with her current leg ceased to be just normal. In light of new 
possibilities, persons may therefore reassess their just normality and if their 
present status is judged to be not good enough or not right when compared to 




Emily and Paul were convinced that there were definite wrongs about their 
prostheses which required righting through replacement. Both approached 
prosthetists and were able to gain limbs that enabled them to live just normally, 
and in the same way alterations may be sought or recommended without the need 
for an entirely new limb that also enable a person to live just normally. However, a 
further variation on righting what’s wrong occurs when persons approach 
gatekeepers (prosthetists or financiers) to improvements they perceive they ought 
to have to find that they are denied this. Being attached to these can then become 
the dominant wrong that prosthesis users are required to right. 
For example, Natasha is a 43 year-old lower-limb prosthesis user who has used 
prostheses for many years. She travels internationally and has lived in a number of 
countries around the world. Natasha currently has a leg that she had made at her 
limb-fitting centre that she is happy with, but she described a time before this at a 
different centre that she returned to when she started to experience significant 
discomfort with her prosthesis. 
I broke down in tears a couple of times in the [limb fitting centre] 
because I was so broken up because I’d been *abroad+ and come 
back and they [limb fitting centre] were kind of making out that me 
being *abroad+ I’d kind of exacerbated myself, by climbing hills and 
that type of thing, but you’re meant to be able to do that – they told 
me that I shouldn’t run the marathon. I’d run – not run it, walked 
the marathon – and that because I was getting older, that it’s 
degenerating. 
Natasha had returned from abroad to her limb fitting centre to find a way to 
address the problems she was having with her prosthesis, only to find it was the 
opinion of her prosthetist that she had brought the problems on herself. When she 
was told that her pains were from her doing too much, rather than a fault with the 
limb, and that she should therefore refrain from such activities, she did not take 
this well. To be able to exert herself, like when climbing hills and taking part in 
marathons, was something Natasha felt she should be possible – ‘you’re meant to 
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be able to do that’ – these were things she saw as necessary for being just normal, 
and to instead be made to feel that these were excesses troubled her. Natasha felt 
that the staff were indicating that the prosthesis prescription was right, and that 
her actions were wrong, and so the solution to her difficulties should involve 
cutting back and leaving more ‘strenuous’ activities behind. But because Natasha 
says she ‘knew herself’ and knew what she was ‘meant’ to be able to do, she 
rejected this judgement on the basis that it was unfair to suggest she limit herself in 
such a way. Natasha stuck with her belief that the limb was deficient, and this was 
the wrong requiring righting. But being with a prosthetist who did not see things 
this way and would not support changes to the limb then became the foremost 
wrong she was compelled to right. In the end, at personal expense, Natasha went 
elsewhere in her search of redress, and was vindicated when she found a centre 
that could provide her with a limb that could cater for her lifestyle in this way. ‘I 
went there and they built me a perfect leg and I still have it.’ 
Natasha felt that living in such a level of discomfort because of her prosthesis was 
wrong, and then that being told that a woman of her circumstances should not do 
the things she did that brought about the discomfort was also wrong. This kind of 
conflict can arise between the parties involved in helping an individual gain a limb if 
individuals are active with their prostheses and therefore cause an elevated rate of 
wear and tear on a limb. Mark, a 46-year old lower-limb prosthesis user, described 
a number of run-ins throughout his prosthesis-using lifetime that related to this: 
I used to get a ‘side-lock guarantee’. Which means as soon as I hit 
the side-lock, the guarantee was over because I would destroy 
things [laughs]. Because I would do things, you know. That was 
when I was a kid with the insurance companies… But this whole, 
‘you should take the elevator, lift, instead of walking up stairs 
because that’s too hard on the leg’ was, you know, ‘you have to get 
it fixed too often’ and that was the insurance – I was getting 
something through the State of Massachusetts, you know, and 
through there they just went, ‘we’re paying out an awful lot for your 
legs and stuff, maybe you should stop, um, hiking, or stop going up 
138 
 
stairs’. And I just went, ‘yeah ok, I will. Yeah sure, right! See ya, 
goodbye!’ [laughs]. 
Like Natasha, for Mark, being told to avoid ordinary activities because of his 
difference provoked a sense of injustice that even as a child, meant that he would 
flagrantly ignore it. As an adult, Mark recognises where the providers are coming 
from with their advice, but still sees it as wrong to bend himself to prosthesis or 
provider, and rather that these should bend to him. He recognised that a 
prosthetist provided a service to him, that he was paying for this, and he indicated 
how he had become more forthright in consultations, and stated that a limb ‘should 
take it. If it doesn’t, fix it.’ So whenever Mark’s limb couldn’t take it, he sought to 
gain replacements or modifications that could take it, and when he encountered 
providers of the mind that he ought to curb his activity as a solution to avoiding 
damage or breakage, he would go elsewhere. 
In some ways, Natasha and Mark’s accounts are similar to Mike’s. Mike is a 50 year 
old upper-limb user who described his past experiences with prostheses and 
prosthetists, involving the need to right what’s wrong: 
My prosthetist right now is probably the best one that I’ve had. You 
know, I’ve had some that they give the socket to me, I go home, I 
take out a jig saw, cut it up and paste it, oh yeah I’ve done that. I’ve 
literally cut sockets up and re-did them. Why would you do that? 
Well, the thing is, by going to – you know the prosthetist I’m talking 
about was out in California- it was five or six prosthetists back. I 
thought he would be pretty good. I went to him, he built me a 
socket, I got it, and after wearing it for a week I was starting to have 
issues. I went back to him and he made a couple of minor changes 
and was basically like, ‘That’s how it’s going to be’. And so basically I 
made modifications to it that made it last about another six months, 
broke the thing and went to a different prosthetist. 
Mike refused to accept that his prosthetists’ professional opinion was right. He 
considered ‘how it’s going to be’ did not have to be the case because of prior 
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experience without these issues, and so he knew that this wasn’t how it could be. 
‘Cutting up’ his sockets and then going elsewhere were Mike’s demonstrations of 
trying to right what’s wrong as the prosthesis in its previous form was not good 
enough, and sticking with a prosthetist that would only willing or capable to 
provide this level of service was similarly not good enough. However, Mike 
expressed his concern that others who lacked this experience of knowing how 
things could be might not be able to judge such outcomes of consultations as 
wrong. 
Somebody who say, that was their first prosthetist, that’s the 
experience they’re going to get. And if they are uncomfortable with 
the socket, there’s a good chance they may never wear a prosthetic 
again. Imagine if the first time you went and tried shoes on, you 
were supposed to get a size four shoe, let’s say, and they put you in 
a size two, and they say, ‘well that’s how shoes are going to feel.’ 
You’d most likely spend the rest of your life running round barefoot. 
Mike was able to judge issues with his prosthesis as wrong through his experience 
of prosthesis use without these. This gave him his yardstick from which he could 
make such assessments of good-enoughness, and from which came his concern for 
others about not being able to do so, and so being unable to identify wrongs 
requiring righting. Yet consider Zane’s account. Zane is a lower-limb prosthesis user 
who also recounted difficulties he had with a prosthetist he once saw. While using 
his prosthesis, Zane discovered that when he went to kneel on the floor, the way 
that his prosthesis bent meant that the height difference between his left and right 
side left him unbalanced. Zane queried this with his prosthetist, and like Mike was 
similarly given a response that did not sit well with him: 
I said to him ‘you know when I sit on my knees, well, there’s more 
space between the knee and the ground on the artificial leg than 
there is on the real leg’, and he just said to me ‘well, that’s just the 
way it is’. 
Similarly, rather than accepting this, Zane went elsewhere: 
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I spoke to another prosthetist and it turns out that there’s a knee 
cap that you can put on the leg so that you’re more level if you’re on 
your knees. So he didn’t know that; I had to go to another 
prosthetist to get that information. 
Zane went elsewhere, and yet he did not have a yardstick with which to judge 
whether accepting being told about ‘the way it is’ was just normal. However, Zane 
had stated earlier that a good prosthetist to him meant that they would be 
‘receptive to my problem and can address it’. So being told that he should just live 
with the issue instead of indications that the prosthetist was prepared to try to help 
him overcome it, or at least being receptive enough to explain why it was not 
possible to rectify, were indications to Zane that sticking with this prosthetist was 
not just normal. So Zane was motivated to go elsewhere because this professional 
had become a potential barrier to his living just normally. And like Natasha, he was 
similarly vindicated when going elsewhere resulted in a solution to his problem. 
So there are various ways in which prosthesis users may perceive barriers to their 
ability to be just normal and to live in a way that is sufficient and fair. To continue 
to live with these violates a sense of being just normal and therefore constitute the 
wrongs that persons right in their redressing. Persons may right what’s wrong 
through going to a prosthetist or financier, where individuals may have alternative 
limbs or components in mind, or they may approach providers as a patient may 
typically approach a doctor – with a description of the problem in the hope that the 
professional will call on their expertise to identify a solution to right the issue 
instead. However, if the outcome of this approach conflicts with how an individual 
feels they should be able to live, such as professionals appearing either unwilling or 
unable to help them right what’s wrong, and persons perceive the possibility of 
otherwise achieving this, then this becomes the focus for righting what’s wrong, as 
persons will go elsewhere to seek a provider that can provide a just normal 
solution. 
Before concluding, an extract from Kevin Garrison’s autobiography illustrates a 
further way that prosthesis users right what’s wrong. Kevin, a lower-limb prosthesis 
user, described the difficulties he had had with his early prostheses. When he was 
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fitted with his first limb, Kevin recounts that it appeared to fit fine when he was 
testing it at the prosthetist’s, but soon after he got home it began to cause him 
intense discomfort whenever he walked on it. After speaking to the prosthetist who 
fitted him with this limb, Kevin was directed to someone more local to where he 
lived in order to address this. The local prosthetist fitted Kevin with a new limb, and 
while this alleviated some of the discomfort, this limb had a host of other problems 
which only further frustrated Kevin. He concluded that receiving a limb so poor in 
other regards was evidence that some prosthetists were not as skilled as others, 
and that a prosthesis was only as good as the person making it. However, Kevin felt 
that he had exhausted his options; there was no one else he was able to go to for 
the right limb, and yet he perceived having one made was possible. This became 
the impetus for Kevin to embark on a career as a prosthetist himself. He explained 
the particular grievances he had with one of his prostheses that motivated his 
career choice. 
I had two reasons for wanting to do this. First, I wanted to learn how 
to make artificial limbs that didn’t make noise on quiet romantic 
nights while hurting your hip as you struggled to walk and scraping 
the bone every time you tried to remove it. Second, and probably 
most important, I wanted to learn how to make a perfect one for 
myself, one that made walking a pleasure, as it should be- not a 
nightmare! (Garrison, 2011, p. 66) 
After living with breakage and discomfort for some time, and considering that 
walking should be a pleasure, and that it should not be a nightmare, as was his 
experience, the last straw for Kevin was having a date nearly ruined by his 
prosthesis. He felt it was wrong to keep with what he viewed as substandard limbs, 
and resolved to do something about this. So Kevin’s course of righting what’s 
wrong was signing himself up for a career in developing prostheses in order that he 




Pursuing a career as a prosthetist in order to gain the means to live just normally 
may appear somewhat of an extreme course of redress, but Kevin is not alone in 
doing so. In addition, Mike exemplifies cases of individuals modifying their 
prostheses themselves when they felt a prosthetist was unwilling or incapable of 
doing so. For these individuals, where professional assistance for righting wrongs is 
not possible, this can involve persons taking matters more directly into their own 
hands. 
Furthermore, as the beginning of Emily’s account illustrates, redress may be sought, 
but if this is unsuccessful and the person perceives this outcome to be reasonable 
and that there are no alternatives – that it is in fact ‘the way of things’ – then 
despite dissatisfaction, if a person’s way of being aligns with the best of possible 
options, then this is just normal. Thus it is the instances of issues that violate what 
is perceived to be just normal that prompt righting what’s wrong, but acting upon 
these is contingent on perceiving that redressing is achievable. 
In summary, persons are implicated in acts of righting what’s wrong that transform 
a way of being that is not just normal into one that is. Where professional 
assistance is required, if this person is unable or unwilling to facilitate this, they too 
may become a focus for righting what’s wrong. In the next section, a distinct 
pattern of actions accounts for ways in which redressing is instead about things 
that are suddenly realised to have strayed from what is just normal, and where 
redressing lies in the ‘getting back’ to just normal. 
Restoring the Balance 
In the previous section, persons identified violations of what they perceive is 
involved in living just normally and sought to address these, thereby righting what’s 
wrong. These were things that persons found they were without, or were 
prevented from getting, or ways they were treated by others, and were things that 
motivated such righting. However, persons are also implicated in actions of a 
restorative nature, where they may discover things that have deteriorated and are 
in fact out of keeping with what they consider is just normal. Discovering this 
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prompts rectifying actions, recovering or tempering things accordingly to re-
establish a just normal status. These are efforts of restoring the balance. 
Mel is a lower-limb prosthesis user in her early thirties who gives an illustration of 
restoring the balance. Mel underwent the amputation of her leg a few years prior 
to our conversation, and described how her confidence and mood were extremely 
low because of the loss of her leg. When she got her first prosthesis, this did not 
improve things in the way that she had hoped it would. A combination of limited 
flexion, difficulties in usage, and a lack of trust in the leg to perform as required had 
led to falls and injury, and this had further reduced her morale. At one point, Mel 
described a time of having ‘no confidence’ when she could not even bring herself to 
go out in public. 
I refused to go into town on nights out or into the likes of a cinema 
or busy shopping centre in fear of someone hitting off me and 
kicking the [leg] from under me accidentally or causing me to lose 
my balance. 
To live with such diminished confidence coupled with a largely absent social life 
was not just normal for Mel. She had hoped that her prosthesis would help to 
restore the balance but this had only eroded her confidence further. Mel therefore 
sought a different prosthesis, perceiving that a better limb would give her an 
improved level of dexterity that would in turn help her confidence to improve and 
get her back up and running. When she received the leg, Mel recalled that early on, 
she did lose her balance a number of times, but was able to use the features of the 
new leg to ‘catch’ herself and prevent injury. She described how this helped her 
morale to ‘return very quickly’ and the broader implications of this: 
Personally, I felt much better in myself. I started doing a lot more 
everyday things. Even simple things like hoovering, going up and 
down stairs seemed easier. I was going out more places as I knew 
now I could catch myself if I did lose balance or someone 
accidentally knocked me. I wasn’t constantly watching the prosthesis 
to see if I could take the next step. I was walking so much better that 
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several people didn’t realise I had an artificial leg. And I was starting 
to dance again in pubs/clubs…hooray! 
Mel’s confidence and her socialising began to improve as she was able to do more 
with her leg and without fear that she would fall. She began to monitor the limb 
less and her anxiety towards using it began to diminish. In this way, obtaining the 
leg and training herself to use it was how Mel restored both her confidence and her 
socialising, and restored them in such a way that they returned to a threshold of 
what she felt acceptable, at which she could once again be just normal. 
For a time, this worked out for Mel, but she then described more recent periods 
where she began to have other difficulties with her prosthesis. 
Wearing the silicone liner on my stump constantly did cause me a 
few issues with dry skin and friction burns. This was down to me 
using the stump/hip a lot more now and not a stiff leg. At one stage 
the scald/burn was very sore or raw that it caused pain with every 
step I took and so I began to limp. People would then ask if I had 
hurt my leg etc and I would have to explain why I was limping. My 
confidence began to drop a little… 
I was walking using a stick/crutch when going shopping or on long 
trips. I was going out but was sitting a lot and not up dancing as 
normal. I then began to refuse invites out as this soon became 
unbearable and I was paranoid re the way I was walking. 
At these points, Mel found herself again living in a way that was not right. Her 
mood had dropped again and she described having more ‘bad days’ than normal. 
This was not the balance of what she considered reasonable - it was not within how 
she felt she should live, and so she sought to attend to root problems once more. In 
the first instance, she received adjustments to her limb and some treatment 
creams, and soon after the issue cleared up and ‘everything was grand’. When the 
issue arose again, Mel returned to her specialist to discover she had an infected 




Zane gives a further illustration of the way that things slip out of keeping from what 
persons perceive is just normal. Zane is a lower-limb prosthesis user who has used 
prostheses for many years and has been involved in a number of support 
organisations for individuals with limb difference. When discussing comfort in 
prosthesis use, Zane described how he expected a level of discomfort, but it was 
when this reached a particular intensity that this was problematic for him. 
I experience varying degrees of discomfort almost every day. The 
question becomes is it something that I can handle or is it something 
completely unacceptable that is interfering with my day-to-day 
mobility. 
For Zane, living with a prosthesis involved a particular level of discomfort that he 
experienced and in this way it was just normal. When this varied to the extent that 
it interfered with his ability to get about and became unmanageable, then this 
became intolerable and he sought to redress this, bringing it back to a tolerable 
level. Zane described how he would go about doing this. 
There are numerous times where I am not comfortable and will 
make an appointment to meet with the prosthetist and no doubt the 
culprit can be seen right on the stump as there is skin breakdown 
caused by weight gain. … Sometimes a new socket would be 
required to be made. Other times, the prosthetist can cut away or 
flame down the periphery of the socket so it doesn’t dig in to the 
skin. 
So there were a number of ways Zane’s discomfort could be reduced once more 
and his mobility restored. As he describes, often the prosthetist or he himself could 
identify that the issue was weight gain, leading to an increase in mass in his residual 
limb that meant his socket no longer fit as well and caused these problems. As a 
number of individuals described, residual limb management was something to 
continually cater for, and when issues became apparent that persons attributed to 
changes in residual limb health or mass, then they would act to bring things back to 
what they perceived was normal. 
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Restoring the balance then, is to do with a normalising of an individual’s 
circumstances back to what is just normal for them. However, Zane also indicated 
that a large number of trips to the prosthetist could also tip the balance of what 
was just normal, as it would not be right for him to be in and out of the 
consultation room to such an extent. So through improving his diet and his fitness, 
Zane could bring the level of discomfort as well as the number of consultation trips 
to a level that he saw was reasonable. 
A further example is that of Luke, a 30-year old upper-limb prosthesis user. Luke 
had been using the prosthesis he had been fitted with for some time and was 
happy with how life with an artificial limb was working out. He described how he 
would tend to wear his limb from early in the day until late at night, involving it in a 
large proportion of his daily living and with only a minor amount of discomfort. 
However, at one time, Luke started to find that he could only wear it for a period 
before increasing discomfort forced him to remove it. The level of pain he had 
started to experience was intolerable, but removing the hand to alleviate this 
meant that Luke was suddenly unable to perform many of the tasks he needed his 
prosthesis for. So in the run up to his consultation to address this, Luke described 
being trapped between experiencing unbearable discomfort and diminished ability, 
neither of which was acceptable to him. The period of tolerable prosthetic usage 
had begun shrinking further and so Luke returned to his prosthetist to try to restore 
the balance of comfort and ability. Upon analysis, Luke’s prosthetist told him that 
the muscle mass in his residual limb had grown through using his residual limb 
inside the prosthesis, and which had deprecated the fit of his socket, resulting in 
discomfort from tightness and sweating. His prosthetist performed a ‘relief cut’ in 
the socket, giving Luke’s residual limb some ‘breathing room’ and which 
consequently brought Luke back to the level of usage and comfort he was used to. 
A number of factors can conspire to complicate the use of a prosthesis and prevent 
this from being just normal. Zane and Luke give examples of the mass of a residual 
limb varying and causing complications with the fit of a socket, while others 
described sockets ‘naturally wearing out’ and losing fit over time, and one who 
developed a neuroma that would be antagonised by contact with a socket. For 
147 
 
each, persons may experience increasing discomfort and decreasing ability that 
corresponds to the development of the issue, neither of which is just normal. So 
whether replacing a socket, managing a residual limb, or otherwise, the redressing 
action of tackling the underlying issue is thus intended to restore the balance of 
bringing discomfort down and activity back up to what is considered just normal. 
Thus restoring the balance constitutes a distinct pattern from righting what’s 
wrong, though both are concerned with getting to being just normal. For righting 
what’s wrong, outright violations of what is considered just normal are determined 
by the individual, such as obstructions or the absence of important things, whereas 
restoring the balance concerns individuals identifying the deterioration of things 
and realising this progression, and where they must act to prevent further decline 
and to get back to where they once were. 
Re-coursing 
In the accounts given up until now in this chapter, it is impetus to change and the 
point at which this was achieved that have largely been foregrounded, as persons 
redress through righting wrongs and restoring the balance. The focus of these 
accounts means that the struggles of effecting change and failed attempts at 
redress are not always apparent. In this section, a pattern is elaborated that 
illustrates the different ways in which persons reconsider and reconfigure their 
approaches to redress when efforts fall short, and so how persons re-course in 
further efforts to succeed in being just normal. 
One way re-coursing is observed is when persons seeking redress contend with 
being denied what they perceive is required to live just normally. In the context of 
prosthesis use, those with the power to sanction limbs may elect not to, and so 
when efforts to redress are denied by such gatekeepers, persons may re-course in 
their approach to try to overcome them through different means. Paul Martin, the 
lower-limb prosthesis user who gave an account earlier in this chapter, gives a 
related account of re-coursing in his autobiography. 
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…I knew I had found someone who could build the leg I so 
desperately wanted. Now I faced the challenge of convincing my 
insurance company that I needed an athletic prosthetic leg to return 
me to the fitness level I had enjoyed before the accident. This task 
required patience and determination. (Martin, 2002, p. 82) 
Third-party financiers may be unwilling or unable to facilitate a request for a 
prosthesis or part of a prosthesis, and so approaches to getting what is required 
may need to be rethought. Like many others, Paul anticipated this would be an 
uphill struggle and kept at his efforts to convince his insurers. He sought to adapt 
his approach by reframing his case with more and more supplementary materials 
to support his application, but unfortunately, these efforts also failed. ‘My 
attempts, properly backed by formal letters from medical doctors and certified 
prosthetists, were shot down again and again. Another leg, the insurers claimed, 
was not medically necessary. I became very discouraged.’ (p. 82). At this time, Paul 
judged that he would not be able to obtain the limb he needed this way. 
Alan is a lower-limb prosthesis user who presents a similar account to Paul. Alan 
described how he had had numerous applications to his health authority rejected 
when he asked them to sanction payment of a prosthesis he sought. Like Paul’s 
insurers, the health authority indicated that the prosthesis Alan requested was too 
expensive and the cost was an excess compared to simpler models. When Alan’s 
case was rejected, like Paul, he re-applied and re-applied, each time re-writing 
letters and providing more and more ‘evidence’ of the need for this particular limb 
in order to improve his chances of success. Eventually, Alan was successful in his 
‘battle’ with the authorities, and he considers that he now knows the level of what 
is required to effect change if he required another prosthesis in the future. In this 
way, both Alan and Paul re-coursed by ‘ramping up’ their efforts at redress until this 
was achieved or it became apparent that no amount of escalating this course of 
action would be successful. 
Returning to Paul’s case, when Paul was unable to get his limb sanctioned, he still 
perceived the possibility of getting this limb, and this led him to appealing to his 
prosthetist directly. Paul’s prosthetist took pity on his case and set about creating 
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the limb, assuring Paul that ‘one way or another he would get the under-writers to 
pay’ (p. 83). So in Paul’s account, redress constituted Paul’s quest for an athletic 
prosthesis, and when his initial attempt failed, and subsequent re-coursing through 
‘ramping up’ was also met with failure, he sought to re-course through a complete 
change of approach, appealing instead to his prosthetist. 
Rob, a 34-year old bi-lateral lower-limb user, gives a different kind of re-coursing in 
his account. Rob described being fitted with a new socket that was supposed to 
give him a ‘firm but comfortable’ fit, but after using it for a time he felt that this 
was way off the acceptable level of comfort that he was used to. ‘I felt that it 
actually felt that it was pulling, pulling you rather than anything else. This one I 
have fits snug, the other one just felt like it was pulling me out. I just was not 
comfortable.’ So Rob returned to his prosthetist a number of times to fix this, but 
efforts at modification were unsuccessful and Rob was left with an ill-fitting limb. 
After a number of further attempts, Rob and his prosthetist agreed to give up on 
this socket, and instead to try something completely different. Rob described his 
uncertainty towards this shift, but he was confident in the judgement and ability of 
his prosthetist: ‘I was kinda going, oh well, I’ll give it a try…’ When Rob tried the 
new socket, he found it gave him the fit he sought, but he was aware that this had 
been a calculated risk. ‘…I wasn’t really into it but it just worked out phenomenally 
well. Again, it’s just the way it goes. Some work for you, some don’t.’ Similarly to 
the previous illustrations then, Rob had kept at the attempts to improve the fit of 
his socket, but he too reached a point where he determined that pursuing this 
course of improvement was unlikely to work out, and re-coursed to trying a 
different kind of socket. 
We might also return to Emily Rapp, the lower-limb prosthesis user involved earlier 
in this chapter, in order to further illustrate re-coursing. Earlier, Emily had described 
feeling ‘transformed’ and ‘reborn’ after she obtained her new prosthesis; a limb 
that would enable her to ‘pass’ in everyday social life and to enjoy social occasions 
at university without fear that she would be perceived or treated abnormally 
because of limb difference. With her new leg, she matched up to her friend 
Samantha who used a similar prosthesis and appeared carefree, and so Emily was 
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confident that her efforts at redress had been successful. She perceived things to 
be just normal, yet soon after, at a party she was at, Emily overheard a 
conversation about her that caused her spirits to plunge: 
As I was about to walk down the stairs and out the door, I heard a 
conversation to my left in the hallway that led to the bathroom. 
“I’ve got a bone to pick with you,” said the man I’d been sitting with. 
“What, dude? I’m totally wasted. What are you talking about?” I 
stood motionless at the top of the stairs. “About that girl. She’s got a 
wooden leg, man. What the hell? I thought you said you’d seen her 
before.” I didn’t wait to hear any more. I walked home quickly 
through the sharp, fragrant air of a Minnesota fall. … I could not 
repeat the words that had confirmed my greatest fears. I wanted to 
tell Liz; I wanted her to say, He’s wrong, he’s a jerk, it will never 
happen again, even though I wouldn’t have believed her. “Yeah?” 
she asked. I shook my head. “Mmmm,” I said. Liz squeezed my hand 
and didn’t make me continue. I began to cry. She didn’t say, “Don’t 
do that” or “stop crying,” she just held my hand and never asked me 
to explain. For a decade, I’d been pinning the advent of my new life 
on the acquisition of an improved prosthesis, but I knew now I 
would not be prancing around or going on romantic dates as I had 
imagined. Boys were not going to start ringing me up or chasing me 
down to blurt out expressions of admiration. I feared–even 
believed–that the encounter at the party had been an accurate 
glimpse of my future. (Rapp, 2007, pp. 160–161) 
Emily had sought to live as ordinarily as possible, to be ‘chased’ and sought after as 
she had imagined she might be with this limb, but continuing to be hurt by others 
despite her new prosthesis indicated to Emily that no kind of limb was going to 
transform her in the way she desired. Her limb difference continued to prevent her 
living in a way she felt ‘right’, and she now saw this would continue no matter how 
advanced the prosthesis was that she was using. This drove Emily to re-course, as 
she strove to find a solution elsewhere: 
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I wanted to live and thrive, only what kind of life was I really having 
now, willingly trapped in outdated social mores and my own self-
hatred? How could I make it a good one? How could I be a good 
person with all this rage inside me? I agonised over this. The task of 
making choices that would lead to a good and right life versus an 
immoral or unsatisfying one-what I began to think of as a “crippled” 
life-drove me to declare a religion major that year. As an early 
reader of the Bible and a lover of its stories, I gravitated to these old-
what we call “classical”-texts. Perhaps there were more elements of 
truth in those time-honored books, those ancient words, and maybe 
I would find some answers there. (pp. 163-164) 
The way Emily recalled being ‘willingly trapped’ and full of ‘self-hatred’ hints at the 
direction of her re-coursing. When improved prostheses failed to help her live in a 
‘good’ and ‘right’ way, she sought solutions through immersion in religious studies. 
And to an extent Emily found what she sought: 
…I felt elated and terrified. In the book were detailed analyses of 
biblical texts and sociological studies explaining the emotional 
impact of feeling on the edge of the world or being viewed as a 
lesser person because of the shape and limits of your body. I read 
bleak statistics and stories of hope. [Nancy] Eiesland envisions God 
as disabled, as the body that is broken at each Eucharistic 
celebration. Her “bones and braces” embodiment challenges the 
notion that there is one normative standard for correct bodies and 
focuses instead on the “mixed blessing” of the unconventional–or 
crippled–body. “The disabled God makes possible a renewal of hope 
for people with disabilities and others who care. This symbol points 
not to a utopian vision of hope as the erasure of all human 
contingency, historically or eternally, for that would be to erase our 
bodies, our lives. Rather, it is a liberatory realism that maintains a 
clear recognition of the limits of our bodies and an acceptance of the 
truth of being human.” These words made a “difficult but ordinary” 
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life possible and permissible; a life that required no healing touch, 
nor miraculous transformation, in order to be complete or 
worthwhile. (pp. 164-165) 
So in seeking to be just normal, individuals may determine that a particular course 
of redressing is not able to achieve this. They realise they are ‘going the wrong way’ 
about things, such that they need a change of approach in order to succeed. Paul 
stopped appealing to his insurance group and appealed instead to his prosthetist, 
Rob tried a different limb when adjustments to his socket were not working out, 
and Emily sought a way to re-considering her circumstances when she felt 
prostheses could not do this for her. Each changed their approach when they 
deemed that their original attempts at change were not working out. 
In addition to this, persons may not know of ways to redress other than what they 
may have already tried, and so they may seek out similar others that may be able 
to indicate possibilities for re-coursing. This can be a ‘last chance’ at redress, where 
individuals may appeal to others to know whether anything can be done or 
whether their situation is unchangeable and to get on with it. In online discussion 
forums, threads of this nature are often started with questions about ‘what to do’ 
about particular problems. Two of these opening posts are given below: 
I am a below knee bi lateral amputee. I wear silicone sheaths on 
both legs, the only down side is that where the sheaths end I get a 
terrible itching. I have tried everything I can think of to stop it, if 
anyone has had a similar problem and been able to solve it please 
could you let me know before I scratch my skin off. (Kastley3, 2011) 
My insurance is no longer contracted with my leg man and he has 
taken another job in the same field but not seeing patients. I 
decided I needed to find someone else nearby. Last year I had a 
socket made here. What a fiasco this has been! This leg man 
proceeded to do his own thing saying the way I had had a socket 
made was 'old school.' I told him the new socket he made was 
uncomfortable and was making my knee swell, he said it wasn't 
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fitting because I had gained weight...not true. I could not wear the 
socket at all. He would not listen to me and I felt like I was talking to 
the wall I said screw it and never went back to him. The socket he 
made sits in my closet. In January of this year I decided to try 
someone else with the recommendation of a doctor friend of mine. 
This leg man has been working on a new socket for six months and 
am still without a new one. I have never heard of this, but he has 
sent it off to be computer sized three times now. Two weeks ago I 
brought the test socket home to try out. It is still uncomfortable and 
hits me wrong at the knee and needs more work. I have been 
putting off going back because I am frustrated and don't know what 
to do from here. …Does anyone have any suggestions on what my 
options might be? (Impala, 2012) 
These posts illustrate the way that persons may seek direction from similar others. 
By setting out their situation, they seek answers from other members of the 
community who they perceive may have had similar issues, and resolved them 
successfully. Responses to these questions tended to be supportive, with some 
offering possible solutions that variously entailed trying new ideas or escalating a 
course of address that had been attempted, as was the case in this example: 
…Your own description of the conversation appears to make it 
sound more like you said something along the lines of, "That spot 
still hurts," and then you waited for the "professional" to make a 
decision for you. Granted, in an ideal world that's what would 
happen...but you've already found out that your "team" is not 
functioning as a team, that, in fact, they seem to be trying to just 
"pass the buck" and hope that someone else will be the one to find 
an answer or make a decision. Given that fact, it's up to you to be 
the one to press the question, demand an answer, and make your 
own decision. I can tell you from personal experience that, if you're 
trying to be detached from what's going on with your foot, it's not 
going to help your situation. I went a full year with a completely 
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snapped tendon in my right foot, while doctors kept telling me that 
"feet take a long time to heal" … It wasn't until I got mad enough to 
stick my foot in my doctor's face, wiggle it weakly and ineffectively, 
and say "that's my FULL range of motion after a year, and it's STILL 
painful, and I'm STILL walking with a cane. If you can't figure it out, 
please refer me to someone who CAN." And so he did...[But] If I 
hadn't pushed the point, I have a feeling I'd STILL be shuffling about 
with a torn tendon. (Cherylm, 2011) 
In sum, prosthesis users have cause for redress when they determine that they are 
not living just normally, yet not all attempts to redress are successful. When 
attempts do not pan out as desired, individuals may re-course to a different 
approach that they perceive could be successful. Re-coursing may include 
escalating approaches, changing the channel of approach, or seeking suggestions 
from similar others who may be judged to be more experienced and to potentially 
have overcome a particular difficulty. 
Summary 
Acts of redressing are intended to enable an individual to be just normal when they 
perceive themselves not to be. Righting what’s wrong contends with the way that 
persons encounter violations of and obstacles to living just normally, and act to 
rectify or overcome these. Restoring the balance concerns persons acting on 
perceptions that particular things have fallen out of keeping with what is just 
normal, exceeding or falling below what is considered right, and so how persons 
seek to re-establish the right levels of things. Re-coursing accounts for acts of giving 
up on particular approaches to redress when these are perceived to be ineffective 
and engaging alternatives, as persons alter their approach to a way they believe 
can help them to be just normal.  
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Chapter 8: Persevering (with living ‘Just Normally’) 
Introduction 
In the previous chapters on preserving and redressing, individuals were said to 
engage in acts that keep them just normal and also in efforts to bring about a just 
normality when this was deemed not to be the case. While a way of living that is 
perceived to be just is sought, this is a way that is reasonable, and ‘about right’, and 
so not necessarily perfect; rather it is just normal, and ‘good enough’, and so this 
leaves scope for accompanying difficulties that persons must contend with. 
In this chapter then, a category of actions is discussed that pertain to persevering, 
or the way that persons keep on with being just normal. Obligated persistence 
explores the way in which persons are compelled to live just normally, and despite 
issues they may encounter. Trusting to transience involves persons foregrounding 
‘an end in sight’ to particular problems, and this enables them to grit through 
these. Mole-hilling concludes this section by exploring the ways in which persons 
equate or contrast difficulties to those that may be experienced by others, and in 
doing so, rationalise the occurrence of problems. This makes an individual’s 
circumstances seem more ordinary, and so difficulties that much more tolerable 
and permissible. These categories account for the ways in which persons persevere 
with living just normally, managing difficulties of a just normal nature. 
Obligated Persistence 
In this section, discussion focuses on the differing ways that persons consider what 
it means to live just normally and do so. Just normal is argued to be an important 
way of being to persons such that they are compelled to keep themselves in ways 
fitting with their conception of this. An ongoing obligation to keep living and doing 
particular things that keep a person just normal is termed obligated persistence. 
This pattern is perhaps most salient when persons are considered to be persevering 
even in the face of difficulties. If these difficulties are judged to be of a just normal 
nature, then persons may not have cause for redressing, as these difficulties are 
seen as a part and parcel of living just normally. Instead, obligated persistence 
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captures the way that persons consider that these are things they ought to get on 
with, as they keep at their persevering with living just normally. 
For instance, in the context of prosthesis use, living just normally may be perceived 
to be contingent on the use of a prosthesis because of a particular function that the 
limb facilitates, and so which would not be possible without. However, the use of a 
prosthesis can therefore become a binding experience, since discontinuing use is to 
discontinue being just normal. This can be problematic if issues arise or accompany 
the use of the limb which would otherwise prompt cessation. If it is perceived that 
little can be done to alleviate an issue aside from non-use, then individuals must 
keep going with the difficulty. The prosthesis as a device that enables can therefore 
also be something that persons may find themselves obliged to persist with. This is 
a form of obligated persistence. 
To introduce this pattern of obligated persistence, Neil’s account is first drawn 
upon in order to explore a compulsion to gain a prosthesis and which then 
continued as an ongoing obligation to persist with. Neil, a 57-year old upper-limb 
prosthesis user, described how he had undergone the amputation of his hand, and 
following his discharge from hospital had largely adapted to life as a one-handed 
individual. 
I had pretty much accepted the limitations and gone on with life. I 
wasn’t, um, I wasn’t stuck at that point. I found ways around, and 
solutions to, most of my daily issues that came up. … I had found 
solutions that were workable to most of the problems I was having. 
For Neil, the loss of his hand had caused initial upheaval in his life, but as he 
explains, after a time, he had ‘gone on’ and ‘wasn’t stuck’. In this way, Neil 
indicates a kind of living just normally and his persevering with ‘daily issues’ within 
this. However, in his work as an attorney, Neil described discovering some tasks 
which he could no longer manage well, bordering on the unmanageable. Amongst 
other activities, multitasking, such as when he was on the phone and when he was 
required to present and discuss evidence in court, were somewhat possible but 
awkward with just his right hand and his residual left limb. While Neil accepted 
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difficulties and differences in how he went about other aspects of his life, not being 
able to perform as effectively as he felt he should at work was not right. Neil had 
learned of a prosthesis that he felt could address this, and that would enable him to 
function in his job at a level he was content with. So Neil sought this prosthesis, and 
in doing so he is implicated in righting what’s wrong. 
However, for Neil, the prosthesis was ‘an all-or-nothing’ that meant that if he used 
it at work, he felt he needed to involve it in other aspects of his life, and he foresaw 
a slow process of learning how to use the limb in tasks of his daily living, and doing 
things slowly and slower than he might with one hand as he learned to live again as 
a two-handed individual. He described his reticence in ‘going back down that road 
again’ and ‘re-visiting a lot of problems’ about going through a process of 
adaptation to get used to two-handed living, but despite these perceived issues, 
‘the big clincher’, as he described it, was in being able to get back to being an 
attorney like he was before, and this is what drove him to get his prosthesis and 
then to persist with difficulties in early and in ongoing usage. 
Neil’s account illustrates the way that when individuals with limb absence perceive 
that a prosthesis can enable them to live just normally, then to be without is to 
therefore live in a way that is not just normal, and so not ‘right’, compelling usage. 
In this way, persons may be engaging in redress when they gain a prosthesis in 
order to live just normally. However, redressing can turn to perseverance, as an 
obligation to become just normal becomes an obligation to stay just normal, and 
this ongoing persistence is the focus for the main part of this section. 
In her autobiography, Emily Rapp, a lower-limb prosthesis user, gives an illustration 
of obligated persistence in her account of the difficulties she experienced while 
managing her prosthesis in sexual encounters. Emily felt that she did not require 
the limb for any physical aspect of sex and suspected that problems with the 
movement of her limb and the discomfort it caused would be troubling. Added to 
this, a friend who also used lower-limb prostheses had told her how much better 
the experience would be without it. However, any inclination to remove the limb 
was overruled by what Emily considered this would mean: 
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To remove the leg in front of a man was unthinkable; the very 
thought of it sickened me. I had no sense of myself as a desirable, 
sexual woman as an amputee. The only activities I did habitually 
without the leg were skiing, showering, and sleeping – and even 
these were tinged with shame. The person I wanted others to see – 
the person I wanted to be – had two legs. The only way for me to 
have sex – this whole body experience – and remain psychologically 
safe was with the leg on. When it was attached, I felt like a complete 
person; when it was removed, I felt monstrous and deformed. 
(Rapp, 2007, p. 172) 
For Emily, just normal meant being bodily-whole, and moreover, as physically 
‘normal’ as possible. Being without the limb went completely against this, and she 
perceived herself to be ‘deformed’ and to be perceived this way by others. 
Practicality prompted removing the leg in situations where things were getting 
intimate, but the thought of allowing herself to become ‘monstrous’ was not only 
undesirable, it was ‘unthinkable’. Keeping the leg on was something Emily felt she 
must do despite how awkward or painful this became because she needed to stay 
just normal in this way. Furthermore, the actual act of removing her prosthesis in 
front of her partner was something that conflicted with her idea of what was 
acceptable: 
The body in two pieces was an image of violence, not of sexuality; it 
was what detectives came to examine after some terrible crime. I 
thought of the legs that arrived from the prosthetist in “body bags.” 
… No matter how hard I tried to pass as an able-bodied woman, the 
act of removing a leg was not normal – it never would be. (p. 162) 
So because Emily felt complete with her prosthesis, and that this was a just normal 
way to be, she was obligated to keep wearing the limb whenever possible, 
persisting in this way despite the difficulties it posed for her and her partner. 
Appearing as ‘ordinary’ through the use of a prosthesis is a common obligation for 
prosthesis users, and while Emily sought to keep this way as much as possible, 
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others may only do so for specific occasions. Chuck, an upper-limb user in his late 
twenties, uses his myoelectric prosthesis because he wanted to appear to have two 
hands. In part of the discussion, he described how he would even wear his 
prosthesis on occasions when it had broken, and so despite it being inoperable. At 
these times he would be able to get by better without the limb, and in fact when it 
was completely broken it hampered two-handed tasks where he would otherwise 
use his residual limb, yet in particular situations he was compelled to keep going 
with it. He explained: 
I keep wearing it [the myoelectric]. I guess most for the mental 
aspect of it. I try to get onto them [the prosthetist] and get it back 
here as quickly as I can, because it’s the only one I have besides the 
hook and I’m not wearing a hook. … I have a hook as well but I’m not 
wearing it… we’re too far technically advanced for me to be wearing 
a hook. The hook was sufficient back in the [American] Civil War era 
but it’s not alright now. 
What do you mean by the mental aspect? 
Like more of the, I guess, …stereotypes -people assuming you wear it 
and I'm gonna look at you, but when you don't wear it- [like] I might- 
the first thing they're gonna say is that it's gone. 
Chuck did not mind others taking note of his limb difference provided this had a 
positive outcome. Wearing his myoelectric limb, if others were drawn to this, Chuck 
said they tended to be ‘amazed by it, just like I was the first time I seen it’. But 
without the limb, or even with his ‘hook’ prosthesis, Chuck felt that others would 
judge him more negatively, perceiving that people would think of him as ‘disabled’, 
and so treat him as if he was deficient in some manner. So because Chuck 
perceived that his myoelectric could avoid this, keeping him ‘normal’ in this way, he 
was compelled to persist wearing it when out in public, even when it had broken, 




In addition, Chuck lamented how often his prosthesis would keep breaking, which 
led to a frustrating amount of trips back to the prosthetist, taking up most of his 
day trying to fix broken motors, displaced sensors, and ripped covers among other 
problems. This was something that had plagued Chuck throughout his prosthesis 
use, and at the time of speaking to him his limb had stopped working again. Yet 
despite his frustration, Chuck was bound to persevere, keeping using and breaking 
the limb because he needed it to keep in ways he felt imperative. And despite his 
hook prosthesis being a more reliable alternative, he persisted with the 
troublesome myoelectric and this cycle of breaking and repairing because only the 
myoelectric could allow him to be just normal. 
Mark, a 46-year old lower-limb prosthesis user, gives a similar account that further 
illustrates obligated persistence. As a prosthesis user who underwent the 
amputation of his leg in early childhood, Mark has used artificial limbs for most of 
his life. He does a lot of outdoor activities, among these skiing and hiking, but his 
prosthesis has broken numerous times in the course of these pursuits, and so often 
that despite trying different solutions designed to overcome these problems, the 
ongoing incidence of something going wrong has led Mark to consider it an 
inevitability of engaging these activities. Mark regularly finds himself back in 
consultations at his limb-fitting centre, trying to fix the latest issue with his limb, 
and despite expressing his frustration with this, he will not stop doing these things 
because they are part of how he feels he ought to be able to live. To avoid or 
engage in these activities in a different way would be fundamentally non-normal 
for Mark; these things were ‘what I do’. And so because of this, Mark had resigned 
himself to being in and out of consultations. 
So it’s broken, then you have to fix it. Ok, fine, that’s the way it is. 
I’m not going to… -just because the leg doesn’t work doesn’t mean 
you shouldn’t be able to do something. That’s how it is. No, I don’t 
worry about it. 
Mark was adamant that he should not have to ‘pander’ to a prosthesis by not doing 
particular things, or doing them at a lesser intensity to avoid damaging the limbs. 
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He had grown up doing things like the other children he knew, being brought back 
to limb fitting centres with broken prostheses when they could not take what he 
was putting them through, and so this was ‘how it is’ for him. In this way, Mark’s 
obligated persistence is in part, an obligation to himself and to keep up his way of 
being, but as an adult he also perceives that it is only fair that he ought to be able 
to keep going like this; so either he gives in or the prosthesis gives in, and the fair 
way of being is for him to keep at it, even if it means continually being in and out of 
consultations. 
Individuals using prostheses may do so to enable them in ways that are variously 
related to appearance and physical function, but when this enables them to be just 
normal, then they are obligated to keep using their limb in these ways in order to 
stay just normal. When use is bound up with being just normal, the idea that 
persons choose to keep using a limb and that they could easily discontinue usage is 
in fact an illusion of choice, and instead individuals are compelled into persisting 
with ongoing usage because of what this affords. 
This is something that troubled Alison, though she too found herself persevering. 
Alison, a 50-year old lower-limb prosthesis user, described how the combination of 
her particular prosthesis and covering clothing meant that others usually do not 
realise her limb difference. She values this ability to live just normally in this way 
because at times when she has revealed her limb difference to others, she felt that 
she is often treated differently, and in ways she linked to stereotypes of inability. 
So Alison appreciates her ability to be treated ordinarily in this way and so to stay 
just normal, but she also feels she should be more involved in activism to change 
the way others think about limb difference. 
Sometimes I have this thing in my head; maybe... this is like stream 
of consciousness: Maybe I should come out more as an amputee, 
maybe to change people’s perceptions of amputees… But the 
second you appear on crutches with no prosthesis they have an 
image of you and it’s kind of a negative image. So it’s fairly hard to. 
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Alison recognises that she is in a position to try to effect change by ‘coming out’ 
and demonstrating her capability, challenging perceptions of limb difference. But in 
doing so, she feels she will invariably incur stigma and could result in permanent 
undesirable associations. If this occurred with those she is in recurrent contact 
with, and her ‘coming out’ did not change their way of thinking about limb 
difference, then she would have lost her ability to be just normal. So instead, Alison 
is compelled to continue to ‘play it safe’, persisting with her unrevealed prosthesis 
use. 
As Alison’s account illustrates, persons may be ‘locked in’ to their prosthesis use 
and in ways they live with their prosthesis if this enables them to be just normal, 
despite other costs attached to this. A further example from Emily Rapp illustrates 
the physical toll that prosthesis users may feel forced to pay as a result of being just 
normal. Emily, a lower-limb prosthesis user, described taking part in a trekking 
orienteering exercise for students coming to spend time in South Korea. This event 
was particularly difficult for Emily, but she found herself compelled to see it 
through: 
I felt sweat pooling at the bottom of the silicone socket, making it 
slip and chafe against the small ankle bone on my stump (the 
residual limb), creating sores that would later itch and bleed. Still I 
walked on. I knew the torn skin would heal after a few days, and I 
would not lose. If I arrived last, I thought, I would be nothing but a 
cripple. By the time I reached the dorm, I was hobbling and in a 
great deal of pain, but making it back was the only thing that 
mattered to me. I was thrilled to be one of the first to arrive at the 
meeting point. I felt a rush of relief mixed with a kind of intoxicating 
pride. (Rapp, 2007, pp. 5–6) 
While Emily could appear to be just like her peers with her prosthesis, extended 
use, particularly in environments like this, turned discomfort to pain, yet she forced 
herself to keep going for fear of what it would mean if she gave in to this: ‘I was 
afraid that if I arrived at the dorm last, people would think it was because of my 
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disability, and they would either pity me or look down on me. Both thoughts were 
equally intolerable and made me almost physically ill.’ (p. 5) So Emily pressed on, 
through soreness and pain because she needed to keep just normal. 
Emily’s account also illustrates how the limitations of a prosthesis can mean that 
while facilitating being just normal in certain regards, persevering with a prosthesis 
can also be a secret struggle for the individual. Emily could meet with her peers and 
be thought of just as one of them, but the discomfort that plagued her from where 
her residual limb connects to the prosthesis meant that keeping this up involved 
sometimes needing to fight through pain and fatigue in order to do so. 
Furthermore, this was something she had to keep to herself, in order to stay just 
normal. 
In her autobiography, Lenor Madruga, a lower-limb prosthesis user, gives a further 
illustration of obligated persistence. Like many individuals with acquired limb 
absence, after the loss of her leg Lenor expressed a desire to return to how she was 
prior to her loss. To this end she described gaining a prosthesis and making 
significant efforts to maintain the roles she had held and doing the tasks she had 
done previously, and in doing so, to an extent she felt she did get back to how she 
was. However, this was not easy going, and Christmas was a particularly testing 
time. Lenor had always been the one to make Christmas happen in her household, 
and so she felt it imperative to keep this going, for herself and for her family. With 
her prosthesis, Lenor could do the things she was able to do before, decorating, 
baking and crafting festive things, but each was more arduous as the leg was heavy 
and less flexible and she found herself tiring quickly from the exertion. Despite this, 
Lenor persevered because her prosthesis presented the possibility to keep 
Christmas going, even if it required that much more effort, and so this was 
something she had to keep at.  Through fatigue, Lenor persisted with work required 
for the festivities and described the outcome of this. 
My friends couldn’t understand why it was so important for me to 
do all the things that I was accustomed to doing. … I wanted to cook, 
entertain, and join in on all the holiday festivities as I did before. … It 
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was difficult and very tiring to stand for the many hours it took to 
decorate the entire house, but I did it. I wanted the house to have 
the same holiday cheer that it had the year before. (Madruga, 2000, 
p. 150) 
Persevering then, is in part understood through the different ways that individuals 
consider what it means to live just normally and keep going with this. This can be as 
fundamental as just wearing a limb, as much as possible or only for particular 
situations, or it may mean doing or not doing particular things with a prosthesis in 
order to perpetuate a just normal status. Furthermore, when difficulties arise that 
relate to this, and when persons perceive that there is either no cause for, or 
possibility of redressive action to deal with these, they are persisted with as persons 
persist with living just normally. 
In this section, persons have been depicted as persevering in various ways, often in 
the face of difficulties, because of the compelling nature of being just normal. In 
other words, just normal obligates persistence. However, individuals using 
prostheses are also implicated in acts of facilitating perseverance that ensure that 
difficulties can be persisted with, and which are explained in the next sections of 
trusting to transience and mole-hilling. 
Trusting to Transience 
Living just normally means living in ways that are right, reasonable, or ‘good 
enough’, but this leaves room for difficulties of a just normal nature that therefore 
must be reckoned with in an individual’s perseverance. One way of managing these 
is through trusting to transience. For instance, the use of a prosthesis may enable a 
person to live just normally, but the limitations of artificial limbs mean that users 
often need to contend with accompanying issues. Some of these were illustrated in 
the accounts given in the previous section. One way that persevering is facilitated 
when such issues are encountered is when these are thought of as transitory. In 
doing so, individuals perceive that problems are just temporary and will eventually 
ease to a level that is more manageable, or they will disappear entirely. This 
facilitates a toleration of problems that could otherwise be at odds with living just 
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normally, as to only bear difficulties on a temporary basis, believing that things will 
improve, can make living with them acceptable. This process of trusting to 
transience, whereby persons focus on the temporariness of an issue, can enable 
persons to persevere living just normally, as they consider difficulties as just bad 
patches to get through. 
A common context within which trusting to transience occurs is when changes to 
one’s prosthetic situation take place. This may be when a prosthesis is first fitted, 
whether a first limb or changing to a new solution, or when adjustments have been 
performed on an existing solution. Whenever such change occurs, issues may be 
experienced in the use of the limb, and persons may trust to transience in order to 
manage living with these. Alan’s account illustrates this. Alan is a lower-limb 
prosthesis user who set up a support group for individuals with limb absence, as he 
felt a meeting point was sorely needed in his part of the country. Over the course 
of the group’s meetings, Alan described how he had come across a number of 
individuals who were struggling to get on with their prosthesis as well as those who 
had stopped wearing them entirely. He differentiated himself from this group by 
indicating how he focuses on issues going away, and he tries to encourage others 
to think this way too: 
I know there are a lot of people that, you know, the slightest bit of 
pinching or things like that and it can affect them, I suppose, 
mentally. In big ways. And then they tend to *be like+ ‘oh, I’m not 
putting that leg onto me because it doesn’t feel right’. But they’re 
forgetting - it’s like a new pair of shoes: you have to wear it in. It 
takes time for your stump to adjust to a new socket, a new shape, a 
new design. Even down to if you get a new knee, you’re walking in a 
different way. 
Alan tried to convey to other members of his group that he was no different in 
experiencing varying difficulties with a prosthesis, but his perseverance was due to 
his conviction that things would get easier over time. He considered that difficulties 
with discomfort, with unusual sensations, or the way walking felt awkward on a 
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new or adjusted prosthesis would be transitory, and this helped him to keep going. 
So when Alan encountered things that ‘didn’t feel right’ he avoided ‘being affected’ 
by this and so was able to keep at his usage through considering that difficulties 
would generally be a matter of ‘wearing in’ before things would eventually feel 
‘right’. He considered that if he persevered he could expect things to get better, 
and reciprocally this helped him to keep going with the difficulties he experienced. 
Alison, a 50-year old lower-limb prosthesis user, gave a similar account when she 
described moving from one prosthesis to another: 
There is a break-in period without a doubt. And you’re kind of adrift 
between the two of them for a little while. I would always kind of 
find – maybe just get on with it and persevere with the new one. 
And there would usually be maybe three or four days of maybe 
significant discomfort. But I’d find if you work through that you’d 
eventually get used to it, you know. 
So Alison also experienced difficulties when there were changes to her prosthetic 
solution, and she similarly urged herself to persevere as she needed the new leg to 
get about – part of her living just normally. Alison was able to do this because she 
considered that the discomfort she experienced would last only a number of days 
before it began to fade. The sensations could remain, but her persevering meant 
that after a time it would stop ‘figuring’ as she got used to it. Alison suggested that 
this was a process that just took time, where after gaining a new limb, at night she 
would have ‘a slight change’ where she would start to ‘adjust to the new one’ such 
that every day when she woke she would be a little more accustomed to the 
sensations of the limb, good and bad. In this way, Alison could put up with the 
‘significant discomfort’ because she trusted that it would be as transient as the 
time it took to get better acclimated to it. 
So trusting to transience as illustrated through these accounts can be considered as 
a belief that unpleasantness will pass, and so that these are difficulties to just grit 
one’s teeth and get through. However, as Alison and Alan indicate, the transience 
of issues may be facilitated by persisting with particular actions as things perceived 
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to be related to the issue are ‘worn in’, helping unpleasantness to pass. So a trust in 
the transience of problems fuels perseverance, and then persisting with particular 
actions as persons live just normally may in turn help the attenuation of issues. This 
may be encouraged by previous experience of difficulties. In Alison’s example, she 
had used many prostheses before that she had gotten used to, and this encouraged 
her to believe that future prostheses would be the same. Alan also had some 
experience of prostheses, but it was his likening of prostheses to shoes that need to 
be ‘broken in’ that gave him faith that his difficulties were only a matter of breaking 
in. 
Lorna provides a further illustration of trusting to transience where she similarly 
had no prior experience of the problem. Lorna is a 51-year old bilateral lower-limb 
prosthesis user who has used many different prostheses over the years, moving 
from what she referred to as her ‘peg legs’ to more advanced prostheses. Lorna 
enjoyed getting better limbs, as she felt that each technological improvement 
helped her out in various ways that little bit more. However, when she went for her 
latest consultation, she was surprised at the extent of the maintenance procedures 
she was told that she would need to do in order to cater for the latest limbs that 
were being recommended to her. These prostheses required regular and thorough 
sterilising before and after use, and this was much more than she was used to. 
When faced with this, she was at first anxious about how much effort was required: 
*I didn’t want to be+ getting hysterical every morning getting up, 
thinking, ‘Oh god I have ten things to do before I even dress myself, 
and I have nine things to do when I come home’. I just want simple. 
Easy. You know, because when I heard about the silicone sock first, 
and they would say, ‘You’ll have to take it off and you’ll have to 
wash it every night and you’ll have to clean it’. I thought, ‘I’m not 
going to do any of that now!’ You know, I just thought, ‘No, no, no. 
It’s not going to be hassle. If there’s going to be hassle with it I don’t 
want it. I want it simple.’ 
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Lorna was on the verge of rejecting the proposed setup, despite her desire for 
better limbs. Having modern prostheses was part of being just normal for Lorna, 
but simplicity was the ‘big, big, huge thing’ and limbs that were ‘hassle’ went 
against this. In the end though, she convinced herself that if she persevered with 
the maintenance then what might be ‘hassle’ initially would eventually become 
routine and something she would not think about. So although Lorna knew that she 
would have to keep at these tasks, she saw that if she did so, she could get used to 
them being a part of her routine alongside the other necessary things she did, and 
that they would soon become little bother. ‘It’s like washing your teeth. … No 
hassle with it at all.’ 
A different kind of trusting to transience is illustrated by Chris, a 61-year old upper-
limb prosthesis user. When Chris first started to use his prosthesis, he found it 
cumbersome having to recall the procedures to use the functions of the hand, and 
annoying to constantly visually monitor it to make sure it was doing what he 
wanted it to do. Usage was not entirely intuitive and many things with the 
prosthesis would take longer than without it. Chris became frustrated by this and 
with mistakes and dropping and breaking objects he was trying to manipulate with 
the hand. But Chris described ‘needing’ to have two hands, and in this way he was 
obligated to persist with the limb despite frustrations because living just normally 
for him involved having two hands. However, Chris felt that his usage would 
improve if he kept at it. He believed that with enough time and effort, he would 
find using the limb much quicker and easier and become more proficient with it 
overall. This was the ‘challenge’ that Chris described needing to tackle and to get 
through, and he similarly trusted that the period of slips, breakages and the 
frustration of laborious operation would be only transient. 
Now I just go off and grab it *objects+ because it’s there and I feel 
the weight, and that indicates to me that I’m at the point where I 
need to think – I make the decision to close the hand, and grab it… 
it’s not a long process to grasp the understanding of how to make 
the thing work, but it does take time to practice to make it happen. 
Then all of a sudden it just happens -all of a sudden now it becomes 
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a second-nature exercise. … I just do it, as it would be if you were 
going to pick up a pencil, you just go and pick it up and don’t think 
about it. You just say well I’m going to make these fingers move, pick 
that pencil up, and I’m going to drop it again, so you don’t think 
about how to move the fingers, you just pick it up. And that’s what I 
now do with the hand. 
For Chris, persevering helped him to reach a point where ‘it just happens’ and the 
use of his prosthesis became ‘a second-nature exercise’. He described how he 
would remind himself about the temporariness of problems he experienced: ‘It’s 
not the end-all, because you can’t get it to work the first time. And it is something 
that you have to work with, to get it to work.’ He explained further: 
*You’ve+ just gotta be persistent with it. It’s like doing anything, like 
going riding a bicycle. The first time you get on a bicycle you fall 
down. So you get back on again, you fall down again. Then all of 
sudden you’re wobbling down the road and the next thing you know 
you’re running round the neighbourhood doing wheelies and shit. 
So Chris likened the mastery of his prosthesis to mastering other tasks that require 
some degree of perseverance, and in this way he perceived that using his limb was 
something that could be mastered, and that with effort it would only be a matter of 
time before this was the case. Difficulties that Chris experienced could be 
persevered with as he considered that they would eventually pass with time and 
effort. This marks a difference in trusting to transience when compared to Alan, 
Alison and Lorna’s accounts. Whereas the former were focused on an 
unpleasantness passing, Chris could be said to be more focused on an expectation 
of things getting better. While there is some conceptual overlap between these, 
there is a distinction to be observed in the way that there can be a greater focus on 
getting toward something or getting away from something. However, when faced 
with an issue, both trust in the transience of an undesirable state with an emphasis 
on the belief that it will pass. 
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Joe LaBrie, a lower-limb prosthesis user, gives an account of trusting to transience 
that is similar to Chris’. Joe is a 36-year old prosthesis user who started a blog to 
document his experiences after the loss of one of his legs. In one post, Joe 
described the aftermath of his first attempt at serious exercise after gaining his 
prosthetic leg: 
My hips are screaming out in pain. My back is frozen in place. My 
hamstrings are wound up tighter than I can ever remember. My calf 
(singular) feels like it is permanently in a locked position and I can’t 
release it. But I just keep laughing… because I’m so happy. Happy 
because for the first time I know it is real. It is really going to 
happen. (LaBrie, 2013) 
Joe’s delight was in realising he was able to run with his prosthesis. He had wanted 
to be able to do this in order to get back to taking part in triathlons as he used to 
prior to losing his leg. However, running was slow and painful and he could only go 
for short periods of time before exhaustion. Joe recognised that his running wasn’t 
‘real running’, but he was convinced it would be one day. The difficulties he 
experienced when trying to run were not something he was prepared to put up 
with in the long-term, but he saw these as being present only for a matter of time. 
…it will only be a matter of time before my body takes back over and 
I wear out my prosthetic. It’s a tall proverbial mountain to climb. 
And I’m starting even lower on the mountain than the last time I 
tried. But I know I can climb this mountain. I have done it before and 
I will do it again. 
The position Joe saw himself at was one of transition back to his athletic standard. 
His conviction that he would improve and that problems would abate sustained his 
perseverance through early periods of being ‘sub-standard’. Joe had trusted that 
things would get better, and what he had achieved had validated his perseverance, 
further facilitating this. 
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…There is no longer any doubt in my mind. I can barely run more 
than .25 of a mile and I’m lucky if I can do 250 meters in the pool 
without drowning, but I will do a triathlon again. And soon! 
As Chris and Joe’s accounts illustrate, persons may foreground a point in time when 
they believe a satisfactory state will occur, giving them the drive to keep going 
through difficult periods. As Joe’s account exemplifies, noting improvements along 
the way can encourage perseverance as it becomes apparent that progress can be 
made. Thus a trust that motivates initial perseverance is further spurred on by 
evidence of change, even while no guarantee of further change is given. 
In summary, when individuals encounter difficulties when living just normally, such 
as when using a prosthesis, their persevering with this can be facilitated by 
believing in the impermanence of these problems. Persons may trust in the 
temporariness of difficulties and consider the proverbial light at the end of the 
tunnel, though they may similarly consider themselves to be moving away from the 
dark. This trusting to transience eases persevering as persons expect that 
difficulties will abate, though there is no guarantee that they will. Persons instead 
go on faith, and they may be encouraged by prior experiences of similar difficulties 
that may have passed. Finally, if indications of desirable change are received during 
persevering, this further encourages an individual to persevere with difficulties 
while living just normally. 
Mole-hilling 
A further way that persevering is accounted for can be seen when individuals 
indicate to themselves that difficulties they may experience are more reasonable 
than they may first appear. Persons recognise that there are worse possible ways 
to be, that difficulties may be ‘natural’, or that they are akin to what others may 
experience at some time, each inferring that these issues are actually of a fair and 
tolerable, and so a just normal, nature. It is this reverse process of ‘making mole-
hills out of mountains’ that facilitates persevering as persons normalise issues 




One way that prosthesis users are implicated in mole-hilling is through engaging in 
social comparisons that can indicate a different way of looking at one’s 
circumstances. This can be observed in the case of Alison, a 50-year old lower-limb 
prosthesis user, when she described a particularly low point early in her prosthesis 
use. Alison described being down about the amputation of her leg and the 
difficulties in using her new limb, and recounted how she got herself out of this by 
comparing herself to those she perceived were worse-off. 
I began to realise I really wasn’t that bad. Things weren’t really that 
bad… 
What made you think that things weren’t that bad? 
I suppose looking at people who, well, certainly… say, people who 
had a brain injury. That was one thing. I kind of thought, ‘I’m still in 
possession of my brain, so at least I have that.’ And also I suppose 
looking at people that had been paralysed …I never used a 
wheelchair, but I was on crutches… 
When Alison was down she compared herself with others who had also lost 
something about themselves, also in accidents as she had, but in doing so, she 
foregrounded the difference between herself and those who had suffered 
perceptibly more extreme physical losses. Reflecting on her circumstances, things 
could have turned out to be much worse. This gave Alison a more positive 
perspective of her situation, reflecting about her acquired limb absence that, in 
fact, compared to what she could have lost, ‘things weren’t really that bad’. What 
Alison perceived was ‘bad’ about herself was suddenly made less extreme by noting 
what was worse for others, and she considered herself considerably closer to ‘ok’ 
than the ‘actual bad’ of what she considered paralysis or traumatic brain injury 
would be like. She elaborated on this: 
I realised that, say for someone who had been paralysed, there was 
going to be this wheelchair, and ok, I knew I was always going to 
have the prosthesis, but like, it could be hidden, you know… I don’t 
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think I even fully realised, we’ll say, what being paralysed really 
involved. You know, I wouldn’t have been aware of bladder issues, 
or bowel issues, so I just thought it was a case of not walking. And 
the fact that I was walking made me realise I was lucky. 
Comparing to others worse-off reminded Alison that her situation could have been 
that much more severe, and that lacking more substantial injuries and retaining the 
functionality of her body that she did, as well as being enabled as she was through 
her prosthesis use, pointed to instead considering that she was ‘lucky’. Thinking 
about more substantial losses prompted considering the implications of these 
losses, like not being able to walk, having a visible difference or issues with bodily 
functions, and so what these individuals would also find difficult and what Alison 
would not. For Alison then, managing her lot was comparatively easier, and this 
made her feel better about herself: ‘Looking at [these] people, you kind of realised, 
actually, ok’. Through this realisation, Alison felt that she could better get on with 
things, that she could ‘pull myself together and get on, you know?’ 
In this study, prosthesis users often made similar kinds of downwards comparisons 
to others perceived to be worse-off, the mole-hilling quality of which distinguishes 
them from such others in a way that makes the individual feel closer to ‘ordinary’ 
and their difficulties that much more possible to persevere with. Many prominent 
examples of this are found on amputee and prosthesis user forums, two of which 
are given here as further illustrations: 
I have to live and go on I try to have a "normal" life as much as 
possible. It not easy to do when your life is a constant struggle. I try 
not to let my leg dictate my life. But daily struggles remind me all 
the time from taking a shower to doing my food shopping to holding 
down a part time job as a teaching assistant. I do have more tings 
[sic] in my life to be happy about my wonderful husband of 13 years, 
my home, my family and friends. And I always think it could be 
worse. PLJ [another forum user] is double amputee and I have full 
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respect for him I feel lucky to only be a LBK [lower, below-knee] and 
that It could indeed be much worse off. (Snowbear, 2008) 
…sometimes we get that why me syndrom [sic] as I call it and forget 
that there is someone somewhere in worse off shape than we are. I 
am always amazed when I get stared at and the people (a lot of the 
time adults sometimes kids) that almost trip and fall because they 
stare at me and don't pay attention to where they are walking. Then 
I see someone in a chair with some kind of disability what their 
disability is unknown to me and sometimes I find myself staring at 
them. I know I stare at them and think it's funny when other stare at 
me. I do it because I wonder what's wrong with them and then I 
wonder are they happy with life as they are? Then I tell myself on 
those days when I have the why me (I don't have them as much as I 
did when I was in my younger years) I say hey life is not that bad. 
Not that I am proud that I have less of a disability but because I think 
this is easy compared to their life. (Brenda, 2005) 
So when difficulties arise while living just normally, persons tend to compare to 
others worse-off in order to mole-hill these, comparatively flattening the issue by 
considering the circumstances of these others more carefully and so realising or 
reminding themselves that things ‘are not that bad’, paving an easier way to ‘live 
and go on’. These others are considered because persons consider they are 
reasonably comparable to themselves on something shared by both, but on a 
continuum of severity they realise themselves as less badly-off; that they may be 
‘lucky’ to ‘only’ have particular issues, or as Brenda put it, ‘less of a disability’. 
Mole-hilling comparisons can be made to known others or to a generalised other 
perceived to be bearing a particular greater hardship. When specific others are 
perceived to be persevering themselves, and so potentially living just normally in 
their own way, individuals contrasting themselves with these others confirm the 
facility of their own perseverance. In his short autobiographical account, Peter 
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Thomas, a bilateral lower-limb prosthesis user, gave an illustration of this as he 
described how he reappraised himself in contrast to ‘other disabilities’: 
…I must say the loss of both my legs below the knees at age 10 was a 
relatively minor handicap when compared with other disabilities. I 
was young and adapted to my amputations rather quickly. I still had 
mobility in my knees, and my stumps (or paws, as my girlfriend calls 
them) were in good condition. When I think of the tremendous 
accomplishments of people who have lost their knees or arms, are 
paralyzed or blind, I realise I have it pretty easy. (Thomas, 2001, p. 
130) 
Reminding himself that great things are achieved by persons he perceived were 
worse-off had led Peter to conclude that difficulties he faced were that much more 
surmountable. This prompted Peter to consider that he was only limited by 
‘attitude and determination, not by my physical situation’ (p. 129). 
In her autobiography, Lauren Scruggs, an upper-limb prosthesis user, gives a 
comparable account of mole-hilling. Lauren had lost an arm and an eye in an 
aircraft accident but had recovered from her injuries and had been fitted with 
prostheses for both that she was involving in everyday life whenever she could. 
However, her arm was challenging to use and she worried about her appearance 
and if she could still pursue a career in fashion as she had always intended. In one 
part of her autobiography, Lauren described reacting to media coverage of her that 
appeared to portray a miraculous recovery, painting her as carefree and being ‘all 
smiles’. She knew that her persevering, trying to keep going as normal, was not as 
easy as this, and described how she had kept going despite difficulties. 
All I’d done was try to keep moving forward—just like Casey, my 
friend from high school, had done. Her father had died and her 
brother had gotten sick, and there were huge moments of pain in 
her life when all she wanted to do was lie down and quit. But she 
didn’t crumble under the weight of all the hardship that hit her. I’d 
drawn strength from her example and from watching others who’d 
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gone through adversity. I’d developed my definition of everyday 
courage—Even when life hits you hard, you keep on going—then 
lived by that definition. (Scruggs, 2012, p. 114) 
Lauren likened her hardships to that of Casey’s, and this had helped her. She 
pictured herself alongside others in the same boat of adversity and looked to those 
doing well despite this. But before exploring Lauren’s account further, consider it 
alongside that of Roy, a 41-year old lower-limb prosthesis user, who reflected on 
how he would talk himself or others out of being down about themselves. 
At the end of the day, it’s only a leg, it’s only an arm, it’s not your 
body down there. You’re not paralysed, you’re not deformed, you 
haven’t got this mad disease… It’s part of life, like if you have a car 
accident, cancer, or leukaemia. But I say, would you be happy if you 
had a deformity on your face or an artificial leg? Which would you 
prefer? Artificial leg, straight away. 
For Roy, having an artificial leg was preferable compared to a facial disfigurement, 
paralysis, or disease, and so living with a prosthesis was not as bad as things could 
be. These were the comparisons Roy made to remind himself it was ‘only’ his leg 
that was the problem. Like Alison, Roy had also explained that a prosthesis could 
enable him in ways where persons with paralysis or other physical difficulties might 
be ‘stuck’, and so he also illustrates how considering those worse-off can help to 
draw out further issues others may experience, making their situation even less 
appealing, and by comparison making his appear better. This helped Roy to keep 
going with the difficulties in life with a prosthetic leg. But Roy also illustrates 
another way that persons mole-hill. When Roy likens having an artificial limb to a 
‘car accident’ or having ‘cancer or leukaemia’ he likens his circumstances to others 
that are meant to be perceived as undesirable but circumstances that anyone 
might find themselves experiencing. For Roy, having limb difference was ‘part of 
life’ in a way that it was something he had encountered by chance, like ‘the luck of 
the draw’, and while undesirable, was something to be taken in his stride and 
gotten on with. This is like in Lauren’s mantra about ‘when life hits you hard’, and 
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when she referred to herself and others going through ‘adversity’. Both Roy and 
Lauren exemplify the way that persons can mole-hill difficulties by generalising 
them to unfavourable incidents but that can happen as a part of a life, and so a life 
that any could experience. For Roy, losing his leg and now using an artificial one 
was just ‘something that happened’ to him as if it could occur to anyone else, and 
so was just the way life had worked out and so was something he needed to 
persevere with: ‘I have to just get on with it’. For Lauren, being ‘hit hard’ as she had 
been in the accident that had resulted in the loss of her hand and eye was like how 
life hit others hard and so a notion of being landed an ‘everyday’ difficulty allowed 
her to form her idea of ‘everyday courage’ that she relied on to keep going. 
In a comparable illustration, Lisa Brewer, a lower-limb prosthesis user, gave an 
account of mole-hilling in one of her blog posts. This post had been published on 
the anniversary of the loss of her leg, and Lisa had taken time on her ‘ampuversary’ 
to reflect on how she was currently getting by: 
Yes, I am still struggling with limb loss.  I do not claim to be perfectly 
adjusted to it.  I still get angry.  I still cry.  I still get very frustrated 
with shoes and shoe choices.  I still suffer from phantom pain and 
my prosthesis being uncomfortable.  I miss being able to stand in the 
shower with the water cascading over my head and neck. I don’t 
think I will ever be able to walk out of a pool with my water leg 
squishing, without being a little embarrassed.  I will never get used 
to having to remember to put my leg on (or at least grab crutches) 
before getting out of bed. However, all of these are normal 
struggles…..and we ALL have struggles.  Amputees are no different. 
(Brewer, 2013c) 
Lisa described her battle with limb loss and how she managed life without a 
biological limb and with an artificial limb, but after describing her struggles, she 
concluded that these were ‘normal’ struggles. So while she recognised that her 
particular hardships were unique to the loss of her leg, Lisa considered the 
normality of having struggles. In this way, Lisa implicates herself in a process of 
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mole-hilling in a way not dissimilar to that of the conceptualising that goes on in 
Grounded Theory methodology: although her difficulties differed from others in 
what they actually entailed, if considering them at a conceptual level she could 
consider them analogous to what other individuals with limb absence could 
experience, and at a higher conceptual level, they were ‘difficulties’ that we all 
experience. Doing so normalises her situation, as she saw herself more like others 
in this regard: that she and other ‘amputees’ ‘are no different’ from everyone else. 
In addition to this, Lisa also considered her responses to her difficulties as ‘normal’ 
responding, as she described in another post: 
As you can see by my posts, I have bad days.  Some days, getting up 
and out of bed is difficult.  Some days, my biggest accomplishment is 
brushing my hair.  It’s ok to have bad days, as long as you bring 
yourself back from them quickly. (Brewer, 2013a) 
Lisa elaborated on this in further correspondence: 
If I just feel like I have had too much, I allow myself ONE DAY to feel 
completely and totally sorry for myself. I stay in bed, eat junk food, 
watch cheesy movies or nap, but I make sure to remind myself that 
tomorrow, I get up and put my big girl panties on and just go where 
life tells me. It's ok to feel sorry for yourself sometimes-baby 
yourself a little and then move on. (Brewer, personal 
communication, December 18, 2013). 
So Lisa had days when things were ‘too much’, and these tended to result in slow 
days of doing little and of just looking after herself. But she asserted that ‘it’s ok to 
have bad days’ and ‘ok to feel sorry for yourself’ and in this way she made these 
things ‘ok’ through considering them at such a broad level, making their occurrence 
that much more permissible. In her short autobiographical account, Laura McClure, 
a lower-limb prosthesis user, provides another illustration of this: 
Yes, there are limitations, even though I choose not to focus on 
them. I don’t have the same endurance I once did. I can’t run as fast 
as I would with a real leg. Sometimes, I still get blisters, or lose my 
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balance. But I look at it from the perspective that everybody has bad 
days. Everyone sits down and cries once in a while. And that’s okay. 
My bad days may be because something went wrong with my 
artificial leg … or one too many people stared at me at the mall. 
(McClure, 2001, p. 77) 
Like Lisa, Laura described living just normally with her prosthesis as being far from 
perfect. However, she also mole-hilled by invoking a perspective of ordinariness, 
considering that everyone experiences hardship at some point. Laura noted the 
specific things that she struggled with, but that everyone struggles with something 
at some time, and ‘looking at it’ this way helped her to get on with these 
difficulties. 
A further way that individuals mole-hill when experiencing difficulties is through 
considering the cause of the difficulties and similarly seeing these as ordinary. For 
example, on his blog, Keiron McCammon, an upper-limb prosthesis user, described 
dealing with being stared at in public. 
…I look odd, people will stare, it means nothing, it’s just a natural 
reaction. Hell, when I catch myself in the mirror I stare, my body 
lacks symmetry, the human mind is used to symmetrical bodies. The 
question is, what does it mean to you when you catch someone 
glancing your way? Whatever you think they are thinking, I can 
guarantee you are wrong, you have no way of knowing what the 
other person thinks, so I prefer to believe they find me so incredibly 
attractive that they can’t help but look my way. I just smile, be open 
to questions or just continue on my way. Forget the stories you tell 
yourself about what you think they are thinking, again it’s bullshit. 
Generally I’m oblivious to it, but occasionally I’ll catch someone and 
it makes me smile. (McCammon, 2009) 
Keiron diffused the issue of being stared at by indicating that staring at unusual 
things is a ‘natural reaction’ -that ‘people will stare’- and this is because of the 
novelty of what they are seeing. To further impress this he implicates himself doing 
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this too. While as Laura illustrates, being stared at can be trying, Keiron’s mole-
hilling allowed him to remove the negativity from the experience, because it 
‘means nothing’. Because of this and because ‘you have no way of knowing what 
the other person thinks’, Keiron instead chose to see staring as an indication of 
unavoidable attraction. 
Roy echoed this idea of ‘natural’ responding, similarly indicating that this means 
staring should not be anything to be concerned about: 
I know people will stare, that’s just… -people will stare. It’s part of 
nature. Everybody stares, if you have big ears, big eyes, bald head or 
whatever. Like ‘oh look at your man, he’s a rough one’, you know. At 
the end of the day I’m from… -I’d say for the younger generation – 
I’m in my 40s – the younger generation, they shouldn’t be worrying 
about it. That’s how I came to see it anyway. 
Interestingly, Leslie Pitt Schneider, a lower-limb prosthesis user, described 
managing living with staring as a child through the kind of comparative boosting 
described earlier in this section, but then as she grew up, how this mole-hilling 
turned to the kind of ‘naturalising’ that Roy and Keiron described. 
While I recall my childhood with fond memories, it was not always 
easy. There were a lot of tears, a lot of frustration, and a lot of 
confusion as to why people stared at me. To me, I was Leslie. I was 
no different. I developed what, in retrospect, was probably a 
defense mechanism in being grateful that the only thing “wrong” 
with me was my leg, while thinking that people who stared had 
something “wrong” with their heads. It was hard for my younger self 
to understand what I know as an adult: People are curious. (Pitt 
Schneider, 2014) 
Prosthesis users may also mole-hill difficulties in their prosthesis use by 
foregrounding the nature of artificial limbs. Chris, a 61-year old upper-limb 
prosthesis user, gave an account of this when he described what he felt enabled to 
do with his prosthesis and what he felt limited by: 
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You start learning what the limitations are and understanding what 
that means. -But you know, it’s a machine. Things break. And that’s 
what you have to understand. It’s… It’s hardware. It’s a mechanical 
thing and those things have a tendency to break. And when I got it, 
you know, being in the beta group, it was brand new technology, 
and the chances were, because of what it is, it was going to break. 
And it did! 
For Chris, highlighting the nature of his prosthesis as a mechanical device meant 
that he was able to attribute problems with the limb to problems a person would 
potentially encounter when using a mechanical device in general. So when Chris 
spoke of taking time to learn how to use the limb, as well as dealing with the limb 
going wrong or breaking, he could bear these difficulties better through reminding 
himself that these were normal possibilities of using such a device. This kind of 
rationalising of issues means that they can be better accepted when they occur 
because they are seen as fair and reasonable difficulties of the technology being 
used. For instance, persons may tolerate some discomfort if they consider that it is 
an artificial attachment to their body, and like Chris, considering the ‘tendencies’ of 
experimental or ‘brand new technology’ can help persons endure teething issues. 
In summary, mole-hilling refers to ways of making issues more manageable by 
making an individual’s situation seem more ordinary. This is achieved through 
processes such as the comparisons that distance persons from others seen to be 
worse-off, indicating a closer proximity to what is perceived as ‘ok’, or through 
considering how difficulties might be analogous to difficulties faced by others, 
whether others also living with limb difference or others more generally, and so 
impressing the normality of having problems. Furthermore, the cause of bad 
experiences may be probed or reconsidered to be thought of as due to ‘normal’ 
reasons, and therefore the outcomes reasonable to expect and to experience. 
Difficulties linked to limitations in a prosthesis may be mole-hilled by persons 
considering how artificial limbs, as technology, will invariably have limitations; that 
it is part of the nature of technology, just as persons may consider it part of the 
nature of others to respond to persons with limb difference in ways that may at 
182 
 
first appear unfair and not right. These processes help individuals to persevere with 
difficulties as they are normalised to make them appear more ordinary and thus 
more acceptable to persevere with. 
Summary 
Persevering accounts for the way that individuals live just normally, keeping going 
with this through an obligated persistence to stay just normal, and manage 
difficulties as they occur through trusting to transience and mole-hilling. Persons 
therefore ‘get on’ with the way of being they see as right and reasonable, and 
manage issues deemed to be of a just normal nature in a variety of ways. 
In particular, obligated persistence accounts for the way in which persons persist 
with actions that are linked to living just normally, and in the context of prosthesis 
use, this may involve persisting with a limb and persisting in particular ways with it, 
and despite difficulties in usage. Trusting to transience captures the process of 
facilitating persevering through persons believing that issues experienced will be 
temporary, and that things will improve. Mole-hilling is to view or reconsider one’s 
situation in a way that portrays issues as being more reasonable to persevere with 
than they may first appear. This can occur through comparing to others to indicate 
that the individual is better off, or to foreground a normality of experiencing 
difficulties. In this way, persons distinguish and liken themselves in ways that make 
problems seem more benign than they initially seem, helping persons get along 
better with them. 
Together, these concepts constitute the category of persevering and also conclude 
accounting for the varied ways in which just normal motivates action in prosthesis 
use. The remaining two chapters are now dedicated to exploring the value and 
relevance of these patterns, and to critically appraising the overall theory.  
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Chapter 9: Exploring a Theory of ‘Just Normal’ 
Introduction 
Over the previous four chapters, the theory of just normal was presented and 
described to account for the varied ways that prosthesis users are troubled about 
being just normal and work to resolve this. The theoretical categories of preserving 
being just normal, redressing to just normal, and persevering with just normal were 
given as three modes of resolving this concern. These modes and their constituent 
concepts were discussed with reference to illustrative accounts, exploring and 
clarifying the elements of the theory. 
To briefly recap: In preserving, persons are said to engage in actions of a pre-
emptive and protective nature, addressing perceived threats to being just normal in 
order to stay this way. Black-spotting was given as one pattern of preserving, where 
situated threats to an individual’s ability to be just normal are identified and acted 
on accordingly. Conserving is another pattern where persons are mindful of the 
limited resources or tolerances they may have and which are required to live just 
normally, thus prompting careful investment and engagement with these. A third 
pattern is sufficing, in which individuals avoid or refuse change when this is 
deemed risky and redundant. In the second mode, redressing was described as 
when persons act to be just normal when they perceive themselves not to be. 
Within this, righting what’s wrong was a pattern described as persons responding 
to violations or obstacles to living just normally, rectifying or overcoming these. 
Restoring the balance instead related to judgements that things had gone awry and 
to the extent that they were not just normal, and so where persons acted to 
increase or reduce these things to bring them back to what was just normal. Re-
coursing is the final pattern of redressing and accounts for when persons judge 
efforts of redress to be ineffective and when they resort to alter their approach. 
The third and final mode of just normal is persevering, where persons keep going 
with being just normal. Obligated persistence was given to account for persons 
persisting in particular ways and how they consider themselves compelled to stay 
this way, despite difficulties that may accompany this. Trusting to transience is a 
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further pattern of persevering where persons facilitate living with difficulties 
though considering that problems they experience will be temporary and that 
things will improve. Finally, mole-hilling is a pattern of ways of viewing one’s 
situation such that issues can be seen as more reasonable to persevere with than 
they first appear. These three modes together with their constituent concepts 
comprise the theory of just normal. 
The development of the theory achieves the aims of the study, which were to 
identify a main concern of individuals that use prostheses and to develop a theory 
that accounts for the way in which this concern is processed and managed. To my 
knowledge, this is the first study to develop a theory in the context of prosthesis 
use. This in itself is an important contribution to the research base, but the purpose 
of this chapter is to foreground the particular new insights that the theory provides 
and also how it enables new perspectives on existing works in the area. In doing so, 
the significance of this theoretical inquiry is foregrounded, and this goes partway 
toward establishing the worth of the theory. 
In this chapter then, the theory of just normal is explored in a number of different 
ways. First, further consideration is given to the concept of just normal itself. The 
theory is then employed to account for the particular ways that a prosthesis is 
used, including how ‘successful’ use may be judged. The theory is next shown to 
provide further insights into coping and the use of self-regulation theory, as it has 
been used in the area and in consideration of the notion of regulating oneself. The 
prescription of a prosthesis and the appropriate matching of persons to technology 
is also explored, and the theory is shown to provide a means of further 
understanding this process and how it may change over time. These discussions 
illustrate the utility of the theory and how it provides a range of novel insights and 
potential for application and practice in the area of prosthesis use. 
The Concept of Just Normal 
Just normal is the name of the core category and of the overall theory presented in 
this thesis, but further exploration of this concept is important for understanding 
the fresh insight this alone can bring to the field. Doing so involves discussion of 
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extant works that this concept speaks to, namely work that has involved 
discussions of normality. 
For instance, towards the end of my analyses, I discovered a body of literature 
referring to things associated with normality in limb absence and prosthesis use. In 
the older part of this literature, work has been conducted that has involved the 
assessment of the impact of limb loss and prosthesis use on proclaimed ‘normal’ 
activities. For example, Williamson et al. (1994) and Williamson (1995) describe 
self-care, doing household chores, or visiting friends as ‘normal’ activities and 
explored these in an assessment of potential ‘normal activity restriction’ due to the 
absence of a limb. A discussion of ‘normal activities’ is reminiscent of ‘activities of 
daily living’ (ADL), a term that is widely used in healthcare research, often in 
reference to models (e.g., Beetz, Tenorth, Jain, & Bandouch, 2010; Roper, Logan, & 
Tierney, 2000) or specific measures of ADL (e.g., Katz, Ford, Moskowitz, Jackson, & 
Jaffe, 1963; Maenner et al., 2013), and similarly is about understanding ‘normal’ 
things people ‘normally’ do. These have been invoked to understand how ADL may 
be affected by limb absence (e.g., Kegel, Carpenter, & Burgess, 1978; Weiss, 
Gorton, Read, & Neal, 1990) and prosthesis use (e.g., Kejlaa, 1993; Millstein, Heger, 
& Hunter, 1986). In addition, studies such as that conducted by Nissen and 
Newman (1992) discuss factors that influence a ‘reintegration to normal living’ 
post-limb loss, and through which Nissen and Newman use a scale for measuring 
reintegration, originally devised by Wood-Dauphinee and Williams (1987) to 
explore the rehabilitation of individuals with chronic diseases. So this early body of 
work is characterised by notions of a ‘normal’ person or ‘normal’ people who do 
‘normal’ things, and can be used as a reference for what an individual should be 
encouraged to aim for, whether rehabilitating post-limb loss or coming to use a 
prosthesis with the aim of re-integrating or ‘re-enter[ing] normal life activities’ 
(Fishman, 1959, p. 328). 
The utility of this approach can be understood through considering the benefit of 
assessing how individuals are managing post-limb loss or post-prosthesis fitting, 
and so where support can be given where difficulties are identified. Similarly, the 
‘success’ of those who do ‘reintegrate’ or are found to be capable of normal 
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activities can be recognised. However, there is obvious danger in assessing an 
individual and suggesting they have not ‘reintegrated’ or are not able to do ‘normal 
things normally’, with consequent inferences that they are not living normally or 
are ‘not normal’. This raises the question about the usefulness of broader 
conceptions of normality, and indeed, many have questioned this, such as can be 
found in the disability studies literature (e.g., Abberley, 1993; Marks, 1999; 
Shakespeare, 2007). Despite this, recent investigations in the field of prosthesis use 
have found that being ‘normal’ is something which individuals with limb absence 
tend to have a strong desire for. For example, Ostler et al. (2014) found that their 
participants who had been referred for prosthetic services (n=8) were focused on 
how this might interact with them ‘returning to normal’, seeing this as the ‘key 
factor’, and that the ‘issue of normality was important to all participants and was 
raised repeatedly throughout all of the interviews’ (p. 4). Similarly in Gallagher and 
MacLachlan’s (2001) interviews with prosthesis users (n=14), the researchers 
describe that the wish to appear and be normal was something that was ‘reiterated 
over and over’ in discussions (p. 90). It is evident that normality remains a 
significant concept within the area of limb difference and prosthesis use, though 
how it is understood may be less clear. 
In this more recent literature in the field of prosthesis use, ‘normal’ can be 
observed in two interrelated forms. In one, there is a desire to be and do like 
others, and this was a central theme in Murray’s (2009) study. Murray described 
individuals seeking artificial limbs and who wished to use these in ways that 
enabled them to be like ‘everybody else’. Here, normal was the ability to act, be 
observed and be treated ‘ordinarily’. Or, it was about feeling a sense of 
‘humanness’ or living life ‘like everybody does’ (p. 579). This is a kind of normal 
where persons consider ‘what people are like’ and seek to be like this. 
Consider as well a second form of normal that occurs in the literature: Where 
persons are found to be wanting to be ‘like me’ and what they have known is 
ordinary for them. This is evident in the limb loss literature, where persons 
experiencing upheaval due to the loss of a limb are said to want to ‘get their life 
back’, recovering, re-establishing, or reclaiming abilities, identities or ways of being 
187 
 
and finding their way back to where they once were (Murray, 2009, 2010; Norlyk et 
al., 2013; Ostler et al., 2014). In these cases, the function of a prosthesis can 
potentially help a person ‘return to normal’, or get back to how they had previously 
experienced things (Ostler et al., 2014). This can be irrespective of considerations of 
‘how people normally are’ and rather that an individual’s own routine, sense of 
self, and prior experiences are instead the focus of what is sought following the loss 
of a limb or the fitting of a prosthesis. So this normal is a kind of everyday regularity 
that has been experienced and which persons seek to bring about when it is judged 
to be displaced. Parallels with this may be observed in works employing temporal 
comparison theory (Albert, 1977), where persons are said to engage in 
intrapersonal comparisons in order to maintain and adjust for an enduring and 
coherent sense of self over time. In the prosthesis literature there is a sense that 
persons seek a kind of personal consistency in the same way, and which can be 
particularly salient when a limb is lost or a prosthesis fitted. 
However, neither conception of normal appears to be universally applicable to 
those who use prosthetic limbs or are considering doing so. For example, Frank 
(1986) described individuals with congenital limb absence who rejected the use of 
prostheses, as they perceived this would be giving in to pressures to become 
‘normal’. Rejecting prostheses for these individuals was a protest against a 
perceived conflation of what is frequent with what is ‘right’ when considering the 
body. There are also accounts of persons who desire prostheses in order to be 
perceived and treated ‘ordinarily’, but then there are also those who ‘show off 
their metal’ and foreground their limb difference (e.g., Batty et al., 2014; Murray, 
2010, p. 89; Murray & Forshaw, 2014). Furthermore, persons may seek to break a 
normal routine or get away from the familiar, and in the context of limb absence 
this may be involuntary, as persons may consider it impossible get back to normal 
(Ostler et al., 2014). A ‘new normal’ may then be experienced and persons may find 
this acceptable (Ostler et al., 2014; Senra et al., 2012). 
So it is apparent that normal can be taken to mean different things by different 
people, and this is a potential means of understanding the desire for normalcy. 
Michael Warner (2000) has explored the concept of normal at length in his text ‘the 
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trouble with normal’, where he interrogates the concept in the context of hetero- 
and homosexual identity. In particular, Warner suggests that problems in 
discussions of normality generally rest ‘on a confusion between statistical norms 
and evaluative norms.’ (p. 56). In the former, there is a normal that comes from 
understanding the most frequent or ordinary occurrence of something, and this can 
be distinguished from something judged according to a standard, or a criterion of 
value. These may interact, but it is difficult to discern to what extent individuals are 
considering one or the other when they refer to wanting to be normal. 
This is where just normal presents a new way of thinking about these discussions 
and has the potential to account for apparently divergent behaviours. Just normal 
is about how persons consider they generally ought to be or be able to be, and thus 
is a multidimensional idea that can involve drawing on prior conceptions of oneself 
as well as how they feel a person in general should be. Just normal makes no 
distinction about what kind of normal is involved here, but instead that a person 
considers that there is an appropriate way for them to be and that this guides their 
actions to ensure an outward consistency with this. For instance, the individuals in 
Frank’s (1986) study who rejected the idea of ‘normal’ bodies through avoiding the 
use of a prosthesis were interpreted as standing up for the acceptability of differing 
body types, challenging ideas of a bodily orthodoxy or the notion that a body minus 
a prosthesis is something to be ‘fixed’4. If such an individual considered that it was 
wrong to support an idea of a normative body, and that avoiding the use of a 
prosthesis is fitting with this, then by doing so they keep consistent with what they 
consider is part of a right and reasonable way for them to be; a way that they 
consider is just normal. Similarly, Murray (2010) recounts those with their 
prostheses ‘on display’ who had described decisions to conceal limb difference as 
an ‘inability to deal’ with limb loss or absence or pressures to conform, or that such 
others were ashamed of their prosthesis use (p. 89) – by acting ‘loud and proud’ 
these individuals are therefore also acting in ways that they saw ‘ought’ to be the 
                                                     
4
 An interesting parallel in assistive technology can be found in the deaf community where there is 
some resistance to hearing interventions (see Miziara, Miziara, Tsuji, & Bento, 2012). 
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way of things, just as those who wanted to conceal their limb difference were 
through their desire to be perceived and treated ordinarily. 
Just normal therefore foregrounds the interesting interplay between perceptions of 
normality and appropriateness for oneself, and thus when persons consider how 
things ought to be for them. This concept therefore presents a unique way of 
considering a broad range of actions within prosthesis use and limb absence, each 
of which can be understood as an individual acting to ensure they can live in ways 
that they consider are right, reasonable, fair or sufficient, and they do so through 
acts of preserving, redressing and persevering. Where ‘normal’ and ‘right’ are 
individually limited ways of exploring prosthesis use, just normal goes further than 
both. Furthermore, as the previous three analysis chapters illustrate, being just 
normal is a concern not just restricted to the initial experience of limb loss or 
beginning prosthesis use. It is instead a prevailing and widespread concern that 
individuals continue to manage (through acts of preserving, redressing and 
persevering). To build on Albert Camus’ observation presented in the opening of 
this thesis, some people expend tremendous energy being normal, but in 
particular, people expend tremendous energy being just normal. This is the new 
and important concept presented to the field of prosthesis use, and as the rest of 
this chapter and the next illustrate, the concept of just normal and the broader 
theory about how people go about managing this concern have significant 
implications for the field. 
Just Normal and the Use of a Prosthesis 
One area that the theory of just normal provides insight into concerns the diversity 
of prosthesis use. In chapter two, reports of varying frequencies of prosthetic usage 
were discussed, where individuals use their prostheses to greater or lesser extents 
than others and some report non-use. An understanding of these varying 
frequencies of usage is limited and interpretations are complicated by 
methodological inconsistencies across studies (Callaghan et al., 2008; Raichle et al., 
2008). However, some have reasoned that satisfaction may account for variable 
prosthesis use, where those who rate aspects or their overall prosthesis as more 
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satisfactory will tend to use their artificial limbs to a greater extent (e.g., Pruitt, 
Varni, Seid, & Setoguchi, 1997; Williamson et al., 1994, p. 261). However, evidence 
for this is weak at best. One study that explored this involved a sample of 
Australian individuals with upper-limb absence (n=70), where associations between 
various aspects of satisfaction and usage ranged from moderate to ‘very low’ 
(Davidson, 2002). Similarly, Dillingham, Pezzin, MacKenzie and Burgess (2001) 
surveyed upper and lower prosthesis users in the US (n=78), and determined an 
average ‘high’ rate of 80 hours per week that a prosthesis was used for, yet only 
43% reported being satisfied with their limbs. 
The link between satisfaction and prosthesis use is further troubled when 
considering some of the qualitative research that has been conducted in the field. 
In Murray’s (2005) study of upper- and lower-limb prosthesis users (n=35), 
individuals were described as continuing to use their prostheses even when there 
were significant difficulties in doing so. Murray includes the account of one 
individual who endured significant pain while away on holiday with friends, ending 
up ‘in a mess’ from the friction of his socket when it began cutting into his groin, 
yet he kept going with the limb despite this. Similarly, in a study of upper-limb 
prosthesis users, Saradjian et al. (2008) described a number of their participants 
continuing to wear limbs despite problems, including one who described doing so 
despite it being ‘very uncomfortable’ (p. 878). Such patterns of usage despite 
difficulties were also evident in my own study, where individuals described 
problems with their prostheses that were often frustrating, yet this did not deter 
their usage. For example, lower-limb prosthesis user Emily Rapp described 
enduring pain and discomfort caused by the use of her prosthesis, but kept up 
using her limb whenever she possibly could. As she in particular illustrates, it is 
possible to be deeply unhappy with a prosthesis and yet continue to be a ‘full-time 
user’. 
It therefore appears there is limited value in employing satisfaction in order to 
account for the variable levels of prosthesis use, though other interpretations have 
been put forward that are more compelling. For instance, Murray (2005) discusses 
the importance of portraying a particular identity to particular groups, and which 
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may manifest as individuals allowing or not allowing themselves to be observed as 
a prosthesis user or a person with limb difference. Murray invokes the work of 
Radley (1993) and Kelly and Field (1996) who have suggested that persons are 
compelled to be seen as capable participants in social life, which the stigma of 
disability can undermine. Bodies are managed in various ways in order to present 
as ‘competent’, and one of the ways of doing so is to wear a prosthesis, as this 
enables a more visibly ‘capable’ appearance. This was given as a potential 
explanation for why the individual holidaying with his friends persevered with pain, 
as he stated that he ‘wouldn’t let this group of people see me without a leg’ (p. 
434). In another of Murray’s accounts, one individual was happy to wear or to go 
without her prosthesis when at her local pub, but could not envisage going to a 
club without her limb. She considered the people at the club were a ‘different type 
of people’ to those who knew her at the pub, who knew her more for who she was. 
At the club she would not have this understanding, meaning she would be thought 
of differently and in a way she was keen to avoid. While she was still happy to go to 
clubs, doing so meant she needed her prosthesis, minimising her limb difference 
and so maintaining her ‘competent’ appearance to others. Saradjian et al. (2008) 
provide a similar interpretations of the accounts of the participants in their study, 
who were described as being ‘socially dependent’ on the use of a limb, and how 
this compelled some individuals to use their limbs despite significant problems in 
usage. 
Such interpretations indicate the utility of exploring the meaning behind prosthesis 
use in order to understand the extent to which a limb is used. This is where the 
theory of just normal is particularly insightful, as it provides an extensive 
understanding of prosthesis use and a means of interpreting what may prompt or 
affect the use of a limb. The theory can also work with existing interpretations such 
as that of Murray (2005) and Saradjian et al. (2008) but go further than these. For 
instance, in these studies a prosthesis was said to provide a social function, 
supporting presentation and an ability to engage in social activities important to 
the individual. The theory would indicate that a perceived just normal level of this 
social function may vary between individuals and between situations and so also 
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account for those who would allow themselves to be recognised as a prosthesis 
user in particular situations as well as those that would desire to avoid this 
whenever possible. However, the theory also has scope for other motives. For 
instance, the WHO’s ICF (2011) could be considered to include social function as a 
part of its categories of body functions and structures, activity, and participation, 
but this indicates a need to also consider non-social functioning. For instance, 
individuals within this study described the importance of prosthesis use in 
managing particular tasks about their households, and how some would wear their 
limbs even when others were not around. Yet this was not universal and the theory 
of just normal considers that persons perceive a way of being, part of which may 
include social function or another kind of function, that is right, reasonable, fair or 
sufficient for them, and that a prosthesis will be used to the extent that it can 
support being these ways. 
So persons may consider a just normal level of something such as social function 
that means they need to be a particular way or do particular things, and if a 
prosthesis enables or aids these endeavours then it must be used as long as is 
required to satisfy this function. The theory of just normal conceptualises a 
perseverance in usage toward such ends (despite difficulties) as obligated 
persistence. In obligated persistence persons are said to be compelled to keep 
going with things that keep them just normal, given that they consider this the right 
and reasonable way to be. So when persons go out of their way to conceal their 
prosthesis use, or they keep using a limb despite pain it causes them, they are 
persisting with these activities because of an obligation to keep in ways they see as 
right. Obligated persistence captures the variable extent of prosthesis use, despite 
potential issues in usage, as persons use their limbs to keep in ways they see as just 
normal. So when persons report using a prosthesis ‘when needed’ (NiMhurchadha 
et al., 2013; Østlie et al., 2012; Saradjian et al., 2008) or for ‘specific purposes’ 
(Davidson, 2002), these needs and purposes may be related to specific functions 
(i.e., social competence, facilitating task engagement) but that ultimately support 
an ability to be just normal. Thus even if a prosthesis is rarely used, the function 
that it supports when it is used may be integral to being able to be just normal and 
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so there is an imperative need to keep up this usage, no matter how infrequent. 
Motives for usage may also be diverse and subtle, where studies have identified 
that persons may require a prosthesis not just (or at all) for physical function, but to 
support a perceived body hexis (e.g., Hoffman, 2013; Vasluian et al., 2013). The 
extent to which a prosthesis is used is therefore importantly related to why it may 
be used, and can be usefully interpreted through the theory and considering what 
an individual conceives may be just normal. 
Such an interpretation indicates the need for professionals to be receptive to 
persons that use prostheses to ensure they are able to express difficulties they 
might experience, given that the extent of their usage may not necessarily reflect 
their contentment with their limb. Researchers and other relevant professionals 
should be sensitive to the difference between a prosthesis that ‘does the job’ in a 
sense that it enables a person to be just normal, and a prosthesis that can be used 
without significant difficulties. Understanding the kinds of obligated persistence 
that an individual perseveres with, where there may be a ‘need’ to use a prosthesis 
in certain situations or in certain ways, despite the costs attached, means that 
addressing any difficulties has implications for improving an individual’s situation. 
For individuals such as lower-limb prosthesis user Emily Rapp, who described 
persevering with the use of her limb despite pain and discomfort because ‘it was 
normal and expected: part of living with a prosthesis’ (Rapp, 2007, p. 5), any 
improvements to her prosthetic situation could only improve her everyday life. A 
skilled and receptive prosthetist who is aware of an individual’s prosthetic 
circumstances, including the particular limb and why an individual considers it 
important to involve in their life, and who is on top of developments in technology, 
may be able to suggest improvements where relevant. 
Furthermore, the use of a prosthesis may be affected by persons managing threats 
to their ability to live just normally. This is drawing on the preserving elements of 
the theory. For example, if a person considers the lifespan of their limb may be 
deprecated from ‘overuse’ of their limb, or through using the limb in particular 
ways or situations, then if they require their prosthesis to live just normally they 
may reduce their usage accordingly to ensure this can continue. Recall Rob, the 
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bilateral lower-limb prosthesis user who described ‘easing up’ and ‘taking care’ of 
his prostheses to ensure he could keep with limbs that were ‘road worthy’ during 
the years up until he could obtain new ones. The need to preserve his prostheses in 
order to preserve his ability to live just normally influenced the way he would use 
his limbs. These are patterns of conserving and protective avoidance that serve to 
preserve an individual’s ability to keep just normal, and are further important ways 
of accounting for variation in prosthesis usage. 
Related to this discussion, there is an important point to be made about how the 
theory can inform what constitutes appropriate usage. For instance, while there is a 
general consensus that a prosthesis can be beneficial to persons with limb absence 
in a variety of ways, some studies extend this logic and consider greater usage as 
being better than lesser usage, and moreover, lesser usage as potentially 
problematic. Concerns are expressed about individuals who undergo the loss of a 
limb who may fail to ‘fully rehabilitate’ if they are only using their prosthesis 
infrequently, and similarly, there are concerns about wasted resources if 
prostheses are perceived to be ‘underutilised’ (Schaffalitzky et al., 2012). 
Consequently, researchers have indicated the need to address this ‘problem’ (e.g., 
Callaghan et al., 2008; Dillingham et al., 2001; Williamson et al., 1994). 
Contrary to this, just normal indicates that variable levels of prosthesis usage 
should not necessarily be considered as better or worse unless indicated this way 
by the individual themselves. Persons may use a prosthesis in ways that help them 
to live just normally and also to the extent that they perceive it is just normal to do 
so. This may translate to some using a limb on a full-time basis, but for others, a 
prosthesis may only be required for particular activities, but yet which are just as 
critical for being just normal. As illustrated above, this may be just for the ability 
not to be noticed for one’s limb difference in public settings, and so when in non-
public places a limb may not be required and persons may get on just fine without 
it (e.g., Murray, 2005, p. 433; Saradjian et al., 2008) – for these individuals it may 
actually be just normal not to use the limb in these settings. 
It may be possible that those considering greater prosthetic usage as better may be 
following the WHO’s guidance that has defined rehabilitation as about achieving 
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and maintaining an individual’s ‘optimal functioning’ in interactions with 
environments (World Health Organization, 2011, p. 96). If a prosthesis is viewed as 
a device which can afford or enhance function, then an extension of this is that 
greater usage means sustaining these greater levels of function, and similarly, that 
time being without a limb means being deficient of a particular function. This fits 
with the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (United Nations, 
2006) that calls for ‘appropriate measures, including through peer support, to 
enable persons with disabilities to attain and maintain their maximum 
independence, full physical, mental, social and vocational ability, and full inclusion 
and participation in all aspects of life’ (p. 19). Persons should, of course, be 
afforded the provisions to enable their maximal function, or to reach their 
‘maximum potential’, yet the Convention calls for an ability or capacity to attain 
these rather than encouraging that persons must actually achieve or take this up, 
and this is what may be overlooked by those considering greater prosthetic usage 
as better. As one of Saradjian et al.’s (2008) participants described about the use of 
their prosthesis: ‘I’m not using it to its full capability I know, but I am using it to 
mine… for what I want…’ (p. 877). This reflects the crux of just normal, and was 
echoed across the accounts in this study, where persons rarely sought the best of 
something, or to reach the peak of what they were capable of, but rather they 
sought what they felt was appropriate – what was right, reasonable, fair, sufficient 
or ‘good enough’ (though this includes scope for those who consider optimal and 
appropriate to be the same). To further illustrate, recall lower-limb prosthesis user 
Paul Martin, who fought to get a running leg, but laughed when his prosthetist told 
him he could have him running marathons with it. Paul wanted to be able to run 
and had described how important it was not to be ‘limited’ or have doors ‘shut’ to 
him, but he did not want to take running to his ‘maximum’ capacity – he just 
wanted to be able to run to an extent that he felt was just normal. 
It is therefore important to recognise and respect the potentially varying levels of 
usage that persons may seek or report when researchers and rehabilitation 
professionals consider what a suitable frequency of prosthetic usage should be. 
According to the theory of just normal, persons should be afforded the capacity for 
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function that they consider is right and reasonable, fair and sufficient, but what 
they actually envisage is their right level of function is also important to identify 
and work with. This goes somewhat against a rhetoric of promoting prosthesis use 
as a means of enabling an individual’s ‘full participation’ (e.g., Sinha et al., 2014, p. 
116) and would instead be better expressed as a means of enabling function to an 
extent that the individual considers is sufficient and good enough – that a 
prosthesis can enable a person to live just normally. 
Out of the outcomes identified in Schaffalitzky et al.’s (2011) interviews with 
prosthesis users and service providers (n=34), ‘reaching his/her potential’ was an 
outcome only identified by service providers, and is telling about the potential 
differences in attitudes that may be borne by users and professionals on this 
matter (Schaffalitzky et al., 2012, also later found that outcomes similar to this did 
not reach consensus in a Delphi study between professionals and prosthesis users). 
Concerns about an ‘underutilisation’ of technology or a failure to ‘fully rehabilitate’ 
can be addressed instead through probing an individual’s understanding of their 
potential with a particular prosthesis, ensuring an awareness of their ‘capacity’ or 
their ‘optimal function’, and in doing so it may be possible to discover those who 
may seek change (those seeking to redress) and those who are content to keep 
going as they are (those who are content may already be living just normally and so 
may suffice in order to preserve themselves being this way). 
This discussion also speaks to the body of literature on prosthetic ‘outcomes’ 
research. In this body of literature, researchers have sought and debated ways of 
assessing how a person is getting on in their prosthesis use. In other words, there 
are questions about how ‘successful’ prosthesis use may be quantified. Deathe, 
Miller and Speechley (2002) recommend that a consensus about outcomes should 
be reached in order to inform evidence-based practice, but this is currently far from 
the case. A systematic review of outcome measures conducted by Condie, Scott 
and Treweek (2006) documents the significant range of measures that have been 
involved in prosthetics assessment over the previous 10 years, from metrics of 
physical abilities to psychosocial scoring, but the researchers note that there is little 
agreement about which measures should be used and when. Research since has 
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sought to employ the framework of the WHO’s ICF to assess and group existing 
outcomes (Hebert et al., 2009; W. Hill et al., 2009; Lindner et al., 2010) as well as a 
means to consider further outcomes (Stucki, Ewert, & Cieza, 2002). However, Wade 
and Halligan (2003) argue that the ICF framework is currently deficient since it does 
not consider changes over time, nor does it give enough emphasis to individual 
conceptions of their circumstances, conflating perspectives of the individual with 
‘external observers’ that may well differ, as well as not doing enough to emphasise 
individual autonomy, and the researchers argue that much remains to be done in 
order to further distance interpretations of disability and rehabilitation from an 
implicitly deterministic bio-medical approach. 
Thus there is currently a lack of agreement in terms of how to go about assessing 
successful prosthetic usage, but a desire to develop a means to do so. In one more 
recent exploration of outcomes, Schaffalitzky et al. (2012) used a Delphi method, 
involving prosthesis users and professionals (n=21), to determine what might 
constitute the most important outcomes in lower-limb prosthesis prescription and 
use. The researchers found 13 outcomes that reached consensus, and which 
involved assessing physical as well as psychosocial factors. NiMhurchadha et al., 
(2013) also performed a Delphi study with users and professionals for upper-limb 
prosthesis use (n=53), in order to gain consensus upon how to judge ‘success’. An 
interesting finding in the study by NiMhurchadha et al. was that consensus was 
only reached on a small number of broad outcomes, including when a person 
‘wears a prosthesis for specific activities’, ‘wears prosthesis as often as they wish’ 
and ‘uses the prosthesis as intended’. More specific measures such as satisfaction 
with cosmetic appearance or use of the prosthesis to gain social acceptance were 
rejected by participants. This underscores the points raised earlier in this chapter 
that what persons consider just normal to be may vary significantly, and so 
consequently how a prosthesis may serve a just normal function may similarly 
differ significantly across individuals. NiMhurchadha et al. suggest that their 
findings indicate a means to develop subjective rehabilitation success measures 
upon which individualized goals and ‘pertinent psychological and social outcomes’ 
can be set and measured against (p. 1730). Subjective measures are fitting with 
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theory of just normal, as are individualised thresholds about what would be ‘good 
enough’ in such measures. Drawing on the beginning of this chapter, even a non-
subjective measure of ‘reintegration to normal living’ may be useful with a given 
individual if they have indicated the importance of reintegrating to this shared 
understanding of normal living. 
In order to gauge ‘success’, holistic discussions are recommended between the 
individual and the professional where the individual is able to outline their 
intentions for a prosthesis or to update professionals on how they are getting on 
with their limb in such regards. The professional should be able to use these 
discussions to discern how persons seek to live just normally and so how this can be 
best facilitated or how persons are getting on in view of this. The importance of 
such an individualistic approach to consultations was underscored in the interviews 
conducted during this study, where individuals expressed the importance of being 
able to paint a picture of themselves and their lives in consultations, and the 
importance of having a receptive prosthetist who was willing and able to 
understand this in order to shape consultations accordingly. In other words, 
individuals sought to be able to convey how they lived or desired to live just 
normally in order for outcomes of consultations to fit with this. 
Therefore, the desire for researchers and professionals to gauge and monitor 
‘success’ can interface with the individual’s desire to have their needs fulfilled if 
consultations are approached with a just normal perspective. An ideal avenue for 
further research is thus an exploration of how this can be operationalised within 
the consultation environment, given resource and time constraints. In addition, 
professionals taking a just normal approach to consultations may be able to probe 
the ways that individuals may use preserving strategies, which individuals 
themselves may appear content with, but which can be evaluated by the 
professional to determine whether these can be improved or supported, or ways 
that threats that prompt preserving can be eliminated entirely. For instance, an 
individual who has found themselves exhausted while trying to use a prosthesis to 
do everything they felt they should be able to do may have found that taking 
breaks between activities is a way to ensure they have enough energy to get by and 
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get what they need to done. A prosthetist understanding what a person intends to 
do and perceiving why this is important may be able to identify how the individual 
is being fatigued and use their expertise to find ways to address this, which can be 
discussed with the individual as possibilities for improvement. 
In summary of this section, the theory of just normal indicates the importance of 
understanding how and why a prosthesis may be used, and the theory provides a 
useful means of doing so. Persons will use their prostheses to varying extents in 
order to be just normal, and their usage may not reflect their satisfaction with the 
limb, but rather that they are doing so because they perceive it to be the right way 
for them to be. The theory indicates that there may be many things that persons 
consider are requisite for being just normal, such as a particular level of social 
function, and where a prosthesis can be considered to facilitate this, obligated 
persistence foregrounds the way that persons may be compelled to use their limbs 
to the extent that they can continue to be this way. 
In addition to this, part of being just normal is also having the capacity for particular 
endeavours even if they are not taken up, meaning that individuals should know 
what is available to them and not feel precluded from potential options, even if 
they are ultimately not chosen. Fundamentally, it is important that persons are 
educated about what they can do with prosthetic technology, and learn about the 
various options available to them in order for a decision to be made about what 
might be the most appropriate technology, ensuring persons have the means to do 
what they feel they ought to be able to with a prosthesis, without necessarily 
encouraging them to always try to ‘meet the best of their capacity’ (Schaffalitzky et 
al., 2012, p. 2092). Where discussions have tried to determine the most suitable 
outcomes in prosthesis use, through agreeing which standardised measures should 
be involved in consultations or through trying to develop new measures, the theory 
of just normal instead presents an approach which emphasises the importance of 
attending to each person individually, exploring where their values lie and what 
they consider to be right, reasonable, fair or good enough, and thus enables 
identification of what to work towards or to try to maintain. A good measure of 
‘success’ is surely to understand the aims and aspirations of an individual in order 
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to understand what they themselves consider would constitute (within the limits of 
prosthetic technology) a just normal success for them. 
Just Normal and Coping 
Man has, as it were, become a kind of prosthetic god. When he puts 
on all his auxiliary organs he is truly magnificent; but those organs 
have not grown on to him and they still give him much trouble at 
times. (Freud, 1962, pp. 38–39) 
Within the literature on limb absence there have been investigations of coping, and 
this is an area that can be extended through the theory of just normal. Most of this 
research has focused on individuals who have received amputations, where studies 
have employed coping perspectives in order to understand responses to the loss of 
a limb and how this may vary between individuals. For instance, Livneh et al. (2001) 
employed the COPE inventory (Carver, Scheier, & Weintraub, 1989) in order to 
explore coping in individuals with amputations (n=61), determining that coping 
strategies could be clustered into active/confrontive (e.g., positive reframing) vs. 
passive/avoidant (e.g., social withdrawal), pessimistic/fatalistic (e.g., 
disengagement) vs. optimistic/positivistic (e.g., planning), and social/emotional 
(e.g., venting) vs. cognitive (e.g., acceptance). Subsequent investigations have 
linked coping strategies associated with avoidance and disengagement to poorer 
psychosocial outcomes following limb loss, while task-orientated problem-solving 
approaches tend to lead to more favourable outcomes (Desmond, 2007; Desmond 
& MacLachlan, 2006). 
Similarly, Dunn (1996) explored three forms of adaptive coping in persons adjusting 
to the amputation of a limb (n=138), specifically investigating the impact of positive 
meaning, dispositional optimism, and perceiving control over disability. Positive 
meaning was found to be associated with lower levels of depression, while 
dispositional optimism and perceiving greater control over disability were linked to 
lower levels of depression and higher levels of self-esteem. Oaksford et al. (2005) 
also explored positive coping strategies in a qualitative study with individuals who 
had lost a limb in the previous six months up until five years (n=12), and 
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determined that persons would tend to use strategies of support-seeking, escapism 
and cognitive appraisal soon after the loss of a limb, though for those with older 
amputations the use of these would tend to become more infrequent. ‘Practical 
coping’ (e.g., continued efforts at physical rehabilitation) was found to peak in 
usage around one year after an amputation before being used less often, and this 
was interpreted as individuals reaching greater adaptation to their circumstances, 
including their prosthesis use, meaning this strategy would be required less when 
persons came closer to reaching this. Also the researchers found that the use of 
humour as a means of coping was useful soon after the loss of a limb, but was then 
used less frequently until a year after the amputation whereby it would begin to be 
used more frequently again. As with previous studies exploring coping in this area, 
this study was cross-sectional in design, and with such a small sample then divided 
and contrasted by age, these findings must be interpreted with some caution. 
However, the suggestion that coping strategies may change over time as persons 
consider different strategies may be more useful at different times, or that some 
responses become less beneficial over time, is consistent with studies from other 
areas that have explored this (e.g., Fawzy et al., 1990; Snyder & Pulvers, 2001). 
However, individuals with limb absence are somewhat unique in their ability to 
adopt a prosthesis as a potential means of managing stressors related to their 
condition (for example compared to chronic illness). Thus a prosthesis may be 
considered to facilitate coping, particularly following the loss of a limb. However, 
living with artificial limbs may in itself be a source of problems taking a variety of 
forms, and this may present an additional area for coping. The potential impact of 
infrequent issues related to a prosthesis is perhaps more clearly illustrated in a blog 
post from lower-limb prosthesis user Lisa Brewer, who described a time when her 
limb difference caused her significant difficulties, and how she later reflected on 
her response to this: 
We decided we were going to decompress and hang out at the pool 
all day.  I put on my water leg and was shocked to discover it was 
too small (I just got that one as well).  I could barely get it on and it 
was painful to even walk.  …  I got angry and frustrated and kept 
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saying things like, “I just don’t understand how this is possible!” and 
“What the heck happened?  It fit when I got it….we even had to pad 
it a little!”  Then it hit me like a ton of bricks!  …  MY everyday liner 
just has a pin and the water one doesn’t. My problem was, I got a 
new, thinner liner for everyday use but never got a new one for the 
water leg.  Because the water liner is thicker, it would not fit in the 
prosthesis.  My frustration mounted, but I realized all I had to do 
was remove the pin from one of my everyday sockets (I have two), 
and use one for water and one for daily use.  … Michael tried, he 
really did, but none of the tools worked.  My frustration was 
mounting, and Michael, bless his heart, was trying very hard to be 
patient with me. … At this point, I was in full-fledged tantrum mode 
while tears rolled down my face. I kept saying things like “this is my 
f’ing life forevvvvvvver!  I hate this!” … Later, as I laid by the pool, 
the REAL reason I freaked out hit me!  It occurred to me that I never 
really think of myself as disabled.  Heck, most of the time, I don’t 
think of myself as an amputee.  I have done everything I have 
wanted to do with little to know [sic] problem.  This was the first 
time in a long time that I realized that I am “disabled”.  I was unable 
to go in the water with two legs unless it was fixed.  I think, because 
I don’t feel disabled, it hits me hard when a disability moment 
happens. (Brewer, 2013b) 
A prosthesis can be a device that enables but also can cause difficulties when 
limitations become salient. While Lisa’s post above illustrates how difficulties may 
arise from time to time, persons may also live with persistent difficulties, such as 
being fatigued from the weight of carrying a prosthesis, or enduring discomfort or 
pain in usage. Or, as Mathias and Harcourt (2014) indicate, prosthesis users may 
suffer ‘constant pressure’ from society related to their appearance or being 
discovered for their limb difference. Many of these kinds of difficulties and 
frustrations were described in the accounts included in this study. Some difficulties 
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may be addressed with differing models of limbs, but the nature of prostheses 
means difficulties may always be found in a limb that is artificial. 
There is a dearth of studies exploring how persons live day-to-day with a prosthesis 
and manage such difficulties and limitations, but the theory of just normal provides 
a potential account of this. According to the theory, if issues are perceived as not 
just normal to persevere with, then persons will not do so, and they will act to 
redress the situation instead. In the context of difficulties with a particular limb, this 
could involve seeking modifications or an alternative to their current limb, or 
reducing usage. However, being just normal is a way of being that is about right, 
that is fair and sufficient or ‘good enough’, and so this leaves scope for a way of 
being that is not necessarily free of difficulties. These difficulties that do not merit 
redressing (or cannot be redressed) may therefore instead be viewed as part of 
living just normally; they are difficulties of a just normal nature, and so persons may 
endure these. This is managed in the theory through persevering, where persons 
are said to continue living just normally and do just normal things even when these 
are accompanied by difficulties because of the importance of being this way. 
Part of an individual’s persevering is accounted for through an obligated 
persistence, where persons are compelled to continue to be just normal, and this 
may involve doing particular things that incur difficulties, yet are necessary if the 
individual is to be this way. The earlier example from lower-limb prosthesis user 
Emily Rapp illustrates this, where Emily noted the discomfort caused by her 
prosthesis that she saw no means of redressing, but because she needed to use her 
limb to be just normal, she did so, accompanied by discomfort that she saw would 
be ‘expected’. In a sense, some difficulties may be incurred through the use of a 
prosthesis because doing so may be considered a necessary part of being just 
normal. However, trusting to transience and mole-hilling are the two other 
concepts that account for persevering and which address the way that persons 
grapple with such just normal difficulties. In trusting to transience, individuals 
perceive that difficulties will be fleeting, and this helps persons endure their 
occurrence and to persist with activities that bring them about, such as the use of a 
limb that may lead to pain or discomfort. Persons do so expecting these problems 
204 
 
to abate, and so this perceived temporariness makes issues more permissible to 
endure. In mole-hilling, persons adopt strategies that normalise issues, making 
them seem less severe than they may initially appear. Thus persons may liken 
difficulties to ‘the problems people have’ or similarly they may consider particular 
groups that are more disadvantaged and that their own problems should therefore 
be more tolerable. These latter processes may have resonance with particular 
coping strategies already identified in the scholarly literature. For instance, 
downwards comparing is a well-known process identified by Wills (1981) that 
advances Social Comparison Theory (Festinger, 1954) through indicating that 
persons experiencing negative affect engage in comparisons with others considered 
to be worse-off in order to distance themselves from these others and raise self-
regard. Downward comparisons have also been observed in the literature relating 
to limb loss (e.g., Rybarczyk, Nicholas, & Nyenhuis, 1997; Sjödahl et al., 2004). 
However, the theory of just normal delineates processes of managing difficulties as 
a means of persevering with living just normally, and so underscores the reasons 
for doing so differently to that in the literature. Mole-hilling may be considered a 
form of coping in order to manage a difficulty, but it is employed in order to ensure 
stressors are realised as just normal stressors. Thus both mole-hilling and trusting 
to transience are processes that help persons keep themselves going just normally, 
but it is the just normalising nature of these processes that is important to 
recognise and presents a novel understanding in the prosthesis use literature. 
As indicated by the accounts within this study and the wider literature, prosthesis 
users may face difficulties relating to their limb absence as well as their prosthesis 
use. By exploring persevering within the theory of just normal, a basis for 
developing a better understanding of patterns of coping in prosthesis use may be 
established. Persevering indicates how persons keep going in ways they perceive 
are just normal, and in particular, processes such as mole-hilling account for the 
way in which persons may respond to difficulties. However, it is the just 
normalising and attenuating quality of these processes, where persons respond to 
difficulties in ways that frame these as just normal difficulties, and so allow them to 
keep this way, that may stimulate further investigation. 
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Just Normal and Self-Regulation 
A further way that a theory of just normal provides an important insight into 
prosthesis use is when considering the recent investigations that have invoked self-
regulation theory in order to understand adjustment to limb loss (Coffey, Gallagher, 
& Desmond, 2014a, 2014b; Coffey, Gallagher, Desmond, et al., 2014a, 2014b; 
Dunne et al., 2014). The main tenet of self-regulation is that human behaviour is 
organised around the pursuit of goals which derive from core aspects of the self, 
and these goals exist in a hierarchical structure. Persons are said to self-regulate 
through assessing whether there is a discrepancy between a desired and a 
perceived state of being and act to close this gap if it is detected. The particular 
self-regulation framework employed in these investigations is the dual-process 
model of assimilative and accommodative processes (Carver & Scheier, 2000) which 
proposes two ways of addressing discrepancies. In an assimilative approach, known 
also as tenacious goal pursuit, efforts are made to modify a person’s situation or 
behaviour to fit with goals and preferences, such as gaining knowledge or skills, or 
changes to a person’s lifestyle, and this is said to enable an individual to maintain a 
sense of identity and purpose. When the assimilative approach is deemed 
ineffective, an accommodative approach, known also as flexible goal adjustment, is 
employed, in which goals and preferences are modified to what is considered 
possible given situational constraints. This approach is said to be useful when 
persons perceive insurmountable barriers between themselves and a particular 
goal (Carver & Scheier, 2000). 
While the studies by Coffey and colleagues indicate how self-regulation can be a 
useful means of understanding adjustment to limb loss and provide an informative 
account of the variety of goals and ways that persons work towards these, it 
remains unclear what persons are actually self-regulating. Coffey et al. (2014b) 
specify that the physical and psychosocial disruption caused by the loss of a limb 
leads to a disturbance between an actual and a desired state of being, but beyond 
this, the goals persons are actually seeking to work towards, or back towards, are 
not entirely clarified. 
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The process of the selection of goals and what they may pertain to is a known 
criticism of self-regulation theory (Locke & Latham, 1990), yet the theory of just 
normal can potentially shed light on this and so provide a greater understanding of 
the regulation of the self in prosthesis use and beyond. For instance, as Carver and 
Scheier (2000) describe, self-regulation theory is about purposive processes, or ‘the 
sense that self-corrective adjustments are taking place as needed to stay on track 
for the purpose being served’ (p. 3). The ‘purpose’, objective, or goal that persons 
are self-regulating themselves about is not further defined and in this way ensures 
that self-regulation theory has significant scope. However, Carver and Scheier 
describe that there is a hierarchy of purposes, from concrete goals to more and 
more abstract goals, the highest of which pertain to core values a person 
possesses: ‘be goals’, or things about a sense of ‘self’ that persons regulate 
themselves around (Carver & Scheier, 2000, p. 49). Just normal was described to be 
an important ‘be’ state that prosthesis users are compelled to attain, and so there 
is potential overlap or fit with a core value/be goal as Carver and Scheier describe 
it. To use the parlance of self-regulation, persons can be said to be in a state of just 
normal or to be making corrective efforts to try to get back on track/become just 
normal (they would be implicated in redressing in order to be this way). 
If being just normal is considered important to an individual, then it is a state or 
goal that will shape the decision to employ particular strategies toward more 
concrete or particular goals. According to the dual-process theory, persons will 
‘assimilate’ or ‘accommodate’ toward concrete goals but these are in service of 
being just normal and depending on the viability and fit with these strategies and 
what is considered just normal. This is addressed through the redressing category 
of the theory, concerning the efforts an individual makes to try to live just normally. 
However, the theory of just normal goes further than just processes of closing a gap 
between perceived actual and desired states of being. For instance, preserving is a 
mode of just normal that establishes the way that persons anticipate the possibility 
of not being just normal and act on this in order to stay just normal. When 
preserving, persons are aware of the potential for losing an ability to live just 
normally and so they are proactive about ensuring this discrepancy does not occur 
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in the first place. Taking black-spotting as an example, persons identify particular 
situations which could lead to a loss of being just normal, and identify these 
through prior experience of this happening, or through predicting this as they 
consider how their engagement with the situation could play out. So the theory of 
just normal not only caters for managing discrepancies (redressing) but it also 
accounts for the way that individuals are aware of the potential for discrepancies 
occurring through particular means and proactively act to manage their occurrence. 
In this way, the theory of just normal goes beyond the focus of self-regulation, 
which is primarily concerned with the resolution of discrepancies. Its reactive 
nature does not take into account the pre-emptive actions that individuals also 
engage in seeking to stay in particular ways as the theory of just normal does. 
A further important way that the theory of just normal can inform the way we think 
about how persons ‘self-regulate’ can be identified when considering the way that 
persons come to act on discrepancies in being just normal. Carver and Scheier 
(2000) have said that persons engage in self-regulation ‘as needed’, and yet there is 
no real definition about how this process occurs. When developing the theory of 
just normal, I identified that being just normal was an ongoing and pervasive 
concern that prosthesis users continually process, but this did not mean that 
persons were constantly consciously troubled by this or ceaselessly checking 
themselves to ensure they were just normal. Rather, just normal appeared to be 
more of a latent concern; something that emerged to conscious deliberation from 
time to time. 
Crossley’s (2006) work provides a comparable and useful way of explaining this 
through a different context. In his ethnographic analyses on motives for joining a 
gym, Crossley began with the traditional idea that persons are concerned about 
‘investing’ in their bodies, but quickly determined that gym-goers, for the main 
part, were instead intent on doing this in order return to a ‘former glory’. 
Individuals would tend to suggest they needed to lose a bit of weight, that they had 
‘let themselves go’, or had ambitions of other aesthetic or health improving 
objectives that related to prior conceptions of themselves. An individual’s decision 
to start going to a gym therefore related to a concern that their actual bodily-
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condition had fallen out of alignment with their preferred self-image. So in doing 
something about this, there is some resonance with discussions of just normal and 
self-regulation. However, Crossley noted that persons were ‘shocked’ to have 
discovered things they had lost about themselves, whether it was catching a view 
of oneself in the mirror one day, discovering clothes had become too tight-fitting, 
or getting out of breath too quickly. In some ways then, these reasons for taking up 
gym-going implicate Crossley’s participants in restoring the balance, where going to 
the gym was the means to reduce or increase particular things which had slipped 
out of keeping from what persons considered ought to be the case. However, the 
important point here is that Crossley determined that persons were not continually 
vigilant about their bodies, and that it was chance encounters that led to the 
discovery of a discrepancy between a desired and actual state. Clothes were not 
necessarily checked for their fit each time they were put on, and persons were not 
necessarily militantly watching their weight. Despite this, when prompted, 
individuals gave indications that an appropriate weight or the fit of clothes were 
important to them, but it was only when contextual factors provoked their 
particular consideration that the individuals realised their need to go to the gym to 
get back to what they felt was right for them. 
In an earlier article, Crossley (2004) elaborates this discussion by discussing lifestyle 
as largely habitual or routinized, drawing on the work of Bourdieu, Giddens and 
Merleau-Ponty. In this perspective, the way people go about their lives is said to be 
generally without deep reflective thought, and habits and routines undertaken in 
such a way possess the flexibility and adaptability to cater to a changing world to 
ensure they can keep going without continual explicit steering. However, this also 
means that subtle and piecemeal changes can occur that may be invisible to the 
individual when the core elements of a routine remain present. Crossley referred to 
this as the ‘creep factor’ where ‘bad habits’ could then work their way into 
lifestyles when exceptions gradually become more prevalent, even the rule (p. 
242). Thus even when persons have an awareness of their conduct in given 
instances, the greater pattern or trajectory of change may pass unnoticed until a 
209 
 
situational prompt indicates that at some point a threshold has been crossed and 
the magnitude of this change becomes apparent. 
So this is somewhat analogous to the present theory, where just normal was not 
identified as an overt, omnipresent concern of prosthesis users, or in the terms of 
self-regulation, a purpose which was being continually monitored for any required 
self-corrective adjustments. Rather, it was a prevalent and important concern 
where things would come up which triggered a realisation about how a particular 
thing may not fit with an individual’s conception of what is just normal. Persons 
identify outright violations of what they conceive to be just normal and they right 
what’s wrong, and similarly they identify things that have strayed from what they 
ought to be and they restore the balance, but they do so when prompted. For 
instance, lower-limb prosthesis user Zane described that he would act to ensure his 
weight was managed (and so his residual limb mass managed) when it had strayed 
to the point where the discomfort in his socket had become so intense it would be 
hindering his ability to get about. Or how lower-limb prosthesis user Mel suddenly 
found herself not going out in public and socialising because of the incremental 
problems in her prosthesis use that had diminished her confidence and her mood 
over time. In this way persons manage being just normal but as it is stimulated 
through their being in the world. 
This then indicates a way of thinking about how persons manage being in ways 
important to them that is different from what self-regulation theory implies – that 
persons do not devote themselves to an overt continual monitoring of a way of 
being, but that such checking is actually bound up with how persons conceive of 
particular states of being (e.g., just normal) and how they experience the world, 
which interacts with these conceptions. In other words, persons can be said to be 
concerned about being just normal and this will be prompted for explicit 
consideration as it is brought up by specific encounters that have implications for 
the individual and their perceptions of this. Chance encounters foreground 
discrepancies, bringing the concern back into what Crossley (2004) termed 
‘reflexive consciousness’. The ‘regulation’ of the self therefore seems to have less 
fit with what has been described to occur in prosthesis use, as persons do not 
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appear to be as self-obsessed or vigilantly checking themselves as the self-
regulation literature intimates (e.g., Johnson, Pratt, & Wardle, 2012; Karoly, 1993; 
Zimmerman, 2005). 
In sum, employing self-regulation theory can help to explore phenomena such as 
adjusting to limb loss and prosthesis use, but the theory of just normal goes further 
than this, enabling a richer understanding of how and why persons may go about 
managing themselves in view of desired ways of being. Where self-regulation 
emphasises reactive processes, just normal includes this through redressing but 
also indicates the importance of considering how persons stay in ways important to 
them, giving additional consideration to proactive preserving processes. 
Prospective researchers considering the utility of self-regulation approaches may 
therefore consider the additional importance of this other aspect of managing 
valued ways of being. Finally, future researchers may also consider just normal as a 
means of distinguishing ‘regulation’ from persons responding to their experiences 
and interactions with the world. 
Just Normal and Matching Person to Technology 
A further area that is informed by the theory of just normal concerns the process of 
matching of person to technology. Within the literature, there is concern about 
ensuring appropriate prosthetic prescription, specifically, that an individual seeking 
a prosthesis receives a limb that is right for them and that technology or funds are 
allocated suitably. Discussions have focussed on models of matching a person to 
the technology they will subsequently use, though these models are found under 
the broader area of assistive technology (AT) prescription. 
A systematic literature review of AT prescription was undertaken by Bernd, Van der 
Pijl and De Witte (2009) and resulted in the discovery of three models that have 
specifically addressed the AT selection process. The first model, developed by 
Scherer (1998), is the model of Matching Person to Technology (MPT). According to 
the review, this is the most well-known model in the literature, and incorporates 
the user’s perspectives and abilities, the attributes of the AT, and environmental 
conditions (Bernd et al., 2009). Taking these into account, along with the needs, 
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desires and goals of the individual, the MPT model indicates that appropriate AT 
can be matched to an individual if these factors are considered, that user 
expectations are met, and that the AT is easy and comfortable to use (Scherer, 
2002). The second model, the Framework for Modelling the Selection of AT 
Devices, builds on the literature of AT outcomes that predict the use and non-use 
of AT (Scherer et al., 2007). This model emphasises an optimal match between 
person, AT, and environment in order to facilitate ongoing usage (Scherer, 2014; 
Scherer et al., 2007). The third model, the Human Activity Assistive Technology 
Model (HAATM; Cook & Hussey, 2002), gives particular consideration to the place 
of AT in an individual’s life that the technology is meant to provide assistance with. 
Thus it foregrounds the particular person and the activity that the AT is meant to 
support, but also gives consideration to the context in which the activity will take 
place, and how these three areas may interact. 
There is significant overlap between these models, and Scherer has said about the 
first two (though the same could be said of the HAATM) that they are a move from 
a previously ‘people-centric’ approach of determining the broader requirements of 
users in general, to a ‘person-centred’ approach, foregrounding the requirements 
of a particular individual when considering what might be the right technology 
(Scherer, 2014). It is suggested that invoking models such as these that match 
person to technology and also involve the person in the process will ensure the 
individual is satisfied with their AT and that this will therefore lead to long-term 
usage (e.g., Scherer, 2014; Scherer et al., 2007). 
However, long-term usage is extrapolated from an initial match and means that 
there is less consideration given to how this may vary over time. The second of 
Bernd et al.’s identified models (Scherer et al., 2007) links to a model of AT 
outcomes (Fuhrer, Jutai, Scherer, & DeRuyter, 2003) and so does go some way 
towards exploring what goes on after an appropriate match has been made. 
However, this model of outcomes is adapted from models found in broader health 
sciences literature, and has been altered to suit AT usage, which is assumed to be 
retained in the short and long term if usage is deemed effective, efficient, 
satisfactory, and supports psychological functioning and subjective well-being. 
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Ongoing usage is also said to be moderated by factors linked to the domains of the 
ICF, concurrent interventions, comorbidities, continuing AT device services and 
costs. 
A theory of just normal is largely complementary of these approaches as both 
emphasise an individualistic perspective where the particular and potentially 
nuanced requirements of each individual are important to attend to when 
considering a good match of prosthesis to person. However, just normal indicates 
that there is a need to consider the idea of matching more closely. For instance, an 
important feature of the theory is that what is actually just normal for an individual 
is continually liable to change. This potential for change is because an individual’s 
judgement of what is and what is not just normal is informed by their conceptions 
of appropriateness, justice and fairness, and these are employed to assess 
something in reference to what is known more broadly about it. So if an individual’s 
knowledge about something develops, then a judgement about whether a given 
instance is in fact just normal may also change. For example, we can only judge if 
something is fair if we know something about that thing such that we can 
distinguish what might be fair about it or what might be unfair. Knowledge of the 
judged thing may expand through a deepening understanding or through learning 
of further variation, and this has the potential for changing judgements about what 
is deemed actually just normal. 
Persons may therefore desire or consent to be fitted with a particular prosthesis 
depending on their awareness of available options that they perceive are overall 
better or worse than others and therefore what would be just normal to have. So 
they may be fitted with a prosthesis that they consider is reasonable and good 
enough because they consider it so through reference to what they know about 
prosthetic options. This would make an initial matching of person to technology a 
just normal match. However, the literature actually informs us that persons are 
largely unknowledgeable about prosthetics when first coming to prosthesis use 
(Murray, 2013), but similarly, if there is nothing known to prompt considering that 
a particular prosthesis is not right or reasonable, fair or good enough, it may be 
tentatively considered to be just normal. However, if the individual was to then 
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gain indications about why a limb may be unfair or unreasonable to be expected to 
persevere with, such as experiencing particular difficulties in using the limb or 
learning of a limb they feel they should be using instead, then they may deem their 
current prosthesis use no longer just normal, considering alternative courses of 
action that would be just normal to switch to instead. Persevering may therefore 
turn to redressing as persons do something about a limb that is no longer ‘good 
enough’. These particular courses of redress could be to try to gain a prosthesis 
that is good enough, to seek improvements to the limb they use, or to stop using 
the particular limb altogether. 
Paul Martin, a lower-limb prosthesis user whose autobiographical account of his 
prosthetic rehabilitation was included in this study, provides a useful illustration of 
this. To briefly recap, Paul was fitted with a prosthesis after the loss of his leg, but 
when he discovered this leg was incapable of enabling him to participate in sports, 
he sought to redress this through seeking a leg that was capable. Similarly, when 
this second prosthesis appeared unable to facilitate running, Paul sought a leg that 
could do this. In each instance, Paul was motivated to seek a prosthesis in order to 
stay true to his conceptions of what it was to be just normal – he saw that being 
limited in his activities, or unable to participate in something was to be restricted 
by the loss of his leg, and this ran contrary to what he saw should be just normal for 
him. When there were prosthetic options that could enable him to overcome these 
difficulties and help him do what he saw was important, then it was not just normal 
to stick with what he had. However, at each fitting, Paul was not aware of the 
particular deficits of the prosthesis that he would later take issue with, and so each 
match at that time was a just normal one. But as he tried to use his prosthesis and 
discovered these issues, they impacted his judgement about whether it was 
actually right to keep going with the limb. 
A different illustration is given by, Alan, another lower-limb prosthesis user who 
was also involved in this study. Alan described how he had been fitted with a 
particular prosthesis, but when he came into contact with another user who was 
using a more advanced limb, he sought to get this instead. Alan was not aware of 
the more advanced prosthesis at the time of his fitting, and his own prosthesis was 
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meant to be good enough for him in enabling him in doing what he wanted to do, 
but when he learned of the existence of this other limb, which he perceived could 
help him to get about more easily, which would not be as difficult to use, and which 
was being used by a person in a similar situation to him, he was motivated to try to 
get this other limb because these things meant persevering with his particular 
prosthesis was no longer just normal. 
Thus if an individual gains information (such as through experience with their 
prosthesis or learning of alternative limbs) which indicates to them that to keep 
using their current prosthesis is not just normal, then this may be because what is 
just normal may have shifted to something else, whether indications of a need to 
alter their prosthetic solution in some way, or to non-use, and so persons have 
cause for redressing in light of this. In other words, a particular match of person to 
technology has been lost. This is not to suggest that this change occurs because of a 
change in a person’s needs, desires or goals, because a prosthesis may be judged as 
good enough for supporting these at one time but then not at another without 
these necessarily changing (when new information informs this). Instead, what 
good enough, fair, right or reasonable mean may not have changed but what these 
actually look like may have. 
So while extant models in this area are useful, a fuller understanding of the ‘match 
between person and technology’ should include that initial matches are not 
necessarily final. A ‘technological solution’ (Scherer, 2002) is instead only ever a 
temporarily sufficient solution for the person, and will continue to be sufficient 
until the individual receives indications that a more fitting solution is known. From 
the result of their study where men’s aesthetic satisfaction was negatively 
correlated with time spent with a prosthesis (n=44), Murray and Fox (2002) 
inferred that the needs of users may change over time and that these could be 
monitored and addressed to avoid an overall decrease in prosthesis usage. 
Similarly, Biddiss et al. (2011) indicate some recognition of the need for potential 
renewal of a matching process when they note that bodily changes, particularly in 
growing children, may necessitate new limbs, and that needs will also change as a 
person ages, meaning that ‘one single prosthesis purchase is NOT a lifetime 
215 
 
solution’ (p. 221). However, the theory of just normal provides an understanding 
that goes further than changing needs and physical changes that might necessitate 
a new match, and does so by foregrounding that there is a need to be cognizant of 
a person’s sense of what is just normal. This is sensitive to new information that 
informs whether particular things such as a given prosthesis are in fact still just 
normal to continue with. This is an important point to attend to, as it adds a further 
dimension to the matching process and provides a possible interpretation of those 
who may reduce or discontinue their usage with a particular prosthesis when there 
is no apparent change in their needs. 
This discussion also draws attention to the importance of attending to the initial 
matching more closely, ensuring that persons have a good understanding of the 
options available to them. As noted earlier, Murray (2013) described how 
individuals experiencing limb loss tend to come to the realm of prosthetics with 
little knowledge about the area. As a novice, the experience of limb loss and then 
of prosthetic consultations is often daunting and individuals tend to feel unable to 
contribute to shared decision-making processes (Murray, 2013; Nielsen, 1991). 
Many are reliant on or strongly guided by their prosthetist, and Murray includes 
one poignant account of an individual recalling how they had ‘nothing to go on’ in 
early consultations and who was led to his matched technology by his prosthetist, 
‘going where ever they told me to’ (p. 516). While prosthetists are often educated 
and trained in their field in order to identify and fit appropriate prostheses, there is 
still much room for problems to occur and Murray includes a number of mixed 
outcomes in illustration of this. In addition, Murray describes individuals that were 
often aware of their own unawareness, prompting them to actively seek 
confirmation of the ‘normality of their experiences’ (p. 516) through discussions 
with others online. One forum post I encountered during this study illustrates this 
particularly well: 
I've been trying to live a normal life. Doing things like changing the 
tires on my car, which requires me to crawl around on the pavement 
and getting back up. I'm starting to feel as though maybe I need to 
baby the prosthetic leg. This is the temp one. One day I went in to 
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have it adjusted and it made a world of difference. I was able to 
wear it 13 hours that day. It felt so good and things were looking up. 
Next time I go to wear it I was back to it making my lower back hurt 
and I'm also experiencing pain in my left foot on the side. Just wasn't 
fitting good. That may have something to do with the weight and 
how my shoes get worn. That adjustment made a huge difference 
but it was nothing I knew about needing. He made it on his own 
noticing while I was walking. Meaning, not knowing what to expect 
with a prosthetic leg you don't know what's "normal" and what can 
be improved upon. I understand it's all a learning process but how 
often do you go back for adjustments and how much time is 
between them? I'm just a little frustrated. Seems like my prosthetic 
guy is only as good as my ability to tell him what I feel needs 
adjusted. By that I mean if I go and I can't explain what I think needs 
adjusted there isn't much he can do aside from his own 
observations. I'm stating I feel it's my fault. I just don't know how to 
explain yet what needs adjusted or how to know. I do know that it 
can feel awesome. It has once. I just hope I can find my way back 
there again. (Systematic Chaos, 2010) 
This individual illustrates the frustration with not knowing more about prostheses, 
and in his searching to know more and learning as he goes along. This developing 
knowledge could then lead to reappraising a prosthesis (or a prosthetist) and could 
indicate to the individual whether it is right to keep going with this. So persons can 
be aware that their judgement may be particularly tentative or that knowing more 
about it may determine that something is not in fact just normal, and this may be 
concerning for the individual as they remain unsure about whether they should be 
persevering or redressing. 
Furthermore, a search for some clarification may similarly be considered to be 
righting what’s wrong, as persons consider it not to be just normal to be unsure 
about their experiences. To address this need, researchers have recommended 
improving the information available to individuals, the key benefit of which is that 
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individuals would then be better placed to participate in a shared decision-making 
process if they are better informed from the outset (Murray, 2013; Murray & 
Forshaw, 2013; Ostler et al., 2014). This is echoed by the UN Optional Protocol to 
the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which calls for the 
provision of ‘accessible information to persons with disabilities about mobility aids, 
devices and assistive technologies, including new technologies, as well as other 
forms of assistance, support services and facilities’ (United Nations, 2006, p. 6). 
Ensuring individuals have access to good sources of information about limb loss and 
prosthetics is not only important from an ethical standpoint, but if individuals tend 
to ‘go along’ in consultations and with what is recommended to them because they 
‘don’t know’, then having an improved knowledge from the outset facilitates a 
better ability to participate in in early consultations and so could help to ensure 
satisfaction and the longevity of a period during which an agreed solution will fit 
with what an individual conceives is just normal. 
A final further consideration for an ongoing matching process comes from the 
preserving mode of the theory. Within this, sufficing foregrounds that when 
persons consider themselves able to live just normally, they will tend to avoid 
change as this constitutes a potential threat to their ability to be this way. So if an 
individual considers they are living just normally with a particular prosthesis, they 
may reject proposals from professionals for suggested improved matches and it is 
important to recognise and respect this. Even when an individual describes 
difficulties in their prosthesis use, they may consider these difficulties of a just 
normal nature and so change in order to address these could constitute a risk in 
pursuit of what is at best considered redundant. Recall Natasha, the lower-limb 
prosthesis user who described her prosthetist seeing her ageing prosthesis and 
who she perceived wanted to ‘bring her into the new world’. Natasha was keen to 
avoid changes to her prosthesis because she considered herself so dependent on 
her limb to live just normally, where changes could risk losing this and where she 
could already get by with what she had. Persons will be more inclined to ‘stick with 
what generally works’, than risk losing this altogether or when change is not about 
helping them to become just normal when they perceive this is not the case. Thus 
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professionals should be mindful when informing individuals about potential 
improvements and anticipating a change in match between person and technology 
that persons may be willing to change and redress if this new information leads 
them to the belief that change would be just normal, but persons may also be 
inclined to suffice even when this means difficulties may remain. 
In summary, when considering models that contend with AT prescription, the 
theory of just normal prompts additional consideration of an individual’s 
knowledge of AT (in addition to features such as needs, desires and goals). An 
appropriate match between person and technology may be usefully modelled on a 
just normal match, and this takes account of such an awareness of the individual. 
This highlights the need to supply an individual with information about prostheses 
or to connect them with experienced others in order to ensure that persons are 
more informed and comfortable with the decisions agreed and that such decisions 
may be long-lived. These models would also therefore be helpfully expanded by 
taking into account that continued retention of AT such as a prosthesis is 
contingent upon a continued fit with what is considered to be just normal, and so 
which is continually liable to change as individuals become more knowledgeable 
about their prosthesis and available options. An open channel of communication 
between prosthetist and prosthesis user can enable the discussion of changing 
needs, desires and goals, as well as the changing nature of what persons may 
consider is just normal for them. 
Summary 
The theory of just normal provides a range of fresh and important insights into 
areas associated with prosthesis use. As a concept, just normal foregrounds the 
importance of considering how users of artificial limbs are motivated to live in ways 
they perceive are in fact just normal, and how this can account for a range of 
behaviours. The theory also provides novel insights into a range of contexts within 
prosthesis use, including accounting for the variable usage of a prosthesis, 
managing difficulties in the use of a limb, and how some display or conceal their 
limb difference in different situations. The theory also provides implications for the 
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way consultations can be framed and how the match between person and 
technology might be ascertained and monitored. 
As far as I am aware, just normal is the first theory of prosthesis use, and so 
provides a useful base to bring together much of the extant literature, extending 
many of the concepts that have been presented in the field. In each instance, the 
theory prompts new ways of thinking about the actions described. Collectively, the 
areas discussed within this chapter illustrate the utility of the theory and its 
breadth of applicability, and in doing so the significance of the theoretical product 
is foregrounded. In the following chapter, the theory is evaluated according to 
methodological criteria, and this helps to further draw out the significance of the 
theory. This chapter culminates in a discussion of the strengths and limitations of 
the overall project, and provides a number of useful avenues for further study, as 
indicated by the theory.  
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Chapter 10: Judging a Theory of ‘Just Normal’ 
In the previous chapter, the significance of just normal was explored through 
examining the theoretical product in a number of contexts related to prosthesis 
use. The new insights offered to these areas partly establishes the worth of the 
theory. This chapter continues this pursuit, but through assessment of the theory 
according to a number of evaluative criteria. These criteria are those accompanying 
the methodology of Grounded Theory itself – of ‘workability’, ‘relevance’, ‘fit’ and 
‘modifiability’. 
As the theory is judged according to these criteria, this leads to discussions of the 
strengths and limitations of the work conducted thus far. These are summarised 
towards the end of the chapter, where avenues for further scholarly inquiry and 
recommendations for practice are also given. 
Evaluation of the Theory of Just Normal 
Every Grounded Theory study should undergo evaluation according to the criteria 
of the methodology. This ensures that the theoretical product is credible through 
remaining faithful to the methodology, and as a means of demonstrating how it can 
be of value to both researchers and those in the researched area. In chapter three, 
an argument was made for the decision to employ Grounded Theory evaluative 
criteria rather than more generic qualitative research criteria. These criteria of the 
methodology are now explored individually. 
The ‘Workability’ of the Theory of Just Normal 
Workability means do the concepts and the way they are related 
into hypotheses sufficiently account for how the main concern of 
participants in a substantive area is continually resolved? (Glaser, 
1998, p. 18) 
An important measure of a good grounded theory is how well it reflects the way or 
ways a main concern in a substantive area is acted upon. This ‘workability’ element 
then, means doing a satisfactory job of conceptualising the potentially varied 
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patterns of action that resolve the concern. Through the processes of constant 
comparison, open coding, and theoretical memoing, I identified just normal as a 
main concern of prosthesis users, and selective coding, theoretical sampling, and 
further memoing helped to refine the categories of preserving, redressing and 
persevering that reflect the modes of managing this concern. These were the ways 
that I determined the concern is resolved, and when theoretical sampling yielded 
no apparent further variation in the resolving, and so no other distinct modes of 
resolving the concern were salient, this to me was an indication of a step toward 
the sufficiency Glaser (1998) speaks of. 
In addition, the modes of preserving, redressing, and persevering have significant 
breadth. That is, they are each accounted for through multiple constituent 
concepts, such as obligated persistence, trusting to transience, and mole-hilling that 
account for persevering, and these give an indication of the scope of these three 
sub-core categories. When considered as a whole, the theory of just normal does a 
considerable job of detailing the variety of ways in which prosthesis users strive to 
be just normal. In this way, the theory enables an extensive understanding of how 
persons are concerned about being just normal and how they act on this, and so 
part of the workability of the theory is established. 
Adding to this, the particular ways in which just normal manifested were reflected 
across the varied accounts of prosthesis users given in chapters five to eight. These 
illustrate a diversity of contexts that indicate the particular ways in which 
individuals are concerned about being just normal and do something about this, in 
different ways and in different situations. For instance, how lower-limb prosthesis 
user Alison sought to remind herself how things could be much worse, which then 
encouraged her to consider that her own circumstances were ‘actually ok’ (mole-
hilling), or how lower-limb prosthesis user Julie began to avoid dating, keeping 
herself from further hurtful experiences (protective avoidance). In chapter nine, the 
categories from which these actions were conceptualised were seen again when 
just normal was offered as a means of interpreting a number of situations identified 
by the research literature, such as how a prosthesis might be used (e.g., to 
protectively avoid others discovering their limb difference and so perceiving them 
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differently) or when issues with the use of a prosthesis warrant change or when 
they are persisted with (persons seek redress or they persevere relevant to how the 
issue and options for response fit with their conception of being just normal). These 
interpretations indicate the explanatory power of just normal, further establishing 
the workability of the theory and also contributing towards the second criterion of 
‘relevance’. 
The ‘Relevance’ of the Theory of Just Normal 
[Relevance] deals with the main concerns of the participants 
involved. To study something that interests no one really or just a 
few academics or funders is probably to focus on non-relevance or 
even trivia for the participants. Relevance, like good concepts, evoke 
instant grab. (Glaser, 1998, p. 18) 
Grounded theory puts into relief… what people think they know 
already, virtually as they hear it. But they only know it casually as 
incidents, mostly with no methodological, conceptual pickup. This 
conceptual pickup is a natural, but waiting to happen for these 
people. … The fact that people recognise bits and pieces of 
grounded theory methodology shows its naturalness and legitimises 
it through sensitive recognition. “Sounds right,” I often hear. (Glaser, 
1998, p. 62) 
Building on workability, a good grounded theory must also be relevant. This is 
arguably the most crucial criterion in a Grounded Theory study, and means that 
concepts must relate to actions within a substantive area that manage a concern, 
therefore making them relevant to the individuals perpetuating them, and thus 
others who are also interested in this group (i.e., researchers or other relevant 
professionals). To this end, participants considering the theory should be able to 
relate to the work as it reflects the important actions they are engaged in. This is 
where the ‘grab’ of a theory comes from, and Glaser (1998) suggested this would 
then prompt participants to enthusiastically offer their own examples of stated 
processes as they identify with categories within the theory. Relevance, then, 
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entails the concepts of just normal having some resonance with prosthesis users, 
although there may be aspects that are not always immediately recognisable: 
GT is generated from much data, of which many participants may be 
empirically unaware. GT is applicable to the participants as an 
explanation of the preponderance of their ongoing behaviour which 
is how they are resolving their main concern, which they may not be 
aware of conceptually, if at all. It is just what they do! GT is not their 
voice: it is a generated abstraction from their doings and their 
meanings that are taken as data for the conceptual generation. 
(Glaser, 2002a, p. 5) 
So just normal, or parts of just normal, may not have immediate resonance with an 
individual partly because of the mundanity of these actions that they might not 
have given a second thought to. For instance, persons may not recognise that they 
are vigilantly risk-reducing because they just do this as is needed without 
necessarily deliberating over this or consciously reflecting on the act. ‘Grab’ may 
also be hampered as a result of the conceptualising process, where how it is for 
one person is but one variation within a concept. Thus, lower-limb prosthesis user 
Pat may not immediately make the connection between vigilant risk-reducing and 
his being careful about terrain he walks on and how he is walking on these surfaces 
because of the difference between a more descriptive ‘care when walking’ and a 
more inclusive but abstract vigilant risk-reducing. This can be somewhat addressed 
in the naming of concepts, ensuring they bear a strong resemblance to the data in 
an evocative way, and in this way they can be more easily received by individuals: 
The concepts themselves have grab for the participants. It gives 
them a conceptual handle which summarises many apparently 
disparate incidents which up that point were just descriptions. It 
does not offend them by telling them what they know. It empowers 
them to see the patterns involved with names for referring to them. 
(Glaser, 1998, p. 55) 
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Accordingly then, the intention was that the naming of a concept such as vigilant 
risk-reducing would enable an individual such as Pat to recognise actions such as his 
particular attentiveness and concentration when walking on even surfaces as 
vigilance in order to reduce risk, and so he may then also perceive other situations 
where he may have similarly vigilantly reduced risk. This would then be the 
summarising intention of the concept, as individuals can then begin to see vigilantly 
risk-reducing in other walks of life, which previously may have been thought of as 
unconnected, but through this connection persons can understand their relation to 
being just normal. 
The naming of parts of the theory of just normal, then, was an important task to 
attend to, where relevance was sought through resonance, and this was something 
I believe is imbued in the naming of each of the patterns within the theory. The 
naming of just normal itself was discussed in chapter five, with further discussion at 
the beginning of the previous chapter. From these discussion and the illustrative 
accounts across the analysis chapters it should be clear that ‘normal’ was partly 
chosen because of the strong desire many expressed about being or being able to 
be ‘like everyone else’. This was something Murray (2005, 2009) also found was a 
prominent feature in prosthesis users’ desires when living with a prosthesis. In the 
present study, many expressed a desire for a prosthesis to help them to look 
normal or to do normal things. This was what a prosthesis ‘ought’ to be able to do, 
or how persons felt they ‘ought’ to be, or be capable of, and which was just like 
anyone else should be afforded. This was how normal was connected to ‘just’. Yet 
just normal was also named to account for individuals who sought to be normal in 
ways more about how they generally were, such as persons who lost limbs that 
sought to ‘get back to normal’ through a prosthesis (Dise-Lewis, 1989; Ostler et al., 
2014), or persons who had limbs go wrong or sought to avoid situations where they 
might go wrong in order to keep or return to this familiar normalcy of functioning. 
For these individuals, normal was less about being like others and more about 
keeping like themselves. In this way, just normal is intended to be identifiable by 
persons in a range of ways, maximising its relevance, and so similarly to Pat 
potentially identifying with vigilant risk-reducing and so potentially also relating to 
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the underlying motivation behind this (to stay just normal), identifying with just 
normal means that individuals are then prompted to give consideration to this 
concept and so track the constituent concepts as they see how just normal can play 
out. 
Relating to a resonant concept in this way means that individuals should also be 
able to perceive other possibilities – they can relate to patterns that vary and see 
how these vary for them in particular contexts, and so through understanding the 
variability of a pattern, what alternatives may exist. This is the conceptual 
empowerment that a relevant theory affords, which Glaser elaborated: 
The analyst gives the knowledgeable person categories, which grab 
many indicators under one idea and denotes the underlying pattern. 
One idea can then handle much diversity in incidents. Once ideas 
can be seen as conceptual elements that vary under diverse 
conditions, action options are provided the man in the know. 
(Glaser, 1978, p. 13) 
A relevant grounded theory then, should also extend beyond recognition of a 
person’s own actions to enabling individuals to see their particular variation as one 
of a number, and so enhance awareness of possibilities. The theory of just normal 
does this by presenting a range of patterns in resolving a concern of being just 
normal. The way some individuals keep using prostheses in particular ways despite 
particular difficulties, whereas others do not, or the way in which persons stay with 
a particular prosthetist, while others do not, or variously shy away from particular 
activities or social situations while others embrace them, or embrace them in 
different ways, all indicate the different possibilities for action for an individual 
locating themselves within the theory and then recognising alternatives. Agency is 
afforded to the individual who was previously unaware of particular actions, such 
as hearing of successful redressing through re-coursing by intensifying one’s 
petitions to gain a better prosthesis, or through other means. Or, they may learn of 
particular strategies through considering mole-hilling that enable them to live with 
difficulties that bit easier. Furthermore, a fundamental quality about just normal is 
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that persons judge the just normalness of something with regard to what they 
know about its variability, and so becoming more aware of different options 
therefore has implications for an appraisal of one’s own situation. This was 
discussed in chapter nine, and for example, could be the difference between an 
individual struggling with a prosthesis that they require to do particular things, but 
then being able to do something about this if they were to hear of others seeking 
to address similar difficulties and so considering this a just normal path of action 
instead. This is not to suggest that prosthesis users act in particular ways because 
they are variously ‘informed’ or ‘uninformed’ but rather that persons do what they 
can with the information available to them. In this way just normal is a sympathetic 
theory but is also the basis for action through learning more about alternatives. 
Discovering ‘action options’ is also particularly relevant given studies such as that of 
Murray and Forshaw (2013) who found that individuals were vocal about their lack 
of information and direction post-amputation and when living with a prosthesis. 
Prosthesis users in this study and in others (e.g., Murray, 2013; Ostler et al., 2014) 
indicated their uncertainty about particular actions or their experiences, suggesting 
that they were often unaware of what was ‘normal’, or as one individual put it, 
they were ‘flying blind’ and did not know enough to know what they ought to keep 
going with or what they should try to change. Studies stressing the importance of 
‘peer visitors’ and support groups also indicate the importance of learning more 
about how things are or could be (Liu et al., 2010). A theory of just normal meets 
these demands, and thus prosthesis users, both new and experienced, may benefit 
from learning about the theory of just normal as it can prompt a deeper 
consideration of their own actions as well as inform them of the possibilities 
available to them, both of which may lead to beneficial change and for persons to 
become more confident in the just normalness of their prosthetic decision-making. 
A further feature of a relevant grounded theory involves extending the appeal of a 
theory beyond those directly involved in the substantive area (e.g., see Glaser, 
2004; Gynnild, 2014). Accordingly then, just normal is intended to also appeal to 
researchers and other relevant professionals. This is partly achieved by being 
relevant to prosthesis users, but there are also other ways the theory may appeal 
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to others. For instance, in chapter nine, just normal was put forward as a means of 
interpreting a range of situations identified in the literature concerning prosthesis 
use. Discussion of these indicated how just normal offers novel insights into areas 
that have already received some attention, such as how to manage the prescription 
of a new prosthesis and to consider how an appropriate match between person 
and technology may change over time, or how redressing has implications for 
conceptions of how persons self-monitor and self-regulate. Just normal is argued to 
provide new understandings by extending extant research and providing new 
interpretations of findings or processes. Furthermore, the theory and the 
constituent concepts of the theory do not have a forced or loose fit with the 
literature as it discusses prosthesis use, and so when studies describe activities of 
prosthesis users such as ‘maintaining leisure time activities’ after the loss of a limb, 
or ‘preventing further damage’, or engaging ‘downward comparisons’ (e.g., Dunne 
et al., 2014; Oaksford et al., 2005), it is clear to see how these fit and can be 
informed by the theory of just normal – how they may map on to concepts within 
the theory and so how a concern of being just normal may provide an underlying 
motive for these actions. The theory may therefore be attractive to researchers in a 
variety of ways. 
Finally, the theory of just normal may also have relevance for researchers beyond 
the field of prosthesis use, and perhaps also to a wider public, through considering 
the concepts as they are presented and without reference to prosthesis use. This is 
a discussion better situated in the final criterion concerning the ‘modifiability’ of 
the theory. However, before this, the ‘fit’ of just normal is discussed. 
The ‘Fit’ of the Theory of Just Normal 
Data should not be forced or selected to fit pre-conceived or pre-
existent categories or discarded in favor of keeping an extant theory 
intact. Our position is that the reality produced in research is more 
accurate than the theory whose categories do not fit, not the 
reverse. (Glaser, 1978, p. 4) 
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Fundamentally, the ‘fit’ of theoretical categories is how well they reflect what is 
going on in the worlds in which people live. This is helped by careful and competent 
application of methodological processes that foster the conceptualising of patterns 
in the data, but it is important to clarify that this occurs on an ongoing basis, such 
that conceptualising continues to occur where comparisons to further incidents 
and categories indicate a better way of framing what is perceived to be going on. 
Memoing, selective coding and theoretical sampling are involved in this 
comparative analysis and each help in the ongoing process of ‘fitting’ and ‘re-
fitting’ concepts to data. 
How well the categories of just normal fit the data is difficult to convey, and to 
some degree the final judgement upon this is left to the reader to compare to their 
own experience of prosthesis use. However, in chapter four it was my intention to 
try to indicate how I went about the processes of the methodology in order to 
express how a good fit might be reached through extended critical discussion of the 
analytical processes. Yet an understanding does not necessarily equate to good 
application and so this is part of the reason for also including the appendices that 
illustrate some of the coding and memoing involved in this work, and importantly, 
that convey the development of some of the categories within the theory which 
underwent significant alterations when striving for a good fit. To include all my 
workings would be to provide this thesis several times over, as the ‘writing up’ of 
the final product was not so much a pulling together of ‘findings’ but a re-drafting 
of many mature memos, which themselves were re-drafts many preceding drafts, 
each refining and re-thinking the match of the work to the data. I would argue that 
the core process of Grounded Theory is constant comparison and the reflections on 
this process when writing about the comparisons at a conceptual level. These 
writings are continually sharpened as comparing goes on. Thus the work in the 
appendices may be considered one moment within analyses of working towards a 
good fit between my writing and the data, before which the fit was less good and 
after which the fit improved some more. By including this, I hope to give a sense of 
the methodology in action towards the final theory and a sense of how fitting and 
229 
 
refitting were constant companions throughout the development of the theory of 
just normal. 
Within the naming of the categories within just normal I also aimed to convey a 
sense of the acts happening, such as in obligated persistence, where persons 
sometimes expressed a sense of trapped-ness or that they were helpless to do 
anything but keep going with a particular thing because they considered it just 
normal. Or how in righting what’s wrong, where there were often strong 
‘righteous’ responses to transgressions or violations of how things ought to be, and 
persons appeared crusader-like against perceived injustices. Or, in mole-hilling, 
which was conceived to express the opposite of persons making mountains out of 
mole-hills and thus how these acts appeared to have an attenuating or pacifying 
quality for the individual. It was my intention to provide names for patterns that 
captured the essence of the action they represented and therefore give an 
evocative sense of just normal occurring in various ways5. To further illustrate by 
contrast, consider the theoretical product developed by Oaksford et al. (2005), 
which was proposed as a grounded theory of coping following amputation. This 
model includes concepts such as ‘coping’ and subcategories of ‘support seeking’, 
‘humour’, and ‘cognitive appraisal’ (p. 271). While no issue is taken with the 
assertion that these concepts come from the application of the methodology, there 
is not much sense of a life being lived through any of these concepts. They lack the 
‘imageric meaning’ that Glaser (2002a) recommends, possess little grab and it is 
hard to believe that they have any immediate resonance with the individuals 
involved in their study. Instead, when giving names to patterns, if emphasis is given 
to trying to capture some of the lived action, concepts become more compelling on 
sight as well in their elaborations. 
Throughout analyses, I did my best to work towards a good fit and continued to 
sharpen the fit of the categories through selective coding and theoretical sampling 
for further variation in the patterns of just normal. When it appeared that no more 
variation was being turned up by theoretical sampling, I reflected on the work as it 
                                                     
5
 This is like the reverse of Green’s (2003) ‘poetical dictionary’, where Green took everyday words 
and elaborated them in compelling exposition that captured something of the experience of the 
words (p. xx). 
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stood and felt that the theory and the constituent concepts worked well in 
expressing the variation in the data and how they worked with each other, and also 
that they had strong ‘grab’ and ‘resonance’ about them. At this point, I felt that a 
good fit had been achieved, and that just normal was also strong in its workability 
and in its relevance (these three criterion, to an extent, having implications for each 
other). However, there is a fourth and final criterion to consider in an evaluation of 
the theory. 
The ‘Modifiability’ of the Theory of Just Normal 
The theory is not being verified as in verification studies, and thus 
never right or wrong. …it just gets modified by new data to compare 
it to. A conjectured theory tends to pre-empt the data by one saying 
the theory is correct and we should ignore the “bad” data which 
does not support it. Many grand theorists are given to this “poor 
data” pattern. New data never provides a disproof just an analytic 
challenge. (Glaser, 1998, pp. 18–19). 
In his later writings (e.g., Glaser, 1998, 2003) Glaser was particularly cautious about 
the claims that could be made for a grounded theory. He asserted that the 
methodology was all about the development of meaningful and valuable theory in 
a substantive area, but that additional work would be required to test or to 
‘validate’ a theory. Rather than ‘findings’, the result of a Grounded Theory is a set 
of interrelated conceptual hypotheses – a theory. So while careful adherence to the 
procedures of the methodology would ensure a theory grounded in the data, the 
actual verificational ‘proving’ of these hypotheses, i.e., confirming the ‘empirical 
accuracy’ of just normal or the features of just normal in the area of prosthesis use, 
is a direction for further research: ‘That is all, the yield … is just hypotheses!’ 
(Glaser, 1992, p. 16). 
This statement about the yield of the methodology speaks to those such as Dey 
(1999) who have suggested that what is written about Grounded Theory indicates 
that the methodology generates theory and also verifies it. It is true that Glaser and 
Strauss’s (1967) original text does contain some ambiguous writing that is 
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indicative of the verification of a theory, and also true that Strauss did go on to 
develop his branch of Grounded Theory that emphasises verification/validation 
(see Charmaz, 2000; Walker & Myrick, 2006). However, this is something that 
Glaser has clearly addressed in many of his works since (e.g., Glaser, 1978, 1992) 
and made clear that this is not a part of a Grounded Theory study, though it is fine 
to do so afterward. Thus one immediate avenue for further inquiry is identified – 
the testing of the hypotheses of just normal. 
It is possible to envisage testing these hypotheses, such as taking the patterns of 
black-spotting and assessing whether and to what extent prosthesis users might 
engage in protective avoidance, risk-reducing engaging, or fail-safing in order to 
preserve their ability to be just normal, and while going about the activities of their 
daily lives. Or in assessing what persons would be willing to live with in a prosthesis 
or prosthetist that prompt sufficing, how this may change over time and what may 
lead to these changes. 
Following statements about verification, it is also important to recognise that just 
normal is a theory of prosthesis use in that it reflects the data of prosthesis users 
that the theory is grounded in, and so caution must be exercised when considering 
the ‘generalisability’ of the theory to prosthesis users at large. This is not to say that 
the theory bears no significance with this wider group, as indeed, the relevance of 
just normal to prosthesis users has been argued and in chapter nine the links to the 
literature and work involving other prosthesis users discussed at length. 
Furthermore the breadth of data involved in this study – from the interviewed 
individuals across the world, the collected autobiographies, biographical accounts, 
and internet data that were sampled and theoretically sampled in pursuit of 
variation – give further indications of the broader relevance of just normal. Each of 
these champion the applicability of the theory to prosthesis users as a whole. 
However, it is ultimately up to further research (such as a large scale survey) to 
have the final say on this. 
So there is confidence to be had that just normal and its interrelated conceptual 
hypotheses apply to prosthesis users broadly. However, a grounded theory is never 
‘final’ in the sense that data could always emerge that could challenge the theory, 
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such as if surveying further prosthesis users and discovering patterns not in keeping 
with just normal as it is presently conceived. A theory should be able to withstand 
this and incorporate it as further variation on a pattern, and this is the key aspect of 
‘modifiability’. As astrophysicist Dave Goldberg (2014) put it, ‘theories are 
malleable, but not infinitely so. … Evolution has, itself, adapted a lot over the years, 
but not so much that it wouldn't still be recogniz[able].’ In this way, just normal can 
be adapted to further variation should this arise, and this can be managed through 
further conceptualisation and reconceptualization of the patterns. 
To explain further, the period during analyses could be seen as a time when the 
theory was ‘incomplete’, but this was knowingly incomplete because I was still 
searching for and identifying variation within just normal, and so expecting further 
variation to arise in further data. As stated earlier, when no more variation was 
apparent, I became confident that theoretical completeness was established. 
However, such completeness does not indicate finality and that the theory of just 
normal will never undergo further development. For example, further 
investigations could reveal a fourth course of black-spotting, or a pattern pertaining 
to black-spotting that prompts a re-formulating of the entire concept. Involving this 
new variation would add to the scope and density of the theory, and so it is 
important to recognise that the emergent fit of theoretical categories is therefore 
good as far as the data goes: 
Our strategy of comparative analysis for generating theory puts a 
high emphasis on theory as process; that is, theory as an ever-
developing entity, not as a perfected product… To be sure, theory as 
process can be presented in publications as a momentary product, 
but it is written with the assumption that it is still developing. Theory 
as process, we believe, renders quite well with the reality of social 
interaction and its structural context. (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 32) 
In a practical sense, modifiability means ensuring it is possible to re-engage 
conceptualising, comparing new data to existing categories and reformulating 
where appropriate. This is the ‘analytic challenge’ that Glaser (1998) referred to, 
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prepared for by ensuring a theory is not tied to the data it has been developed 
from. Being ‘readily modifiable’ then, can be received as ensuring a good degree of 
conceptuality/abstractness in a category compared to something more descriptive 
or locked to a particular context, e.g., obligated persistence that can cater for a 
variety of things that persons are compelled to persist with, as opposed to 
‘persisting with prosthesis use and activities’, which is less accommodating should 
something else that persons are required to persist with become salient. 
This discussion of modifiability draws out some of the limitations of the study and 
in developing theory in general, but nonetheless should be balanced with recalling 
the strengths of the theory as outlined in the former part of this chapter and in 
chapter nine. Additionally, the idea of modifiability and the modification of a theory 
may stimulate further advances in broader scholarly inquiry. For instance, at the 
end of the discussion of the relevance of the theory, just normal was also suggested 
to have potential appeal to researchers and lay persons external to the area of 
prosthesis use. This can occur when theoretical categories can gain more 
widespread appeal than just in their original substantive area, whereby others can 
envisage their application elsewhere. A theory of just normal, while currently 
grounded in accounts of prosthesis use, has that quality about it. For example, 
when developing the category of persevering, I began to see examples of 
persevering occurring in all manner of contexts. Colleagues would complain of 
unreasonable workload burdens because they ‘just had to get through it’, or that it 
would ‘be over soon’, and that ‘the end was in sight’. This appeared to keep the 
unreasonable reasonable as I considered them to be trusting to transience. 
Similarly, when I was later reading for stylistic ideas and read in David Karp’s (2001) 
The Burden of Sympathy, that despite the degree of difficulties in caring for a family 
member with mental illness, even when persons felt unable to keep going, they 
also felt unable to stop because it was not right to do otherwise - they seemed 
obligated to persist with their caring. 
Moreover, we are each arguably committed to living in ways that we perceive are 
just normal, acting through this and on this when there are problems. Niebuhr’s 
well-known serenity prayer, occurring in various forms, goes as far as calling for 
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divine support to this end: ‘Give me grace to accept with serenity/ the things that 
cannot be changed, /Courage to change the things/ which should be changed,/ and 
the Wisdom to distinguish /the one from the other.’ This opening verse about living 
day-to-day is strongly suggestive of persevering and redressing according to a way 
that things ‘should’ be, and that there is ‘wisdom’ in making this apparently just 
normal judgement. It becomes difficult not to see just normal as an account of 
behaviour in general and so possible to envisage the concepts of the theory having 
utility well beyond the area of prosthesis use. Glaser (2011b) pre-empted this by 
stating that researchers developing readily modifiable concepts would start to see 
them occurring everywhere, that it would lead to a ‘core category fever’, and that 
this could be taken as a sign of readiness for Formal Grounded Theory (see Glaser, 
2007b, 2010; Glaser & Strauss, 1967): 
Grounded theory is based on a third level conceptual perspective 
analysis. The first level is the data. The second level perspective is 
the conceptualisation of the data into categories and their 
properties. There are sub-levels exist within this level. The third level 
is the overall integration through sorting in a theory. A fourth level 
perspective is the formalisation of a substantive theory to a more 
general conceptual level by constantly comparing substantive theory 
articles, as I did in my reader: “Organisational Careers”. Thus 
credentialising of nurses can be generalised to credentialising of 
professionals or even of all occupations. These are the basic levels. 
But, of course, the level of perspective can get higher and broader, 
as it gets more general. One can also conceptualise concepts. And 
there is always a perspective on a perspective, as all is data. (Glaser, 
1998, p. 136) 
So just normal is ready to be further abstracted from the area of prosthesis use, 
though doing so was beyond the scope and objectives of the present study. 
However, the potential application of just normal to areas beyond prosthesis use 
does appeal to further investigation. One step towards formal theory yet close to 
prosthesis use is to consider the theory of just normal with regards to those using 
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other forms of assistive technology (e.g., wheelchair users, hearing aids, forms of 
prostheses other than limb prostheses), or those with different forms of physical 
difference (e.g., paralysis, disfigurement). The extent or ways in which persons are 
concerned about being just normal in these areas would be interesting in itself but 
also for potentially drawing out differences between these areas and prosthesis use 
via constant comparison. As Glaser indicates, an understanding of potential 
differences and what may account for their variation can lead to further 
conceptualisations, and so toward broader theories, such as theories of assistive 
technology use, or of physical difference. 
This concludes an assessment of just normal, though it is now useful to summarise 
the strengths and limitations of this study, and to draw together the implications 
for practice and avenues for future research. 
The Strengths and Limitations of the Study 
The key strength of this project is the development of novel and relevant theory in 
the area of prosthesis use. This is the first theory to be produced specifically about 
the use of prostheses and contributes a deeper understanding of the use of 
artificial limbs. 
A core concern of prosthesis users has been identified, against which the modes of 
resolving this concern have been presented. This concern enables an understanding 
of an important preoccupation of prosthesis users, and the resolving theory 
accounts for a broad range of action within the area. The theory is argued to 
resonate with prosthesis users as they identify with the categories of the theory 
and perceive how their own variation is captured within it. In doing so, individuals 
are also afforded ‘action options’, or recognition of other possibilities which may 
have implications for an appraisal of their own situation. Furthermore, discovering 
more about the patterns of prosthesis use addresses a critical information need 
that has been identified in the literature. 
The theory is also of importance to researchers who are interested in learning more 
about prosthesis use, through understanding this main concern and the varied 
ways it is resolved. The theory also provides further insights into existing research 
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in the area, such as potential explanations for the extent to which a prosthesis is 
used, gained through a richer understanding of the purpose it serves. The theory 
can also provide an enhanced understanding of the goal structure that may 
motivate prosthesis users in rehabilitation, and has implications for considering 
how persons regulate themselves. 
Through development of theory, considerations are prompted for the prescription 
of a prosthesis and the need to consider an individual’s patterns of usage and how 
these may be judged by both the user and relevant professionals. Suggestions for 
the development of best practice in consultations and the direction of prosthetic 
technology development are also given. Directions for further inquiry are also 
foregrounded and these are summarised in the section below. 
There are also some limitations to this study that must be considered. In particular, 
developing theory through analyses of data from a limited number of prosthesis 
users means that ultimately the applicability of the theory to prosthesis users in 
general remains to be verified. This is a caveat found in many forms of qualitative 
inquiry that use relatively small sample sizes, but the diversity of individuals 
involved in this study encourages that the theory is relevant to prosthesis users in 
general. A further verification study exploring the hypotheses of the study in a 
broader sample of prosthesis users could address questions of generalizability. 
The limits of the methodology also invariably dictate how a theory will develop. For 
example, it could be speculated that sampling from prosthesis users who happened 
to be (or, in terms of the internet data, who appeared to happen to be) from 
Western societies and so where assistive technology is relatively accessible, led to 
the emerging concern of just normal, whereas those in areas where prostheses are 
harder to come by may have different main concerns. At the least, just normal may 
be of lesser relevance in these contexts, and this would be an interesting avenue 
for further study where more data can only help elaborate the theory and 
contribute to a developing understanding of global prosthesis use. 
Furthermore, prosthesis users were sampled and theoretically sampled, as were 
autobiographies and internet data, but in each case these were people who 
237 
 
appeared to have something they wanted to say. Such sampling overlooks the 
individuals who specifically do not put themselves forward in such ways. For 
individuals experiencing depression or anxiety as the result of the loss of a limb, 
and so who may be more withdrawn and less willing to engage with research, just 
normal may also be less relevant. Further sampling from a clinical population 
therefore presents a possibility for additional exploration to see whether these 
individuals are similarly concerned about being just normal. However, it is difficult 
to envisage how those who do not wish to talk could (or ought to) be encouraged 
to do so. 
Finally, just normal is a readily transferrable concept and theory, prepared for 
exploration in other areas and to be potentially expanded through further data that 
indicate variation beyond which was identified in the present study. Just normal 
appeals to the development of formal theory, and more locally there are 
indications that the theory may provide useful interpretations of those living with 
other physical differences or using other assistive technologies. 
Summary of Implications for Practice and Directions for Further Inquiry 
Following the development of the theory of just normal, a number of 
recommendations for practice can also be made. Potentially the most salient of 
these is to add to the suggestions of others in recommending an individualised 
approach to prosthetic consultations, where persons can be encouraged and feel 
able to express their particular needs and desires in their prosthesis use. Doing so 
enables the professional to understand and be able to assess how a prosthesis can 
support individuals in doing what they consider is important and in ways that the 
individual considers reasonable. 
Professionals must be able to gain a holistic picture of the individual in order to 
understand how a prosthesis can support an individual to be just normal. This 
involves learning about the specific functions a person may perceive a prosthesis is 
required to serve (e.g., wanting to run again, wanting to feed oneself with two 
hands) as well as how these may fit with more abstract or broader functions (e.g., 
remaining independent, being able to socialise). Going beyond the specific enables 
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professionals to evaluate how a person is getting on with these particular goals and 
if troubled, whether there may be alternatives befitting broader goals. Thus it is 
encouraged that professionals try to understand what persons may consider 
sufficient in prosthetic provision. Provided that individuals are knowledgeable 
about various prosthetic options and have an awareness of the potential that 
prostheses can enable, it is important that professionals work towards what 
individuals may consider is reasonable or ‘good enough’. This is not to encourage 
outcomes of consultations that are merely tolerable or passable, but more that 
professionals consider that persons may not wish to ‘optimise’ themselves, to 
reach a ‘maximum’ potential, or to have the ‘best’ they can in a prosthesis (though 
some may do). Instead, a prosthesis that enables a person to be just normal, as the 
person conceives it, may constitute a useful individualised model for rehabilitation 
and ongoing prosthesis use. 
In consultations, just normal foregrounds that what persons consider right and 
reasonable in a prosthesis and in consultations themselves may be subject to 
change based on a developing knowledge of both. Thus it is recommended that 
individuals be afforded information early on to an extent that decisions can be 
made about gaining particular prostheses or managing targets for prosthesis use in 
order for the persons to be more comfortable with these and to encourage that 
they are lasting. Furthermore, understanding that a good match between person 
and prosthesis is only as lasting as it continues to be seen as appropriate means 
that it is important to maintain an open dialogue between professional and client, 
where individuals are able to discuss possibilities for change when this appears 
warranted. 
When considering the theory of just normal and the constituent theoretical 
categories, each inspire interesting opportunities for further research. For instance, 
the exploration of the hypotheses of the theory in a broader sample of prosthesis 
users may be informative, such as exploring what in particular may be most likely 
to prompt individuals to suffice with a particular prosthesis and what could 
persuade them to try different forms of limbs. Or, it may be of interest to discover 
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more about the forms of black-spots that prosthesis users identify, and the 
particular strategies they invoke to work around these. 
The extent to which persons are willing to put up with particular limitations in a 
prosthesis would also be a further area of interest for future research. For instance, 
persons may trust to transience with issues that they deem are of a just normal 
nature, but how long this trust lasts before persons consider ‘enough is enough’ 
and they seek to redress the situation is something that would be important to 
explore, particularly if this impacts an individual’s perseverance with a prosthesis. 
Researchers (e.g., Coffey, O’Keeffe, Gallagher, Desmond, & Lombard-Vance, 2012; 
Sjöberg et al., 2014) have called for an increase in longitudinal studies in the area of 
limb loss because of the potential for change in psychosocial outcomes over time, 
and similarly here such study designs may provide insight into how individuals may 
engage in processes of perseverance and redressing differently over time, and what 
may contribute to this. 
The non-use and abandonment of prostheses is an area for further research that 
could also be an insightful next step. The theory of just normal was developed to 
discover more about prosthesis use, given the sizeable number of persons using 
artificial limbs, but the literature has also identified a sizeable incidence of persons 
that stop using a prosthesis altogether, as well as those that never begin using one, 
and so non-use presents an additional interesting area to explore. The literature 
has also struggled to account for non-use, yet the theory of just normal could 
provide potential leads. While the theory was not developed from data from 
persons that could be considered ‘non-users’, it did involve individuals who had 
variously given up on prostheses before trying others, given up on them for a time, 
or persons who came to prostheses at later stages. Persons did so because of the fit 
with the use of the prosthesis and what they considered was involved in being just 
normal. An extension of this logic therefore presents a potentially useful means to 
explore non-use. 
Finally, just normal is a concept that was developed over the course of this study 
that may inspire further work in itself. While the theory of just normal is presented 
as a contribution to the area of prosthesis use, and potentially to fields beyond, the 
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concept of just normal is also submitted to help stimulate further thought on the 
notion that people desire to live in ways that are generally right, reasonable, fair 
and good enough. Furthermore, throughout this thesis, ‘the’ theory of just normal 
is referred to, but perhaps it would be more fitting to refer to it as ‘a’ theory of just 
normal, in the same way that there are multiple theories of coping or identity 
development, each sharing these central concepts but being distinct in other ways. 
This may not be the only theory of just normal and further inquiry beginning with 
this idea or similarly conceptualising it through emergent analyses of data may 
develop theory that is distinct from what has been presented here. 
Concluding Remarks 
This research presents the first theory of prosthesis use. It was developed using 
Grounded Theory methodology in order to better understand the substantial 
number of individuals using artificial limbs across the globe, and it does so through 
clarifying a prevailing concern of this group and delineating the varied ways that 
this concern is resolved. In the theory, persons are said to be concerned about 
being just normal, such as living in ways they consider are generally ‘about right’, 
fair, reasonable, and good enough. An in-depth conceptual account of the resolving 
of this concern was given through the three distinct modes of the theory: That 
individuals preserve their ability to be just normal when this is perceived to be 
threatened, they redress to just normal when this is judged to be lacking, and they 
persevere with living just normally, keeping going with this despite difficulties. The 
theory was discussed at length and each of these modes of resolution were 
accounted for through a number of constituent concepts, foregrounding the 
richness and explanatory power of the theory through the variety of processes 
described. 
The theory enables a new way of considering how persons using prostheses live 
and perceive the need to live and draws out what may not be readily perceptible, 
being useful to both prosthesis users and professionals alike. It also offers an 
interpretation of a breadth of contexts in the area, such as accounting for how and 
why a prosthesis may be used, and has implications for other existing research and 
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for informing evidence-based practice through considering how to develop the 
consultation process and when matching person to technology. Finally, the theory 
of just normal indicates a variety of interesting avenues for further research in the 
field of prosthesis use, in broader topics of assistive technology use and disability, 
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I am a researcher at Dublin City University conducting a study in prosthesis use. 
The aim of the study is to discover how individuals that use artificial limbs make the 
most of their prostheses. I believe that understanding those that are getting the 
most out of their prostheses can enhance the rehabilitation process for others that 
are adjusting to their own prosthesis and potentially aid the design of new 
prostheses. To this end, I wish to talk to a number of individuals about any 
successes or obstacles in their lives that they have encountered since obtaining 
their prosthesis. I also hope that this project allows those that take part to have their 
say on a range of topics, whether about their prosthesis or other related issues they 
believe are important. 
I would like to invite you to take part in the research. This will simply involve a short 
interview/phone call interview lasting less than one hour where I would like to 
engage you in an informal discussion about the things most important to you in 
relation to your prosthesis. In particular, I would like to ask you a number of open-
ended questions about the good and bad aspects of using your prosthesis, your 
lifestyle and how this is affected by the use of a prosthesis, and your main concerns 
with using your artificial limb. Any information you provide will be treated with the 
utmost confidentiality. 
If you are interested in participating, I would be grateful if you could read the brief 
information sheet overleaf and complete the consent form. Please get in touch if 
you have any questions about the project. 
I look forward to hearing from you soon. Thank you for your time, 
 
Phil Jefferies 
PhD Researcher, School of Nursing & Human Sciences, Faculty of Science & Health, Dublin 
City University, Ireland 
Phone – 00353 (01) 7007582 
Email – Philip.jefferies@dcu.ie 
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Appendix B – Study Information and Consent Form 
 
 
‘Aspects of prostheses and their relation to individuals and society’ 
 
Plain Language Statement 
 
Investigators 
Mr. Phil Jefferies, School of Nursing, Dublin City University 
Dr. Pamela Gallagher, School of Nursing, Dublin City University 
Prof. Malcolm MacLachlan, School of Psychology, Trinity College Dublin 
Dr. Mark Philbin, School of Nursing, Dublin City University 
 
Introduction  
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide to take part or 
not, it is important that you understand why the study is being done and what it will 
involve. Please read the following information carefully and discuss it with others, if you 
wish. 
If you require further information, or would like to ask any questions, please contact Phil 
Jefferies (Tel: 00353-1-7007582 / E-mail: Philip.jefferies@dcu.ie). 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
The aim of this research is to investigate the psychosocial aspects of complex 
prosthetics. It will explore your experience of using your prosthesis, the benefits and 
challenges of using your prosthesis and what you think about your prosthesis. This 
information is important as it will provide insights on future areas to focus upon in 
rehabilitation. Having a better understanding of these issues will be helpful in managing 
issues that arise while deciding on the most appropriate prosthesis. Therefore, it will 
also help inform the process by which the prosthesis prescribed is matched to the 
person’s needs. This is an important endeavour in getting the best use from the 
prosthesis, in facilitating independent living and participation in society, and enhancing 
quality of life. 
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Why have I been invited? 
The study aims to investigate how people feel about their prosthetic limb. You have 
been asked to take part in this study as you have been prescribed a prosthesis. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
No, it is completely up to you whether you take part or not. If you decide to take 
part, you are free to withdraw from the study at any time without giving a reason. 
Your decision will not affect the standard of care you receive and you will not give 
up any benefits you had before entering the study. 
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
You are being asked to take part in a study about your thoughts about your 
prosthesis. The actual study will consist of an interview, lasting about an hour. The 
interview will consist of a series of simple questions probing your thoughts and 
feelings towards your prosthesis and lifestyle with the prosthesis. This interview will 
be audio-taped. No one will listen to these tapes except the members of the 
research team listed above. If you are willing to take part, you are asked to sign and 
return a consent form indicating that you agree to take part and for the interview to 
be tape-recorded. When we receive your consent form, we will contact you to 
arrange a convenient time to meet. 
What are the possible risks of taking part? 
We do not anticipate any risks that are greater than those encountered in everyday 
life. However, if at any stage during the interview, you feel uncomfortable or 
distressed at any stage, you can withdraw without any consequences. In addition, 
the research team will support you in accessing suitable support systems, if 
required. 
What information will be held about me? 
If you agree to take part, all information collected will be kept strictly confidential within 
the limitations of the law in Ireland. Interview transcripts with all identifying information 
removed (e.g. names) will be stored for 5 years in a locked cabinet in DCU. Only the 
researchers named above will be able to access this information. Tapes of the interview 
discussions will be destroyed when the study is finished. Any information that will 
identify you in any way will be removed. Despite this, it is important to note that if you 
are using a prosthesis which is new and only used by a small number of people, it 
might be possible to identify you. The researcher, Mr. Phil Jefferies, will be responsible 
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for the safety and security of the data. The procedures for handling, processing, 
storage and destruction of your data will be compliant with the Data Protection Act 
(1998). 
What will happen to the results of the study? 
The results of this study will form the basis for preparation of reports, academic 
publications, conference papers and other scientific publications. 
What will happen if I don’t want to carry on with the study? 
Your participation in this study is entirely voluntary. You are free to decline to take part 
of to withdraw from the study at any time without having to give an explanation. If you 
choose not to participate in the study, or to withdraw once entered, you will not be 
penalised. It will affect any care you receive and you will not give up any benefits you 
had before entering the study. Any participation you had in the study before your 
departure will be stricken from records and destroyed if you so wish. Participation in this 
study will in no way affect your legal rights. 
Who is organising and funding the research? 
The research is organised by a research team from the School of Nursing & Human 
Sciences, Dublin City University, Ireland. It is funded by the Irish Research Council for 
Humanities and Social Sciences. 
 
Complaints 
If you have any concerns about this study, please contact a member of the research 
team who will do their best to answer your questions: 
 
Mr. Philip Jefferies (principal investigator): e-mail Philip.jefferies@dcu.ie 
Dr. Pamela Gallagher (co-investigator): e-mail Pamela.gallagher@dcu.ie 
Prof. Malcolm MacLachlan (co-investigator): e-mail Malcolm.maclachlan@tcd.ie 
Dr. Mark Philbin (co-investigator): e-mail Mark.philbin@dcu.ie 
 
If you wish to discuss any concerns you may have with an independent source, please 
contact: 
The Secretary, Dublin City University Research Ethics Committee, c/o Office of the Vice-
President for Research, Dublin City University, Dublin 9, Ireland.  Tel 00353-1-7008000 
This research has been reviewed by the Dublin City University Ethics Committee. 
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You will be given a copy of the information sheet and a signed consent form to keep. 
Thank you for taking the time to read this sheet. 
If you have any queries regarding this study, please contact the researcher at the 
following: 
 
Name:   Philip Jefferies 
Address:   School of Nursing & Human Sciences, 
   Dublin City University 
   Glasnevin 
   Dublin 9 
   Ireland 
Phone:  00353 (01) 7007582 
E-mail:  Philip.jefferies@dcu.ie 
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DUBLIN CITY UNIVERSITY 
Informed Consent Form  
 
Title of Project: 
Aspects of prostheses and their relation to individuals and society  
 
Investigators 
Mr. Phil Jefferies, School of Nursing & Human Sciences, Dublin City University 
Dr. Pamela Gallagher, School of Nursing & Human Sciences, Dublin City University 
Prof. Malcolm MacLachlan, School of Psychology, Trinity College Dublin 
Dr. Mark Philbin, School of Nursing & Human Sciences, Dublin City University 
 
The aim of this research is to investigate the psychosocial aspects of complex 
prosthetics. It will explore your experience of using your prosthesis, the benefits 
and challenges of using your prosthesis and what you think about your prosthesis. 
This research is being funded by the Irish Research Council for Humanities and 
Social Sciences. 
 
You will be asked to take part in an interview which will take about one hour. This 
interview will be audio-taped.  
 
Participant – please complete the following (Circle Yes or No for each question) 
Have you read or had read to you the Plain Language Statement?  
 Yes/No 
Do you understand the information provided?    
 Yes/No 
Have you had an opportunity to ask questions and discuss this study?  
 Yes/No 
Have you received satisfactory answers to all your questions?   
 Yes/No 




It is important to remember that you may withdraw from the Research Study at any 
point. There will be no penalty for withdrawing before all stages of the Research 
Study have been completed.   
If you agree to take part, all information collected will be kept strictly confidential 
within the limitations of the law in Ireland. All information will have your name and 
address removed to protect confidentiality. Any information that will identify you in 
any way will also be removed. Despite this, it is important to note that if you are 
using a prosthesis which is new and only used by a small number of people, it 
might be possible to identify you. Tapes of the interview discussions will be 
destroyed when the study is finished. 
Signature: 
I have read and understood the information in this form.  My questions and 
concerns have been answered by the researchers, and I have a copy of this 
consent form.  Therefore, I consent to take part in this research project. 
 
Participant’s Signature (please type if replying by email):   
   ________________________________________________ 
Name in block capitals:      ________ 
Email address:       _________ 
Telephone number:  _____________________________________ 


































Rob M 34 Acquired Lower (b) 1984-86 
Sean M 18 Congenital Lower (b), Upper (u) N/A 
Alan M Unknown Acquired Lower (u) 2007 
Alison F 50 Acquired Lower (u) 1976-77 
Pat M 62 Acquired Lower (u) 2008 
Roy M 41 Acquired Lower (u) 1985 
Roger M 44 Acquired Lower (u) 2004 
Zane M Unknown Acquired Lower (u) Unknown 
Mark M 46 Congenital Lower (u) N/A 
Mike M 50 Acquired Upper (u) 1982-83 
Chris M 6 Acquired Upper (u) 2008 
John M 52 Unknown Upper (u) Unknown 
Luke M 30 Acquired Upper (u) Unknown 
Mel F 26-34 Acquired Lower (u) 2009 
Lorna F 51 Congenital Lower (b) N/A 
Jay M 18 Acquired Upper (u) 2006-07 
Stephen M Unknown Acquired Upper (u) Unknown 
Neil M 57 Acquired Upper (u) 2003 
Liam M Unknown Acquired Upper (u) 2010 
Natasha F 43 Congenital Lower (u) N/A 
Chuck M Unknown Acquired Upper (u) Unknown 
Carl M 49 Acquired Lower (u) 2009 
Jack M 47 Unknown Upper (u) Unknown 














One step at a time: A young 
woman’s inspiring struggle to walk 
again 




(2000) F The next leg of my journey Acquired Lower (u) 
Paul 
Martin 




Drinking from my leg: Lessons from 
a blistered optimist 




Living with a below-knee 
amputation: A unique insight from 
a prosthetist/amputee 




Still LoLo: A spinning propeller, a 
horrific accident, and a family's 
journey of hope 




Back In action: An American 
soldier's story of courage, faith and 
fortitude 




Unthinkable: The true story about 
the first double amputee to 
complete the world-famous 
Hawaiian Ironman Triathlon 




It's just a matter of balance: You 
can't put a straight leg on a 
crooked man 




Life and limb: The true story of 







(2012) M Blade runner: My story Congenital Lower (b) 
Aron 
Ralston 
(2005) M Between a rock and a hard place Acquired Upper (u) 
Emily 
Rapp 




In a single bound: Losing my leg, 
finding myself, and training for life 




On the ragged edge of drop dead 
gorgeous 































One smile, one arm: Life 
experiences with one arm 






You’re not alone: With the stories 
of 38 remarkable amputees who 
conquered the challenges of a 
lifetime 
Various Various 







Allie Frick F onearmchick.blogspot.ie Acquired Upper (u) 
Becky Alexander F onesmileonearm.wordpress.com Congenital Upper (u) 
Caitlin Pereiras F streamofcaitlinness.com Congenital Upper (u) 
Dave McGill M limblogger.wordpress.com Acquired Lower (u) 
Dwayne Fernandes M dwaynefernandes.com.au Acquired Lower (b) 
Justin ‘Glen’ Pedua M lifeofawesomeness.blogspot.ie Acquired Lower (u) 
Kate Sawford F shesgotlegs.me Acquired Lower (u) 
Kieron McCammon M onehandedblogger.wordpress.com Acquired Upper (u) 
Lindsey Erdody F lindseyerdody.wordpress.com Acquired Upper (u) 
Lisa Brewer F lisaonalimb.com Acquired Lower (u) 
Mark O’Leary M amputee-adventures.org Acquired Lower (u) 
Paul Martin M onemansleg.com Acquired Lower (u) 
Peggy Chenoweth F amputeemommy.blogspot.ie Acquired Lower (u) 
Ross Turnbull M terminaldevice.wordpress.com Congenital Upper (u) 
Suzanne - F bionicmom.blogspot.ie Acquired Lower (b) 
‘Trac’ F 40yroldsrcitizen.blogspot.ie Acquired Lower (u) 
Ty Wilson M activeamp.blogspot.ie Acquired Lower (u) 
Name of site Address 
The amputee discussion & support forum Amputees.proboards.com 
Heather Mills forum Heathermills.eu/forum 
The amputee treatment center forum Amputee-center.com/forum2 
Amputee Coalition of America (Facebook group) Facebook.com/amputeeusa 
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Appendix D – Interview Guide 
 
Brief explanation of the project aims (to investigate experiences of patients and their 
prosthetic devices). 
Ice-breaker (question of minor importance for research but designed to encourage 
discussion): 
Can you tell me a little about yourself, what your job is and how you came to be doing 
what you’re doing? 
1. How long have you had your prosthetic limb(s)? 
2. What are you happiest about with your prosthesis? 
a. What isn’t so good? 
b. What might you change? 
c. Would you ever consider trading the device in for something better? 
i. Why/Why not? 
3. If you were to design yourself a new prosthetic limb, what would be the most 
important factors for you? 
a. What would be the least important? 
4. How does having the artificial limb make you feel? (prompt: How natural does it 
feel?) 
5. How do others treat you with regard to the prosthesis? (prompt: Do they try to 
ignore it, or are they actively interested?) 
a. What do others think about your prosthesis? 
i. How does this make you feel? 
6. How do you feel about the functionality of the device? (prompt: Does it do what you 
want it to do?) 
7. How do you feel about the look of the device? (prompt: Does it feel/look right to 
you?) 
8. Is there anything that you feel is no longer open to you, since gaining the prosthesis? 
a. What are they and does this affect you?  
9. Are you interested in the design or the workings of your prosthesis? 




Appendix E – Open Coding Samples 
Below are two examples of the open coding conducted during analyses. The first is 
an excerpt from an interview transcript which was hand-coded. The second is an 
excerpt from NVivo v10 where coding was typed. Because of such organisational 
features as being able to quickly view all incidents under a code, NVivo became 








Appendix F – Theoretical Memo Examples 
 
Sample Memo 1: 
Making comparisons 
There are two forms of social comparisons individuals using prostheses engage in. 
One form of comparison is the comparison to others that use prostheses in order to 
develop knowledge. This is to expanding one's knowledge of prostheses to be able 
to determine whether a current prosthesis is good or whether another might be 
better. 
For example, 006 describes how he has to wear three stump socks. He does so for 
comfort and he says this eventually leads to sweating and eventual discomfort. 
However, he accompanied this by describing how he knows of a woman who only 
wears one stump sock, but he realises that this person only has to wear one 
because she is that much lighter and so she does not experience discomfort so 
easily from the weight of her body pressing down into the socket of her prosthesis. 
This comparison enables him to realise that although the number of stump socks 
are a pain from being uncomfortable, for a man of his stature they are necessary, 
and by comparison to a lighter woman, he can see how he proportionately needs to 
wear more. This gives a sense that three stump socks is reasonable, given his 
circumstances, even if it’s not ideal because of the discomfort. 
The second form of comparison is to others that is not limited to users of 
prostheses. The individual compares for reasons of self-esteem, engaging in kinds 
of upwards or downwards social comparisons. So some individuals use these 
comparisons as a way of saying they are lucky - at least they aren't as bad as this 
person with spinal injuries, or this person with more amputations than themselves. 
Others compare with ‘high flyers’ in the world of prostheses, like Oscar Pistorius or 
Heather Mills, which then link to discussions of positive possibilities. However, one 
individual remarked that this can be detrimental for him if he sees prosthesis-using 
athletes on TV because he didn’t believe it would be possible for him to get to that 
same level. He tries to keep away from situations where he could encounter this. 
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So these patterns of comparing contain a number of property patterns of types of 
comparing – for evaluation and for self-esteem – and which may be useful to 
investigate individually. There are linkages here to memos on learning and 
developing knowledge with prostheses. 
 
Extra note: Comparing to similar others appears to be extended by examples where 
the comparison is to what they see as a 'normal' prosthesis user. Persons compare 
themselves to this generalised individual in order to check how they are faring by 
comparison. For 020, he describes the importance of being told by his prosthetic 
team that he had picked up mastery quicker than most, and how this helped him 





Sample Memo 2: 
Avoiding losing enablement 
Persons within this study are often implicated in avoiding particular things that 
could cause their enablement to suffer. A common example of this is activities 
where a prosthesis can be broken or rendered inoperable. One instance of this is 
Rob, who played football and broke one of his legs in doing so. After getting the leg 
repaired, which was costly in terms of his time and energies in not being able to do 
things and then attending consultations and going through the fixing and re-fitting 
procedures, he would avoid things like football because he didn’t want to lose his 
legs and get stuck inside where he would get ‘cabin fever’. 
This has been discussed in previous memos but there are several incidents coming 
to light which appear to go against this. Roy is a 41-year old lower-limb prosthesis 
user who has had a number of different prosthetic limbs over the years since his 
limb loss. He uses an artificial limb to aid him in ambulation, but has periodically 
had limbs break during use. He recounted one particular instance: 
R: It was a nightmare. I was getting off the bus, I forget where I was, and 
the foot just went snap. And I looked at it… 
P: Had you been doing anything? 
R: I wasn’t doing anything. No, I was coming off the pavement, just you 
know how you normally step off the pavement and it snapped down. The 
only thing is I had a pair of boots on – thick boots on, and I had my laces 
done up and the foot didn’t come off, but it was hanging. It’s like someone 
getting an amputation – having their leg cut off. … They said Roy you were 
lucky you didn’t walk any further - because I was in the middle of the road 
– coming off the middle of the road when this thing happened. And I’m 
thinking oh Jaysus… 
So naturally Roy went to get this sorted out and to try to stop it happening again. 
He did not avoid ‘stepping off pavement’. He ‘wasn’t doing anything’ and was just 
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doing what a person ‘normally’ does, so this potentially accounts for why he kept at 
it, rather than being like Rob and avoiding such situations. 
Or Mark gives an example of his prosthesis breaking up hills and yet he does not 
stop doing this. He is aware that it may well continue to happen if he keeps going 
hill-walking but he insists on doing so because he feels he should be able to hike up 
hills and not be stopped just because of a prosthesis breaking. 
This disparity appears to be accounted for by what an individual feels they should 
be able to do. Those that avoid particular things see themselves as having no choice 
or that it does not matter so much if they avoid these particular things that are 
hazardous to their enablement, and that it is better for them if they do, but Roy 
and Mark are intent on keeping doing what they feel is normal and right to do, and 
things would be worse if they did not. In this way they are also avoiding losing their 
enablement but in different ways.  
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Sample memo 3: 
Comparing just normally 
Elaborating previous memos on comparing, persons engage in social comparisons 
for the purposes of keeping just normal. When difficulties occur or persist, they 
compare to those worse-off because this reminds them about how things could be, 
and therefore that their own hardships are more acceptable (are acceptable) to 
bear. This makes their situation more manageable and they are able to keep 
persevering this way. 
Comparisons are also made to others that are like the individual in order to 
normalise their situation. Individuals refer to others ‘like me’ when describing 
issues they face, noting that they are not alone and that their particular troubles 
are being experienced by others too. There are numerous examples of this 
occurring between individuals with limb absence, but it also broadens out to others 
who experience disability as well as examples of persons pointing out that ‘we all 
have difficulties’. Doing so puts into relief how difficulties may be commonplace 
and so that they are therefore relatively ‘normal’ difficulties, or difficulties of a just 
normal nature, and thus something to keep going with.  
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Appendix G – Selective Coding Sample 
Excerpts of selective coding within autobiographical and interview data. This 
selective coding – the coding for further variation within the core category of the 
theory – was performed within Microsoft Word, though other coding was generally 
done through NVivo. 
 
